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Abstract
This thesis investigate how the presence of communicative signals such as direct
gaze and infant-directed speech might help infants and young children to under-
stand, anticipate, and segment actions. For this, the thesis draws upon a range of
methodologies, such as electroencephalography (Chapter 2), eye tracking, pupil
dilation (both Chapter 3), and behavioural research (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2 and 3 both investigate whether the presence of communicative
signals, such as infant directed speech and direct gaze, increase infants’ under-
standing of actions as meaningful. The ERP experiments on 9-month-old infants
reported in Chapter 2 found limited evidence that the presence of communica-
tive signals enhances the N400 response, a correlate of semantic understanding.
Furthermore, there is limited evidence of a complex response taking into account
the presence of communication and action congruency in the Pb component in
the second experiment, in which referential signals were added and the structure
of the presentation was changed. Meanwhile, Chapter 3 found no evidence that
communicative signals enhance anticipatory looking in 7-month-old children.
Chapter 2 and 3 also investigate the possibility that communication enhances
arousal. However, neither the Nc component reported in Chapter 2, nor the
Pupillary Light Reflex investigated in Chapter 3 provided evidence in support of
this hypothesis.
8Instead, communicative signals may play a different role in supporting action
understanding. Chapter 4 investigates whether addressing infants within (rather
than after) a two-step action can increase their imitation of the action manner.
The study shows that communicative signals can contribute to the segmentation
of low salience actions, but children imitate salient actions irrespective of the
position of the address.
These results are discussed in terms of Natural Pedagogy Theory and domain
general, statistical learning accounts, such as curiosity learning.
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Communicating the meaning of
actions in infancy
Culture and its transmission are considered to be what makes humans unique
(Dennett, 1996; Tomasello, 2009, 2016). Unlike many other species, humans can
transmit cumulative cultural information for many generations, allowing them to
develop a rich set of behaviours that are not genetically predetermined (Csibra
& Gergely, 2009, 2011; Hill, Barton, & Hurtado, 2009; Laland & Brown, 2011;
Mesoudi, 2013; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). This flexible social learning system re-
lies largely on human language and communication (Richerson & Boyd, 2005),
which in turn is subject to cultural learning (e.g. Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008).
The repertoire of human cultures consist of a set of behaviours, actions and
communication systems that are passed on from one generation to the next. At
its foundation are the basic action units and structures that allow for the interac-
tion with the environment and other agents specifically. Social learning mecha-
nisms form the basis of how actions are transmitted from one generation to the
next. However, social learning already requires the learner to make considerable
inferences about the action units, objects and movements involved, and some
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actions cannot be understood without knowing the actor’s intentions and beliefs.
This poses a problem for infants, who do not yet have the full socio-cognitive un-
derstanding of higher order mental representations that are necessary to com-
pute such information.
In order to explain the efficient transmission of culturally relevant informa-
tion to the next generation, it has been argued that infants are already prepared
to learn from their caregivers by relying on socio-communicative signals that
inform them that a specific piece of information is relevant to them (Csibra &
Shamsudheen, 2015). In infants, this expectation may be triggered by a subset
of social signals, such as direct gaze, infant-directed speech, and contingency
(Csibra, 2010). Because these signals allow infants to identify learning contexts,
they have been called pedagogical signals (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 2011).
To date, a large body of research has looked at how such communicative sig-
nals contribute to learning. For example, studies have found that the presence
of communicative signals increases gaze following, and thereby ensures that in-
fants’ attention is focussed on the same objects and events as their caregivers
(e.g. Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & Johnson, 2004; Hoehl, Reid, Mooney, & Stri-
ano, 2008; Moll & Tomasello, 2004; Senju & Csibra, 2008; Symons, Hains, Dawson,
& Muir, 1996; Wahl, Michel, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2013). Communicative signals have
also been shown to facilitate learning in general (e.g. Hoehl, Michel, Reid, Parise,
& Striano, 2014; Michel et al., 2015; Michel, Wronski, Pauen, Daum, & Hoehl,
2017). They also help infants to associate words to meaning (e.g. B. Ferguson &
Waxman, 2016; Medina, Snedeker, Trueswell, & Gleitman, 2011; Parise, Handl,
Palumbo, & Friederici, 2011) and facilitate children’s imitation of actions (e.g.
Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007; L. P. Butler & Markman, 2012, 2013;
Király, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013; Hoehl, Zettersten, Schleihauf, Grätz, & Pauen,
32014; Kupán et al., 2017; Nielsen, 2006). However, less is known about whether
and how communicative signals influence infants’ understanding of actions, par-
ticularly in early infancy. This PhD thesis will contribute to the question of how
communication influences infants’ interpretation of everyday actions by looking
at whether, and through which mechanisms, communicative signals may affect
infants’ understanding of actions.
This chapter will provide the introduction to this thesis by laying the theo-
retical foundations for this research. It will review the literature on infants’ un-
derstanding of actions by discussing action understanding in general, and action
understanding through action segmentation and understanding actions as tele-
ological. Going back to social learning in communicative contexts, it will further
discuss how a subset communicative signals act as an early signal of commu-
nicative relevance in infancy, as suggested by Natural Pedagogy theory (Csibra &
Gergely, 2009, 2011). There are numerous studies that suggest the influence of
communicative signals on children’s processing of objects and actions. However,
alternative accounts argue in favour of an emergent understanding of the com-
municative function of these signals and/or suggest that any enhanced learning
in the presence of these signals is due to an increased arousal. The final section
of this chapter will review different methodologies used to study action and so-
cial learning in infancy, and look at the development of imitation, anticipatory
looking and the neural signatures of action understanding and communication
in particular.
The experimental component of this thesis consists of four experiments util-
ising event-related potentials (ERP), anticipatory looking, pupil dilation and be-
havioural data. The first two experiments in Chapter 2 investigate infants’ se-
mantic understanding of everyday actions by measuring ERPs in 9-month-olds.
4 Chapter 1. Communicating the meaning of actions in infancy
Furthermore, it investigates whether communication directly influences infants’
semantic interpretation of actions, or whether communication modulates ac-
tion understanding through attention or arousal. Chapter 3 reports an exper-
iment on whether communication helps 7-month-old infants to anticipate the
outcomes of familiar, unfamiliar and novel actions using eye-tracking. The fi-
nal study in Chapter 4 investigates whether communicative signals, such as di-
rect gaze and infant-directed speech, support children’s interpretation of actions
by helping them to segment actions at event boundaries. In the general discus-
sion in Chapter 5, I argue that the findings of the first two experimental chapters
provide limited evidence in support of the notion that communicative signals
facilitate the learning of actions. However, neither the results presented in Chap-
ter 2 nor Chapter 3 suggest that the effect of communicative signals lead to in-
creased arousal, preempting some alternative explanations to Natural Pedagogy
Theory. Therefore, Chapter 5 further discusses alternative accounts of action un-
derstanding that rely on an emergent understanding of the function of commu-
nicative signals, without relying on arousal as a mechanism for learning.
1.1 Action understanding in infancy
It has been argued that humans understand others’ actions semantically within a
wider context, similar to how words are understood within a sentence (Amoruso
et al., 2013; Reid et al., 2009). There is a strong link that connects actions, lan-
guage and communication, and the foundations for all three processes emerge
during infancy. It has been suggested that infants’ emerging understanding of
actions is the source of pre-linguistic meaning (Arbib, 2005; Kaduk et al., 2016;
Pulvermüller, 2012). Although children tend to learn most verbs later than
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nouns (McDonough, Song, Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, & Lannon, 2011, but see Imai,
Haryu, & Okada, 2005, and Waxman et al., 2013 for a discussion), an understand-
ing of actions is predictive of children’s later language acquisition. For exam-
ple, infants’ understanding of everyday actions is predictive of their later word
learning (Kaduk et al., 2016) and 30-month-olds show improved verb learning
for actions that they had a chance to imitate first (Gampe, Brauer, & Daum, 2016).
Furthermore, verbs that are common or describe imaginable actions are learned
early (Braginsky, Yurovsky, Marchman, & Frank, 2019; McDonough et al., 2011).
Further research shows how actions contribute to learning features about the en-
vironment that are necessary for language acquisition. Actions can help to estab-
lish links between objects and their uses (B. Ferguson, Graf, & Waxman, 2014).
For example, by the age of 11 months, children categorise objects by their func-
tion (Träuble & Pauen, 2007). The relationship between word learning and ac-
tion understanding is bi-directional and action words also help children predict
actions (Gampe & Daum, 2014). Therefore, action understanding is closely inter-
twined with children’s linguistic and communicative abilities.
Infants show a semantic understanding of the actions of others, taking into
account the goals and intentions of an agent (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Reid et
al., 2009). There is evidence that infants already have a basic understanding of
others’ actions. Infants’ understanding of action semantics can be measured
through anticipatory looking in eye-tracking and the N400 ERP component in
semantic priming paradigms. Anticipatory looking shows that the child can pre-
dict the outcome of an action movement even before its conclusion and in order
to do so needs to have a representation of the goal of the action. The N400 is a
well-researched ERP component known from the adult language literature and
commonly found in semantic priming paradigms with words, gestures and ac-
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tions (Amoruso et al., 2013; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Other measures include
behavioural measures, particularly paradigms using rational imitation and chil-
dren’s persistence to carry out inefficient action means (e.g. L. P. Butler & Mark-
man, 2012, 2013; Király et al., 2013; Schleihauf, Graetz, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017).
Understanding an action involves the ability to contextualise and predict an
ongoing action within its preceding and following actions and its perceptual con-
text. Visual and auditory features, such as the salience of an outcome or move-
ment, impact action understanding and determine whether infants are able to
learn action meanings. More salient outcomes are more readily anticipated or
imitated than less salient ones (e.g. Adam et al., 2016; Elsner, 2007; Elsner &
Pfeifer, 2012; Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, & Gredebäck, 2012; Moher, Anderson, &
Song, 2015). The salience of an action’s manner also determines children’s imita-
tion and 12 and 18-month-old infants are more likely to imitate a salient hopping
action, compared to a less salient sliding action (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello,
2005). Once recognised, actions can be learned by association, for example by
visual similarity or by associating certain movements with their outcomes. These
studies suggest that infants are selective in their imitation of actions and that the
saliency of outcome and manner plays an important part in determining whether
children anticipate or imitate an action.
It is probably no coincidence that many studies find that children are able
to predict and anticipate the outcome of eating actions (Hunnius & Bekkering,
2010; Reid et al., 2009; Reid, Csibra, Belsky, & Johnson, 2007). Hunnius and
Bekkering (2010) provide evidence that 6-, 8-, 12-, 14-, and 16-month-old infants
and adults anticipate goal-directed actions using a range of objects—a phone (to
the ear), a brush (to the hair) and a cup (to the mouth). Whilst some participants
were presented with the congruent outcomes, e.g. a cup going to the mouth,
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others saw an incongruent outcome, e.g. the cup going to the ear. Anticipation
during the first trial of the action was low and did not reliably distinguish be-
tween congruent and incongruent outcomes, but infants were able to anticipate
the congruent, meaningful actions (e.g. a cup going to the mouth) after nine
exposures. Unlike adults, they were not able to anticipate incongruent action
outcomes (e.g. the cup going to the ear) after repeated presentations.
These results are corroborated by neuropsychological evidence by Reid et al.
(2009) who investigated whether 7- and 9-month-old infants and adults predict
action outcomes. Based on an ERP paradigm, they presented participants with
short action sequences consisting of a series of three pictures. The first two pic-
tures primed a feeding action, the third picture concluded the primed action and
either supported the anticipated outcome by showing the food in the mouth,
or showing an unanticipated outcome, e.g. the food being moved to the fore-
head. The data revealed that 9-month-old infants and adults show an increased
N400 for the unanticipated outcome, which suggests that, 9- but not 7-month-
old infants show an adult-like response and experience semantic incongruence
for unanticipated action outcomes.
Infants’ ability to predict such eating actions is also culture-dependent.
Whereas 8-month-old Chinese infants are able to anticipate that chopsticks (but
not spoons) go to the mouth, Swedish infants of the same age have the opposite
prediction (Green, Li, Lockman, & Gredebäck, 2016). However, these predictions
are exclusive to eating actions and do not extend to picking up food from a bowl,
where neither group of infants anticipated chopsticks or spoons to pick up food
items, indicating that infants’ understanding of actions is still limited.
In summary, within their first twelve months of age, infants show evidence
of understanding a range of actions that they are likely to have learned from ex-
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perience. Nevertheless, beyond these basic features other aspects of action un-
derstanding also play important roles in infants’ action understanding, namely
(1) the segmentation of action events into appropriate units, (2) understanding
these action units as intentional and goal-directed, ie. teleological and (3) being
able to understand actions presented in communicative contexts as pedagogical
demonstrations that are targeted towards the infant. These topics will be dis-
cussed in the next sections.
Action segmentation through event segmentation
Before actions can be learned and understood they need to be segmented from
the ongoing stream of information that the infant perceives. Events are seg-
ments of continuous input that are processed by the perceiver as a single unit.
Event Segmentation Theory argues that the goals and intentions used to interpret
events are hierarchically organised and that the way that an ongoing stream of
actions is organised influences how it is interpreted. The problem of segmenting
actions and other events within an ongoing stream of information is comparable
to the problem segmenting speech sounds in an ongoing speech stream and we
can draw upon domain-general theories of chunking to make predictions about
the processing of actions within the wider events they are embedded within.
There are two independent theoretical approaches to the segmentation of ac-
tions, Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds,
2007; Zacks & Swallow, 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001) and Cognitive Chunking
(Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Isbilen & Christiansen, 2018). Event Segmentation
Theory looks at how movement cues and higher-order knowledge contribute to
the segmentation of an ongoing stream of an action or a general event and in-
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fluence how it is interpreted and remembered. Like Event Segmentation Theory,
the Cognitive Chunking account (Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Isbilen & Chris-
tiansen, 2018) argues for a hierarchical processing of the input. Importantly,
Cognitive Chunking also suggests that any input is processed immediately and
is discarded if it cannot be interpreted. Consequentially, the on-line processing
capacity of the cognitive system is a bottleneck that determines how much in-
formation can be processed at any point in time. More information can only be
processed by forming higher order abstractions that abstract away from the rich-
ness of the signal that can be used to make further predictions about the data.
Consequentially, Cognitive Chunking predicts that a learner’s limited cognitive
capacity acts as a source of abstraction and restructuring of information.
An unfolding action sequence provides a considerable amount of informa-
tion that a learner can use to segment it into its appropriate units. For example
differences in velocity and movement kinematics are reliably used to segment ac-
tions (Zacks, 2004; Zacks, Kumar, Abrams, & Mehta, 2009) and from 15-months
onwards, children are able to use the velocity of a goal-directed action to predict
its target (Stapel, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2015). This low-level information is an
important source of breaking up actions into smaller units and adults are able to
use both featural (e.g. using a fist to turn on a lamp) and configural (e.g. using
an arcing path to run on the lamp) information to identify deviations of familiar
actions (Loucks & Baldwin, 2009).
How faithful an action goal or its manner is imitated also depends on the
salience of its units and a repeated finding in the literature is that salient out-
comes are more likely to be linked to the action and are therefore more likely to
be imitated (cf. Elsner, 2007; Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004). Already 6–8-
month-old infants are more likely to detect changes at event units, but are less
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likely to notice changes between them (Hespos, Saylor, & Grossman, 2009). Fur-
thermore, infants are able to detect event boundaries at inflexion points where
one action turns into another. Nine-to-eleven-month-old infants prefer look-
ing at a continuous stream of actions if a sound matches the inflexion points
between different action units (Saylor, Baldwin, Baird, & LaBounty, 2007). Simi-
larly, ten- to eleven-month-olds became disinterested in actions that are paused
at event boundaries but show renewed interest if these events sequences are
paused mid-stream, suggesting that they perceive these as different to the event
sequences they have been familiarised with.
Event boundaries also form an important source of information for learning
about actions and their effects. Therefore it is not surprising that infants show
better retention of objects presented at event boundaries (Sonne, Kingo, & Krøj-
gaard, 2017), but the occlusion of event boundaries has a detrimental effect on
the memory of the action sequence in 16- and 20-month-olds, with the latter age
group being particularly negatively affected (Sonne, Kingo, & Krøjgaard, 2016).
By the end of their second year, toddlers use event segmentation cues to map
novel verbs to different event units (Friend & Pace, 2011).
Both, Event Segmentation Theory and Cognitive Chunking, predict a bidi-
rectional relationship between the way that an ongoing stream of information is
segmented (bottom-up) and prior knowledge about the event (top-down) that
is used to interpret an incoming stream of information. Infants as young as 7–9
months are able to use the statistical probability of events following each other
to identify segment boundaries (Stahl, Romberg, Roseberry, Golinkoff, & Hirsh-
Pasek, 2014). If they are familiarised with an abstract agent engaging in a contin-
uous sequence of several actions, they will look longer during a subsequent test
session if the test sequences depict a previously unseen order.
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Loucks and Meltzoff (2013) found that three-year-old children do not only in-
terpret action units sequentially, but that they reproduce the hierarchical struc-
ture based on the overall goal of an action sequence. When imitating a series of
actions, such as putting a doll to bed or a doll driving a car into a garage, children
will not mix up different parts of the action sequence with units of a different
one, even if the original presentation did so. These results show that by the age
of three years, children reliably use higher order action representations and that
these representations in turn influence how actions are imitated.
Finally, there is evidence that caregivers actively adapt child-directed action
presentations in ways that potentially aid action segmentation. Previous re-
search has shown that parents overemphasise the movements of an action us-
ing so-called ‘motionese’ (Brand, Baldwin, & Ashburn, 2002; Brand & Shallcross,
2008; Koterba & Iverson, 2009; Rutherford & Przednowek, 2012; Williamson &
Brand, 2014). Furthermore, they are more likely to use communicative signals be-
tween different action units (Brand, Shallcross, Sabatos, & Massie, 2007; Brand,
Hollenbeck, & Kominsky, 2013) to highlight action units and goals. A previously
untested question is whether children use this information to segment events
into appropriately-sized chunks and consequentially influence how children un-
derstand an action within its wider context. Chapter 4 addresses the question
to what extent communicative signals might help to segment events and thereby
change the way that they are imitated.
Teleology
Infants understand actions teleologically, i.e. they interpret actions in terms of
goals, intentions, outcomes and situational constraints (Csibra, 2003; Csibra,
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Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Given knowledge about
any two of these, an observer can reconstruct the third. This allows an observer
to predict the progression of actions, but also to look for causes, consequences
and intentions of actions that are not immediately apparent to them (L. P. But-
ler & Markman, 2014; Csibra et al., 2003; Király et al., 2013), whilst also ignoring
accidental actions (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998). Evidence that infants
understand actions teleologically comes from a wide range of studies that have
used abstract objects and movements to investigate infants’ understanding of
goals (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Eshuis, Coventry, & Vulchanova, 2009; Woodward,
1998), others have used familiar actions to investigate whether infants are able to
anticipate these outcome (e.g. Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Reid et al., 2009).
The strongest evidence for infants’ teleological understanding of actions
comes from studies that demonstrate that they show a basic understanding
of rationality (Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; Gredebäck &
Melinder, 2011). For example, by the age of 9 months, infants expect that an
abstract object takes the direct path when moving to a goal location (Csibra et
al., 1999). Infants also interpret the behaviour of others according to the same
principle and by the age of four months, watch an irrational feeding action, such
as putting food into someone else’s hand, rather than bringing it straight to the
other person’s mouth. When an actor feeds another actor, infants show greater
pupil dilations (indicating arousal and/or expectancy violations) to the actor
putting food into the others’ hand, instead of feeding them directly. However,
the pupil dilation is at baseline when an obstacle prevents the expected feeding
action (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). This response is not just due to the novelty
of the action. Instead, infants are able to judge the rationality of the action, and
do not show increased pupil dilations for scenes where an obstacle prevented the
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expected trajectory and provides a rational explanation for the different trajec-
tory. However, only 12-month-olds actually anticipate feeding action and look
to the recipients’ mouth before the conclusion of the feeding action, suggesting
that they are able to anticipate the goal of the action (Gredebäck & Melinder,
2010).
More evidence comes from studies on rational imitation that provide ev-
idence for the importance of situational constraints in action understanding.
From 14 months onwards, infants are able to disregard accidental actions
marked vocally by ‘Whoops!’ compared to those marked as intentional by
‘There!’ (Carpenter et al., 1998). Gergely, Bekkering, and Kiraly (2002) found
that toddlers are more likely to imitate an adult model using their head to turn
on a lamp when the model had their hands free. If the model’s hands were
occupied, children were more likely to copy the goal of the action only by using
their hands. Imitation of the head touch goes down, however, when the model’s
hands are occupied because they are holding a blanket. In this condition, the
model’s behaviour can be explained by the actor not having their hands free
to turn on the light. However, Beisert et al. (2012) found that toddlers are also
more likely to copy the irrational action (using the head instead of the hands to
turn on a lamp) when the actor is covered by the blanket but can still use their
hands, as evidenced by putting up two smileys next to them. Even though the
actor has demonstrated that they are free to use their hands, infants still copy
the head-touch, suggesting that they may not base their decision on whether
or not to imitate the model on an understanding of the model’s constraints.
Instead, it is possible that many studies appear to find positive results for infants’
mentalising capacities that are actually driven by perceptual distractors (see also
Heyes, 2014a, 2014b).
14 Chapter 1. Communicating the meaning of actions in infancy
Communication as a source of meaning
Human social learning relies on communication to share thoughts, ideas, inten-
tions and motivations behind the action. Some social learning theories, such
as Natural Pedagogy (See next section), have also argued that infants’ early un-
derstanding of communication allows them to learn, predict and imitate socially
relevant actions. Therefore, before discussing Natural Pedagogy, it is important
to discuss its theoretical foundations in theories of human communication and
cognition, in particular Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wilson &
Sperber, 2012).
Pragmatic theories of dialogue (Grice, 1957, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1995;
Wilson & Sperber, 2012) and language evolution (Scott-Phillips, 2015) have ar-
gued that human communication is different to other animal communication
systems, as it uses two channels to exchange information. These theories are
grounded in Grice’s (Grice, 1957, 1975) distinction between non-natural (com-
municative) and natural meaning. Natural meaning describes meaning derived
from relationships in the environment, for example between a certain type of
clouds and the likelihood of rain or a certain type of spots indicating measles.
Because of this, natural meaning describes a direct relationship between the sign
and the signified. For communicative meaning, the decoding of the meaning of
an utterance, gesture or an action starts with the recognition of the speaker’s (or
in the case of actions, demonstrator’s) intention to communicate, and the actual
content (informative intention) is reconstructed by inference. This intention to
communicate has also been called ostensive intention, whereas the intention de-
scribing the content is the informative intention (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wilson
& Sperber, 2012).
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Sperber and Wilson (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2012) argue
that speakers and listeners use the principle of relevance to create and interpret
a message. According to the relevance principle, successful communication re-
quires that a message is constructed in such a way that it is simple and famil-
iar enough to be understood, but also contains sufficient novel information, so
that it is interesting to the listener. The interpretation of a message therefore de-
pends heavily on the cognitive system, and interpretations that require the least
cognitive effort to extract a meaningful interpretation of the content should be
preferred.
An important implication of this inferential model of communication is that,
within a communicative context, the same message can have different meanings.
For example, the meaning of the sentence “Isn’t the weather nice today?” is deter-
mined by its context, and may be understood either as sincere on a hot summer
day or–in the case of the typical British weather–as ironic. In order to understand
the different informative intentions, the listener needs to know about the state
of the referent of the communicative intent, e.g. whether the weather is actually
nice, or whether the speaker has a propensity towards irony.
While it is unlikely that infants are able to understand inferences such as
irony, there is evidence that in the presence of communicative signals, children
take into account prior knowledge to interpret actions. For example, when pre-
sented with a stuffed animal hopping or sliding into a house, 18-month-old chil-
dren have a strong tendency to imitate the outcome of an action (e.g. putting
a mouse into a house), but not the action’s manner (e.g. whether the mouse
hopped or slid Carpenter et al., 2005). However, children increase their imitation
of manner if they have previously been told about the outcome, and the manner
is a novel aspect of the demonstration (Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2009).
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This behaviour suggests that toddlers may take into account prior information
to infer whether and which parts of an action demonstration are relevant.
However, for much younger infants, already recognising the communicative
intention poses a problem as it requires an understanding of higher order mental
representations (Gergely, Egyed, & Király, 2007). In order to address this prob-
lem, different mechanisms have been proposed to explain whether and how hu-
man infants learn in social contexts: Natural Pedagogy Theory (Csibra & Gergely,
2009, 2011) argues that humans have evolved a specialised learning mechanism
that allows them to recognise when a caregiver directs relevant information to-
wards them, so that infants can learn cultural knowledge quickly and efficiently.
However, there are a number of accounts that posit that no such mechanism is
necessary to account for cultural learning, and that children’s understanding of
communicative signals is acquired through domain-general processes of learn-
ing (e.g. Corkum & Moore, 1998; Gredebäck, Astor, & Fawcett, 2018; Heyes, 2016a;
Yu & Smith, 2013).
1.2 Natural Pedagogy
In order to solve the problem of the complexity of processing ostensive-
inferentially presented information, Natural Pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009,
2011) argues that in the presence of communicative signals, such as direct gaze,
infant-directed speech and response contingent behaviour, infants actively
search for potentially relevant information in the environment. Because these
signals indicate the presence of a communicative intention to the child, they
have also been called ostensive signals. By marking communicatively presented
information as relevant to the learner and reduce the cognitive effort required
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in determining when relevant information is presented to them, before infants
master the more complex aspects of human communication.
According to Natural Pedagogy, sensitivity to ostensive signals is necessary
because many human cultural activities are complex and opaque, and their
open-endedness makes it difficult for infants to determine when they observe
culturally relevant information (cf. Csibra & Gergely, 2011). The process of
recognising communicative intentions is difficult and computationally complex,
because “teaching in humans exhibits at least two properties (open-endedness
and content opacity) that make the recognition of teaching episodes without os-
tension untenable” (Tatone & Csibra, 2015, p. 49). Therefore, Natural Pedagogy
(Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011) proposes that infants are sensitive to a sub-
set of communicative signals from birth onwards. Csibra (2010) identifies three
of them: direct gaze, infant-directed speech, and contingent responses. If infants
encounter one of these signals, a referential expectation is triggered that facili-
tates the attention and encoding of relevant information and provides the foun-
dation for faster and more generalised learning (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015).
In the presence of such signals, infants actively seek out the meaning of com-
municatively presented information, and expect novel, generalisable and type-
relevant information (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). Importantly, Natural Peda-
gogy suggests that such ostensively-communicated information is more general-
isable because infants perceive pedagogically demonstrated actions to be repre-
sentative of other actions of the same type (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015; Gergely
et al., 2007). By triggering a referential expectation and marking the relevance of
an action, ostensive signals allow infants to identify culturally relevant actions
from potentially confusing background noise, thereby making the acquisition of
opaque, but culturally relevant information faster and easier.
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Communicative signals: development
Communicative signals is a general term for different classes of social signals that
indicate the presence of communication or its disambiguation. Within the class
of communicative signals, we can distinguish ostensive signals, i.e. signals that
make the intention to communicate manifest, from referential signals that link
the signal to its referent. Ostensive signals make the intention to communicate
manifest and are the basis for inferential communication, since they make the
speaker’s intention to communicate manifest to the listener.
The most obvious ostensive signal is someone’s own name. Addressing some-
one by their name makes it obvious that they are the intended target of the
mesage. Infants from 5 months onwards prefer to listen to their own name over
a foil with the same stress pattern (Mandel, Jusczyk, & Pisoni, 1995). Further
evidence from six-month-olds suggests that by this age infants listen longer to
an auditory stimulus and show increased hemodynamic activity in the fronto-
central areas after hearing their own name (Imafuku, Hakuno, Uchida-Ota, Ya-
mamoto, & Minagawa, 2014). Furthermore, electroencephalography has shown
that they distinguish their own name from other names 100–380 ms after the
word onset, and crucially also show differentiated object processing (Parise,
Friederici, & Striano, 2010). After hearing their own name, infants showed a de-
layed but more sustained Nc component, suggesting a difference in attentional
processing (Parise et al., 2010). Eye contact and hearing their own name also re-
vealed activation in adjacent, but non-overlapping regions in the left frontal cor-
tex, suggesting that the infant brain processes these ostensive signals in similar
ways (Grossmann, Parise, & Friederici, 2010).
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Natural Pedagogy draws considerable support from the observation that
sensitivity to some communicative signals, such as direct gaze, infant-directed
Speech and contingent responsivity, appears to be present at birth (Csibra, 2010).
Direct Gaze: There is considerable evidence that infants use others’ gaze to
learn about the world. Newborns already prefer to look at faces with direct gaze
over averted gaze (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002). Their preference
for faces is driven by the contrast polarity of the human eye (Farroni et al., 2005),
suggesting that since birth the eyes (and direct eye contact in particular) are a
centre of attention and a source of information (Reid, Striano, Kaufman, & John-
son, 2004). Infants’ representation of eyes becomes more specific later in life,
and from 3 months onwards they show a preference of human eyes over primate
eyes, a distinction they do not yet make shortly after birth (Dupierrix et al., 2014).
Infants start to follow others’ eye movements by four months (Farroni, John-
son, Brockbank, & Simion, 2000). However, it is currently debated whether in-
fants’ preference for human eyes translates into increased gaze following, as in-
fants show considerable variation in their use of ostensive signals. This might
either indicate that the sensitivity to ostensive signals is innate, but infants mod-
ulate their sensitivity towards ostensive signals from very early on, or that the use
of ostensive signals is learned. Infants initial interest in faces gradually declines
(Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991) and from four months onwards, in-
fants rely less on simple gaze cues when interacting with caregivers they know
well, but gaze remains an important cue for their interactions with strangers
(Gredebäck, Fikke, & Melinder, 2010). Sighted children of blind parents also show
a reduced face scanning and gaze following, compared to children of sighted par-
ents and this difference increases with age (Senju, Tucker, et al., 2013; Senju et
al., 2015; Vernetti et al., 2018). Vernetti et al. (2018) found that 6–10-month-old
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infants born and raised by blind parents did not show differences in face pro-
cessing, compared to children growing up with sighted parents. Senju and col-
leagues (Senju, Tucker, et al., 2013; Senju et al., 2015) highlight that the current
evidence does not allow us to conclude that gaze-following is fully learned, as it
is possible that children who grow up with blind parents may be desensitized to
gaze being a reliable signal. In fact, 8-month-olds showed reduced gaze follow-
ing for a model that did not reliably cue the appearance of an object on a screen
(Tummeltshammer, Wu, Sobel, & Kirkham, 2014).
Like gaze following, the evidence that ostensive signals directly modulate
learning of the referentially presented information is debated. The earliest evi-
dence that direct gaze influences infants’ memory encoding is from four-month-
old infants (Reid & Dunn, 2015), and objects previously cued by direct gaze show
a diminished slow wave in a later retest (Reid et al., 2004). Whereas some au-
thors report that infants look longer at objects cued by an actor that engaged in
direct gaze (Michel, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017; Reid & Striano, 2005), others report
reduced attention to previously cued objects as indicated by the Nc ERP compo-
nent, potentially because they processed objects more efficiently during the first
cued exposure (Wahl et al., 2013; Michel, Wronski, et al., 2017).
Infant-directed speech: Similar effects have been found with infant-directed
speech: Its use reduces the latency with which 4-month-old infants look at target
objects after encountered infant-directed-speech (Marno et al., 2015). Infants
also prefer the rising and falling intonations of infant-directed speech (Pegg,
Werker, & McLeod, 1992) and parents modify their speech accordingly (Fernald,
1985; Fernald & Simon, 1984; Fernald & Kuhl, 1987; Liu, Tsao, & Kuhl, 2007; Ki-
tamura, Thanavishuth, Burnham, & Luksaneeyanawin, 2001; Piazza, Iordan, &
Lew-Williams, 2017; Rutherford & Przednowek, 2012).
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Direct gaze and infant-directed speech share similar behavioural and neu-
ral responses in infants. By the age of six months, infants are more likely to fol-
low gaze when the gaze shift is preceded either by direct gaze or infant-directed
speech (Senju & Csibra, 2008). Furthermore, infant-directed speech and direct
gaze share a typical ERP signature (Parise & Csibra, 2013) and a particular pat-
tern of alpha oscillations from 4-months onwards (but not two months) (Michel
et al., 2015).
Contingency: The third ostensive signal is caregivers’ contingent reactivity to
the infant (Csibra, 2010), i.e. that parents respond to children’s actions. Such con-
tingent responsitivity is a natural aspect of communicative interactions such as
dialogue and interactive play and parents respond contingently to their infants
in similar ways across a wide range of cultures (Kärtner et al., 2008). Already
newborns increase their sucking when it is accompanied by sounds (Floccia,
Christophe, & Bertoncini, 1997). After three months, infants prefer imperfect
contingencies, ie. responses that are not perfectly aligned to their own behaviour
(Bigelow, 1998, 1999). By the age of 8-months, infants are more likely to follow
the orientation of agents that respond contingently to their gaze, even if these
agents are tea-pot-shaped and lack direct gaze, speech or other human features,
suggesting that they potentially expect relevant information in the direction in-
dicated by contingently-responding agents (Deligianni, Senju, Gergely, & Csibra,
2011). They also prefer observing agents that respond to each other contingently
and make different predictions about where an agent will go if the agent has pre-
viously engaged with another agent in a turn-taking-like exchange of a tone se-
quence (Tauzin & Gergely, 2018). However, infants do not make such predictions
if the agent simply repeated the other’s tone sequence (Tauzin & Gergely, 2018).
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Fewer studies have investigated whether ostensive signals directly affect the
processing of information in infants, although this type of evidence is essen-
tial to support Natural Pedagogy’s argument that the presence of communicative
signals directly influences the processing and integration of information. Here,
the strongest evidence comes from behavioural studies on older children or us-
ing neuropsychological methods investigating object encoding. Behaviourally,
Marno and Csibra (2015) have shown that 18-month-old infants are more likely
to imitate a communicatively presented action, even if it is on average less suc-
cessful in achieving the desired outcome than a non-communicatively presented
one. Evidence for a difference in the encoding of communicatively presented in-
formation comes from nine-month-old infants, who show a bias for an object’s
identity at the expense of its location when addressed by an adult using infant-
directed speech and direct gaze (Yoon, Johnson, and Csibra, but see: Silverstein,
Gliga, Westermann, and Parise), with similar findings in adults towards direct
gaze (Marno, Davelaar, & Csibra, 2014).
Furthermore, in the presence of ostensive signals, infants and toddlers should
generalise information about the object or matter presented. This is evident
in the studies by Gergely et al. (2007) and Egyed, Király, and Gergely (2013).
Eighteen-month-olds expect an actor to prefer the same object that a different
actor previously ostensively expressed interest in, compared to when the other
actor had expressed the interest without addressing the child ostensively (Egyed
et al., 2013). According to these studies, the fact that these object-related biases
carried over only in the ostensively communicated conditions is evidence that
children form a generalised object-centred, rather than a person-specific repre-
sentation.
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However, another function of communicatively presented actions might be
that they are more resilient to counter evidence than actions that are observed in
incidental contexts. Hernik and Csibra (2015) found that when 13.5-month-old
infants were presented with a device that could peel and another that could un-
peel bananas, infants were better at understanding the link between the different
tools and their outcomes in communicative contexts. They looked longer when
the previously demonstrated function of the banana peeler/unpeeler was re-
versed after ostensive communication, but only if a clear goal leads to a clear dis-
cernible outcome, i.e. the state of the banana changed (Hernik & Csibra, 2015).
Although infants picked up on a goal’s functions in the absence of ostensive com-
munication, their expectations about action conclusions were short-lived and
decreased after the second incongruent presentation. Only after being addressed
ostensively did they show resilience towards unexpected outcomes and contin-
ued to anticipate the previously (and communicatively) demonstrated outcomes
in spite of repeated counterexamples.
Taken together, these results provide evidence that infants are sensitive to-
wards the three communicative signals—direct gaze, infant-directed speech and
contingent behaviour—suggested by Csibra (2010). However, the extent to which
they use these signals to guide their own actions is, at least for younger infants,
mixed.
1.3 Alternatives to Natural Pedagogy
There is ample evidence to show that infants are interested in social stimuli. Cri-
tiques of Natural Pedagogy reject the claim that direct gaze and infant-directed
speech are privileged (Deák, Krasno, Triesch, Lewis, & Sepeta, 2014; Heyes,
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2016a) or are more than attention-getters (Gredebäck et al., 2018; Szufnarowska,
Rohlfing, Fawcett, & Gredebäck, 2014; Triesch, Teuscher, Deák, & Carlson, 2006;
Yu & Smith, 2013). Furthermore, they dispute that ostensive signals create a ref-
erential expectation without prior experience, instead communicative meaning
manifests itself in the interaction provided by the caregiver. Despite this, some
of these theories still propose that ostensive signals influence infants’ learn-
ing, albeit through different mechanisms and a different developmental trajec-
tory. Rather than being inherently communicative, they become communicative
through the interaction between caregiver and infant.
The role of social signals is a particularly controversial aspect in the discus-
sion between Natural Pedagogy and its alternatives. Natural Pedagogy predicts
that infants use a subset of social signals to identify learning contexts (Csibra,
2010). One of these instances is infants’ increased propensity to follow gaze
after encountering infant-directed speech or direct gaze by six months of age
(Senju & Csibra, 2008). However, infants are also sensitive to non-ostensive sig-
nals and increase their gaze-following towards agents that shiver or engage in
other attention-getting activities (Gredebäck et al., 2018; Fawcett & Gredebäck,
2014; Szufnarowska et al., 2014, but see: Csibra, Hernik, Shamsudheen, Tatone,
& Senju., 2018). According to these accounts, infants learn to follow gaze, in the
same way as they learn the meaning of other social signals. Taken together, so-
cial signals such as direct-gaze and infant-directed speech play a role in initiating
social learning within the first 2-4 months and other social signals, such as hand
movements (Fausey, Jayaraman, & Smith, 2016) and their own name (Parise et
al., 2010), are quickly added and supplement and supersede infants’ use gaze
and infant-directed speech. However, the underlying mechanism as to why so-
cial signals lead to increased gaze following is still debated. Whilst Natural Ped-
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agogy suggests that infant-directed speech and direct gaze create a referential
expectation of novel, generalisable information, critics argue that they are sim-
ply more attention-grabbing and arousing (Gredebäck et al., 2018; Szufnarowska
et al., 2014). Natural Pedagogy does not rule out that communicative signals in-
crease infants’ attention or arousal. However, an increase in arousal is necessary
for alternative accounts of infants’ social learning. Therefore, Chapters 2 and 3 of
this thesis will also investigate correlates of infants’ arousal during communica-
tively and non-communicatively presented actions.
Alternative accounts to Natural Pedagogy have suggested that this referen-
tial expectation develops through the interaction with caregivers (e.g. Deák et
al., 2014; Triesch et al., 2006; Yu & Smith, 2013). Although some of these ac-
counts still require a perceptual preference towards communicative signals, such
as direct gaze (Triesch et al., 2006), communicative signals, at least early in de-
velopment, may not carry a referential expectation towards meaningful content
with them. This expectation only develops through rewarding stimulation in the
presence of communicative signals. Therefore, as long as direct gaze and infant-
directed speech are perceptually interesting on their own, simulations show that
the referential expectation can be learned if gaze following is rewarded by in-
trinsically interesting outcomes (Corkum & Moore, 1998; Michel, Wronski, et al.,
2017; Michel, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017; Triesch et al., 2006). Indeed, not all cues
are equal and infants will only learn to follow gaze for face-like objects in which
the ‘eyes’ match the contrast polarity of the human eye (Michel, Wronski, et al.,
2017; Michel, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017). This is mirrored by computational models
on gaze-following. In models developed by Triesch et al. (2006) simulated agents
were able to acquire gaze following given a basic set of rewards and preferences.
However, models were only successful if infants showed a perceptual preference
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to eyes in the first place. Such a perceptual preference towards eye gaze does not
necessarily imply that they immediately generate referential expectations.
Other studies have highlighted the high prevalence of social signals during
early life and therefore may contribute to their relevance to infants in guiding
their learning. The constrained environment that infants experience (Piantadosi
& Kidd, 2016) might privilege the communicative signals discussed by Csibra
(2003), because of the role they play in providing a predictable environment to
the child. For example, direct gaze might be such a relevant social stimulus be-
cause faces are one of the most frequent visual stimuli children experience dur-
ing their early months of life (Fausey et al., 2016). Their prevalence contributes
to a highly structured environment that might allow a child to develop an under-
standing of social signals as communicative from the bottom up by providing ‘a
curriculum for learning’ (Smith, Jayaraman, Clerkin, & Yu, 2018). Therefore, even
a perceptual preference can be scaffolded by the environment.
Other critics have argued that communicative signals are simply arousing to
infants and by providing a more arousing context, support social learning by en-
hancing gaze following (Gredebäck et al., 2018; Szufnarowska et al., 2014) and
memory encoding (cf. Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). Furthermore, infants may ex-
ploit additional cues that would not traditionally be considered ostensive, such
as hand movements. At the age of 12 months, hand movements play a more im-
portant role in guiding an infants’ attention than gaze, because they are a more
reliable cue of an adult’s object manipulation than gaze (Yu & Smith, 2013). The
link between ostensive communication and infant learning is not straightfor-
ward either, as data from word learning shows. At 18 months, children privilege
object salience over gaze information in associating objects and words (C. Moore,
Angelopoulos, & Bennett, 1999). Only by 24 months, children reliably choose the
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referenced object, rather than a visually salient distractor (C. Moore et al., 1999).
Findings like these highlight the complex relationship between communication,
perception and learning.
Currently, such alternative accounts are largely underspecified with regard
to theory and because of that, have largely focussed on inductive data mining
of infants’ early development (e.g. Fausey et al., 2016; Yu & Smith, 2013). Fur-
thermore, many empirical papers draw upon a wide range of different theories,
with little overlap and a lack of clear research agenda. Because of this, it can
be difficult to assess theoretical predictions that generalise beyond a few limited
experiments. Natural Pedagogy is subject to the opposite criticism, as few stud-
ies have investigated whether social signals are used in caregiver-child directed
interactions as predicted by this theory. For example, research into infants’ un-
derstanding of humour suggests a more complicated relationship between social
signals and teaching.
Parents’ use of ostensive-referential signals is not restricted to pedagogical in-
teractions. Parents use more ostensive signals while joking, but more referential
signals (such as pointing and gaze shifts) are used when the action presentation
was generalisable such as in pretence and sincere contexts (Hoicka, 2016). Such
findings highlight the importance of referential signals in social learning, since
establishing reference may be an equally important aspect of successful trans-
mission of information (cf. Spike, Stadler, Kirby, & Smith, 2016). Therefore, Ex-
periment 2 in Chapter 2 also explores the effect of referential signals, in addition
to ostensive signals, on infants’ neural correlates of action understanding. Natu-
ral Pedagogy is also critiqued because it requires an early understanding of com-
municative intent. R. Moore (in preparation) argues that ostensive signals can-
not function as a marker for learning contexts as proposed by Csibra (2010). The
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mere act of recognising communicative intent cannot explain which inferences
children make from the interaction without relying on a complex understanding
of belief states and perspective taking. Therefore, a simple code-based under-
standing of communicative intent is insufficient to explain infants’ learning in
a situation. A more complex understanding of communicative intent, however,
would be too computationally complex and not solve the problem of how infants
understand ostensive-referential signals. Consequentially, it would require an
explanation for the very thing it attempts to explain (R. Moore, in preparation).
Contingency embodies communication
Parents’ contingent behaviour on the child’s actions structures the input in im-
portant ways. On the one hand, pedagogical interactions are structured by par-
ents to exploit infants’ attention and therefore facilitate learning. On the other
hand, they allow infants to learn the ostensive function of communicative sig-
nals.
Contingent responsivity (e.g. Deligianni et al., 2011; Q. Wang et al., 2012) is in
itself a highly predictive process that mirrors natural dialogue. The timing of cues
is a natural aspect of interactions (R. Moore, 2014; Rochat, 2007). By providing
structure to actions and timing it to the learner’s needs. Caregivers exploit their
children’s attention and children show faster word learning in shared attention
contexts because adults name objects that are already in the focus of children’s
attention (Axelsson, Churchley, & Horst, 2012; E. V. Clark, 2010; Tomasello &
Kruger, 1992; Tomasello, Strosberg, & Akhtar, 1996; Stephens & Matthews, 2014).
Stimulus-response contingency (e.g. Deligianni et al., 2011; Q. Wang et al., 2012)
is particularly useful to learning, as it times responses to the learner’s attention.
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Mothers are more likely to name or look at objects, after the child has vocalised,
looked at the mother or handled an object, thereby decreasing potential noise
that might disrupt associative learning (Chang, de Barbaro, & Deák, 2016). Par-
ents of 11-month-olds are more likely to respond to vocalisations when the child
looks at their parents, and parents’ responsivity is predictive of children’s lan-
guage development of up to two years later (Donnellan, Bannard, McGillion, Slo-
combe, & Matthews, 2019). Heyes (2016a) notes, the adaptive function of ped-
agogical interactions depends “on what the teacher intends and knows, rather
than on what the infant intends and knows” [p. 286].
Adjustments in action structures mirror adjustments in infant-
directed speech
Infant-directed actions share many of the structural adjustments that are found
in language. For example, infant-directed speech has many features that con-
tribute to the learning of syllables, words and sentences. When interacting with
infants, caregivers accentuate features that help to segment and interpret the
speech input, providing similar structural adjustments that are also used in for-
eigner directed speech (Eaves, Feldman, Griffiths, & Shafto, 2016; Uther, Knoll,
& Burnham, 2007). The overemphasised syllables contribute to the segmenta-
tion of words (Floccia et al., 2016; Schreiner & Mani, 2017) and phonemic cat-
egories (Eaves et al., 2016). The action-equivalent ‘motionese’ also overempha-
sises actions and their boundaries (Brand et al., 2002), making action demon-
strations easier to segment and allow children to extract which parts of an action
are relevant. Furthermore, ostensive signals are particularly prevalent at segment
boundaries (Brand et al., 2007), and are useful to segment the continuous stream
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of actions. They provide ways of temporal reference, in a similar way that point-
ing and gaze direction provide spatial reference (cf. Saylor et al., 2007).
Sparking curiosity to sustain attention
But not all aspects of infant-directed speech make it more predictable. For ex-
ample, the falling and rising intonations in infant-directed speech are less pre-
dictable compared to adult-directed speech, but the degree of novelty poten-
tially increases infants’ arousal and interest in speech itself, which in turn facil-
itates learning (Räsänen, Kakouros, & Soderstrom, 2018). This supports models
of curiosity-based learning, according to which infants actively seek out informa-
tion that is sufficiently different to be novel, but not too different that it cannot
be integrated into their existing knowledge (Twomey & Westermann, 2015, 2017).
The different conceptualisation of the role of social signals emerges because
Natural Pedagogy and statistical learning accounts have different evolutionary
accounts of the human ability to engage in cultural learning. Whilst Natural Ped-
agogy draws upon an innate sensitivity towards a subset of communicative sig-
nals that create a referential expectation that the following information is mean-
ingful, so far domain-general statistical learning accounts have not given an ex-
plicit evolutionary account of human cultural learning, possibly with the excep-
tion of Heyes (2012, 2016a) and Oudeyer and Smith (2016).
Appealing to curiosity as the driving force of infants’ learning (Gottlieb,
Oudeyer, Lopes, & Baranes, 2013; Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012; Oudeyer &
Smith, 2016; Mather & Plunkett, 2011; Twomey & Westermann, 2017) might offer
an intrinsic motivational factor that facilitates how infants learn the relevance of
social communicative signals, particularly since curiosity shares a fundamental
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property of communication: the provision of novel, relevant information (Grice,
1957; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2012). Curiosity may act as a
driver to increase learning in general and actively search for sources of input
that are sufficiently familiar and novel, so that they can be used to acquire novel
information and integrate it into existing knowledge. Because of the role that
parents have as caregivers, they provide a highly structured input (cf. Goldstein
et al., 2010) to fulfil the child’s physical and emotional needs (Heyes, 2016a).
In conclusion, interactions between caregivers and children are not only
more predictable, but caregivers actively shape the input children receive and
exploit their social and attentional needs. Through this process, parents scaf-
fold infants’ learning. Infants may still possess an attentional bias towards com-
municative signals, such as direct gaze and infant-directed speech, however the
referential expectation that is necessary for facilitating learning only develops
through infants’ interactions with caregivers.
1.4 Methods to study how communicative signals af-
fect action semantics
This PhD uses a wide range of different methodologies to investigate how com-
municative signals might influence the processing of actions in infancy. Chap-
ter 2 uses EEG to investigate the neural signature of action processing after com-
municative and non-communicative signals in 9-month-old children. Chapter
3 investigates a similar question but uses eyetracking measures–namely antici-
patory looking and pupil dilation–in 7-month-olds instead. In Chapter 4, uses a
behavioural measure to study whether communicative signals might influence
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the interpretation of an action by providing different segmentation information
in 18-month-old children. The following sections will provide a brief summary
of each of these methodologies and the developmental trajectories of the under-
lying mechanisms.
EEG
The advance of neuroimaging methods, in particular, EEG, has allowed us to
study infants’ understanding of meaning much earlier than behavioural studies
have. Furthermore, it is possible to compare infants’ neural responses to adults
to make inferences about the extent that infants already have (or don’t have) an
adult-like understanding of actions and their meaning.
Key developments in the social brain are the processing of faces, direct gaze,
the understanding of motion and others’ actions and joint attention (Grossmann
& Johnson, 2007; Ní Choisdealbha & Reid, 2014). Several neural markers are im-
portant for the processing of social and action-related development in infancy.
Some of these components, like the Nc, are infant-specific and no equivalent
Others, like the N400 or N170, are well-studied in adults and infants, however
generally show a later onset and peak, compared to their adult equivalents (de
Haan, 2007; Kuefner, De Heering, Jacques, Palmero-Soler, & Rossion, 2010).
From birth onwards, infants prefer looking at faces and face like configura-
tions (Farroni et al., 2005), and a recent study suggests that even at the fetal stage
infants prefer looking at face-like top-heavy configurations (Reid et al., 2017). Fa-
cial information is processed in the fusiform face area, which responds stronger
to intact, rather than scrambled faces, houses, or other body parts (Kanwisher,
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McDermott, & Chun, 1997). The fusiform face area already responds to the pas-
sive viewing of faces in 2-month-old infants (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).
In ERP studies, the N170 ERP on the occipito-temporal scalp is associated
with the perception of faces (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996;
Kuefner et al., 2010). From four years onwards, the N170 only shows small de-
creases in latency over development (Kuefner et al., 2010). In adults, the N170
shows a faster response to upright, compared to up-side-down faces (Bentin et
al., 1996), an effect not found in six-month-old infants, who only distinguish be-
tween human and ape faces (de Haan, Pascalis, & Johnson, 2002). The N170 is
sensitive to emotional facial expressions (Hinojosa, Mercado, & Carretié, 2015).
In infants, the processes associated with the N290 (corresponding to facial
features and configurations) and P400 ERP (corresponding to the integration of
emotional processes) components (de Haan & Nelson, 1999; de Haan et al., 2002;
Leppänen, Moulson, Vogel-Farley, & Nelson, 2007; Peykarjou & Hoehl, 2013).
Already from 3-months onwards, infants show a faster N290 response towards
faces, compared to cars. Furthermore, at four months, the N290 is also highly
sensitive to the configuration of the eyes and face (Farroni, Johnson, & Csibra,
2004), suggesting that from very early in life show sensitivity towards faces and
eyes.
Neural signatures for meaning and action
The neural marker of meaning is the N400 ERP component. The N400 is a time
locked response to a violation in the meaning of a word, gesture, action or similar
stimuli within their wider context (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011). In adults, the
N400 is characterised by a negative deflection peaking around 400ms for stimuli
that do not fit into a primed context. Recently, it has been argued that the N400
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amplitude responds to probabilistic predictions of the content within its wider
context (Rabovsky, Hansen, & McClelland, 2018).
Numerous studies report the absence of the linguistic N400 in infants as old
as 12 months (Friedrich & Friederici, 2005a, 2005b, 2010), however, Friedrich and
Friederici (2011) were able to detect a very late (600-900ms) N400-like effect in
6-month-old children in a study on word learning. This effect was only found di-
rectly after a training with word-picture associations, and the effect disappeared
when infants’ memory was tested on the following day. Therefore, infants may in-
terpret words as being referential even from 6-month on, but are not able to form
stable memory associations. Furthermore, infants as young as 9 months show a
reliable N400 response towards familiar word-picture associations if tested on
their own mother’s voice (Parise & Csibra, 2012).
The action N400 emerges around the same age, and it is found in 9-, but not
7-month-olds Reid et al. (2009). This is slightly later than infants are able to an-
ticipate the outcomes of familiar eating actions (Green et al., 2016; Hunnius &
Bekkering, 2010; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). However, already by the age
of five months, infants respond to familiar actions with a Positive Slow Wave, a
marker of familiarity (Michel, Kaduk, Ní Choisdealbha, & Reid, 2017).
Infants’ understanding of actions is also indicated by activity in motor-related
frequency bands, and 12-month-old infants show greater activation in the mu-
frequency band for unexpected, compared to expected actions (Stapel, Hunnius,
van Elk, & Bekkering, 2010). Nine-month-old infants show greater activation
when observing others’ actions in the same frequency bands that are active when
they are executing actions themselves, irrespective of whether they are able to
carry out the observed actions themselves (Southgate & Begus, 2013).
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Infants’ learning and attention is also indexed by increased activity in the
theta band, but the responsivity of theta activity to different stimuli changes over
maturation (Michel et al., 2015; Orekhova, 1999). Likewise, although adults show
increased power in the theta band towards unexpected than expected action out-
comes, no such effect has been observed for 7- and 9-month-old infants (Reid et
al., 2009). Theta band activity may also indicate an information-seeking process,
and 11-month-old infants show greater theta activation when they are being ad-
dressed by someone speaking their language (Begus, Gliga, & Southgate, 2016).
Eye-tracking and anticipatory looking
Eye-tracking is a particularly suitable method to study infants’ action under-
standing, as it allows us to investigate whether infants are able to anticipate the
outcome of actions before their conclusion. Furthermore, anticipating move-
ments and actions of others forms a key aspect of communication and dialogue
(Huettig & Altmann, 2005; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009; Yamashiro & Vouloumanos,
2018).
Infants are able to anticipate grasping actions from six months onwards, tak-
ing into account the goal and hand shape of the action, an ability that improves
with age (Ambrosini et al., 2013). From 15-months onwards, infants also use the
velocity of the reaching movement to anticipate whether the outcome is a small
or large target location, which 9- and 12-month-old infants were not yet able to
do (Stapel et al., 2015). Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) found that already by 6-
months of age, infants are able to anticipate action outcomes for the use of fa-
miliar objects, however even after repeated observation infants do not readily
associate new goal locations to familiar actions.
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Infants’ ability to predict actions also depends on perceptual features, in par-
ticular, the salience of any of the three aspects of action understanding – manner,
outcome and situational constraints. The salience of the goal and the rationality
of the actions contribute the to their ability to predict and imitate actions (e.g.
Adam et al., 2016; Elsner, 2007; Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012; Moher et al., 2015). By
twelve months, infants are more likely to anticipate a human hand (but not a
mechanical claw) reaching for a high saliency goal consisting of multiple objects,
compared to a low saliency goal consisting of only one object (Adam et al., 2016).
Infants at 12 months of age are faster at anticipating actions towards a large, com-
pared to a small goal (Henrichs et al., 2012).
Generally, many of these studies have found that infants find human reaching
movements, as exemplified by arms or hands easier to predict than those of robot
claws or rods (Adam et al., 2016; Woodward, 1998). However, familiarising infants
with a human operating a claw prior to demonstrating its effect potentially allows
them to anticipate claws like human hands (Boyer, Pan, & Bertenthal, 2011).
Pupil dilation
The primary function of the pupils is the control of the amount of light enter-
ing the eye. At constant light, the pupils continuously oscillate, as they are con-
strained by the sympathetic and parasympathetic activity of the brain (Hepach
& Westermann, 2013, 2016). Because of the involvement of the sympathetic and
parasympathetic nervous system, different cognitive processes also influence the
dilation of the pupils, beyond what would be expected by the change of bright-
ness in the environment. They have indicated higher pupil dilation during cog-
nitive load (Porter, Troscianko, & Gilchrist, 2007; Verney, Granholm, & Marshall,
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2004), others’ emotions (Aktar et al., 2018; Geangu, Hauf, Bhardwaj, & Bentz,
2011; Jessen, Altvater-Mackensen, & Grossmann, 2016) and expectancy viola-
tions (Jackson & Sirois, 2009; Wetzel, Buttelmann, Schieler, & Widmann, 2015).
Cognitive responses are linked to different components in the pupil dilation.
Online measures of the pupil dilation are based on the pupils’ immediate re-
sponse to the presentation of the stimulus. For example, 8.5-month-old infants
show an increased event-related pupil dilation towards a re-emergence of a train
from a tunnel, if the train has a different colour than the one it had upon enter-
ing the tunnel (Jackson & Sirois, 2009). Pupil dilation measures are also linked
to the processing of social information in developmental samples. For exam-
ple, 14 month-olds, but not 10-month-olds, show increased pupil dilations to-
wards actions that do not fit an emotional context, e.g. when an angry actor
performs a positive action (Hepach & Westermann, 2013). Furthermore, 6- and
12-month-old infants show increased pupil dilations when hearing a recording
of another child’s distress (i.e. crying), compared to positive or neutral vocalisa-
tions (Geangu et al., 2011). Some of the early responses to the semantic mismatch
of words and pictures have been linked to the N400 component in ERP research
(Kuipers & Thierry, 2011).
Other pupillary responses reflect a slower, emotional response, like the
change in re-dilation of the pupils in the pupillary light reflex (PLR). The PLR
is the automatic response of the pupils towards the change from a dark to a
bright light. When the light suddenly increases, the pupils constrict, and this
initial constriction is followed by a re-dilation. This process lasts for about 5
seconds, before the pupils resume their normal oscillations again. Before the
pupils are fully re-dilated, the pupil size is affected by emotional arousal (Hepach
& Westermann, 2016).
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The PLR develops in infants between 30–35 weeks (Robinson & Fielder, 1990)
and has been implicated in children’s socio-emotional development (Hepach,
Vaish, & Tomasello, 2017). Children from two years onwards show an increased
pupil dilation towards situations in which they observe another person in dis-
tress but cannot help (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012; Hepach, Vaish, Gross-
mann, & Tomasello, 2016) and when they accidentally caused harm to someone
but a third person (rather than the child) helps the victim (Hepach et al., 2017).
Previous research has also shown an enhanced PLR at 9–10 months to be predic-
tive of an Autism diagnosis at 36 months (Nyström et al., 2018), and that siblings
of children diagnosed with autism also show an enhanced PLR (Nyström, Gre-
debäck, Bölte, Falck-Ytter, & EASE Team, 2015). The link between the emotional
response in the PLR signal and the social learning differences in autism make
the PLR an interesting candidate to investigate whether children’s learning in so-
cial contexts is linked to their emotional processing. Currently, the PLR has not
been used to study whether communicative signals affect the PLR or action un-
derstanding directly. However, its slower response might offer an interesting win-
dow into children’s understanding of a social context over a longer period of time.
Furthermore, since previous research has linked the PLR to arousal, finding an
increased PLR after communicative signals would potentially support arousal-
driven accounts of the effects of communicative signals on learning.
Behavioural measures: imitation
Behavioural measures, in particular, their imitation, are still one of the most im-
portant sources of our understanding of children’s learning of actions. The lit-
erature on early imitation discusses two distinct stages of imitation that present
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during infancy. Studies on neonatal imitation of a basic set of actions, such as
tongue protrusions, mouth openings, lip protrusions and index finger protrusion
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1989; Meltzoff et al., 2017; Nagy, Pal, & Orvos, 2014) are
highly contested (Anisfeld, 1991; Ray & Heyes, 2011; Heyes, 2016b; Jones, 1996,
2007; Oostenbroek et al., 2016). However, by the second to the third month of
their life, infants show no evidence of matching tongue protrusions or other po-
tentially imitative behaviours disappears until six to eight months of age (Jones,
2009). By this age, they start to imitate basic vocalisations, such as ‘ah’ (Jones,
2007). The vocalisation of ‘Eh-eh’ follows at 12 months, and infants imitate tap-
table movements by 12, ‘Bye bye’ by 12, clap hands by 10, sequential finger move-
ments by 16 months, putting their hand on the head by 16 months and reliably
imitate tongue protrusions by 18 months (Jones, 2007). Hence, the second year
represents the emergence of learned imitative behaviours (Jones, 2007, 2009).
Only a few studies investigated the imitation of actions in communicative and
non-communicative contexts. Behavioural studies on toddlers also support the
argument that communication affects action imitation. Fourteen-month-old in-
fants are more likely to imitate an unnecessary head-touch instead of using the
preferred hand to activate a lamp in an ostensive context, but not when they are
merely observing the actor without being addressed (Király et al., 2013). How-
ever, they only do so when the action has an apparent goal (i.e. the switch turns
on the light), but not when the action has no clear goal, i.e. the head touch
does not lead to the light being switched on (Király et al., 2013). In addition,
Nielsen (2006) presented 12, 18 and 24-month-old children with an actor en-
gaging in a series of actions of which not all were necessary to achieve the de-
sired outcome, and presented these actions either by an aloof or communicative
model. Whereas the 12-month-olds only copied the necessary actions, 18-month
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and 24-month-olds prioritised communicatively presented actions. These stud-
ies show that ostensive signals influence children’s imitation of actions from 18
months onwards.
However, other studies have found that children take into account ostensive
signals only from about four years in order to decide how to learn actions, and
instead use the intentionality of an action to guide their own object exploration.
L. P. Butler and Markman (2012, 2013) show that 3- and 4-year-old children re-
spond differently both to whether an action is presented communicatively as
well as if the action is presented accidentally. In this study, an experimenter
demonstrated 3- and 4-year-old children the magnetic properties of an object
either accidentally, intentionally while communicating with the child or inten-
tionally with no communication. While there was no difference between the age
groups in the exploration of a non-magnetic variant of the object in the condi-
tion without communication, the results show that communication significantly
increased exploration by 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds. At the same time, re-
duced exploration in the accidental condition was found in for 3-year-olds, but
not 4-year-olds. This suggests the importance of intentionality and communi-
cation changes between 3 and 4 years of age in terms of understanding actions.
Schmidt, Rakoczy, and Tomasello (2011) obtained similar results in 3-year-old
children that either observed an action being introduced as familiar or made
up on the spot, and during which they either observed the action incidentally
or were directly addressed by the actor: For familiar actions, children were less
likely to protest and showed increased imitation, but being addressed commu-
nicatively did not change their protest or imitation. Therefore, for younger chil-
dren, the intentionality of an action might be more important than the commu-
nicative presentation (L. P. Butler & Markman, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2011).
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1.5 Communicative signals and action understand-
ing: Summary
This question forms the core of the thesis that will be investigated in the three
experimental Chapters 2, 3 and 4 using a wide range of methodologies. Chap-
ter 2 described a set of experiments using EEG to investigate whether ostension
on its own, or ostension in combination with referential signals change infants’
and adults’ interpretation of actions as meaningful. Chapter 3 describes an eye-
tracking study on 7-month-old infants to investigate whether ostensive signals
help them to anticipate familiar, unexpected and novel action outcomes. Chap-
ter 4 takes a different perspective on the contribution of ostensive signals towards
action understanding by discussing a behavioural experiment on toddlers’ use of
ostensive signals in segmenting actions.
The evidence suggests that infants and toddlers take into account numerous
signifiers of ostensive communication, beyond the three basic ostensive signals
suggested by Csibra (2010), to inform whether or not to generalise or imitate new,
socially presented information. However, there is a discussion on whether or not
infants show an inherent sensitivity towards a subset of these signals. If peda-
gogical signals are indeed special in putting infants into a ‘learning mode’ that
makes infants more likely to understand actions as symbolic and meaningful,
then they learn to pick up cues that modify these expectations very early in life.
Currently, there is little research on the underlying mechanisms of how commu-
nication might affect social learning, particularly in pre-verbal children.
In particular, there is little research on how communication affects infants’
representations of meaning. For example, it is unclear whether communication
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directly affects the interpretation of an action, or modulates action understand-
ing through mechanisms of attention and arousal. In order to address this ques-
tion, the experiments presented in Chapter 2 and 3 provide measures of atten-
tion and arousal. The EEG studies reported in Chapter 2 allow us to contrast a
semantic understanding of actions, as measured by the N400 component, with
one driven by arousal, as measured by the Nc component. Furthermore, the eye-
tracking data presented in Chapter 3 uses anticipatory looking as a measure of
action understanding and prediction, but also providing analyses of pupil di-
lation to record infants’ arousal towards ostensive and non-ostensive signals.
Therefore, both studies can provide important information in testing the po-
tential contributions of arousal in infants’ use of communication during action
comprehension. Finally, the role of ostensive signals as providers of structural
information about actions and action sequences provides an important poten-
tial mechanism of allowing infants to learn about actions and their meanings.
Chapter 4 also contributes to the discussion of the underlying mechanisms of
the contribution of communication towards action understanding by suggest-
ing that communicative signals also contribute to the segmentation of action
sequences. Taken together, this thesis will be looking at whether communica-
tive signals modify infants’ interpretation of actions, whether communication




The effect of communicative signals
on the semantic interpretation of
actions: Two ERP studies
Human culture can be defined as the transmission of concepts, beliefs and be-
haviours that are not genetically determined as such, but transmitted from one
generation to the next through social learning (Laland & Brown, 2011; Mesoudi,
2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). The capacity of humans to engage in such social
learning has been considered key in the transmission of cognitively opaque, cul-
turally arbitrary actions. Human social learning is rooted in a basic understand-
ing of communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Whereas most animal commu-
nication systems are based on direct mappings between signals and meanings
that are either innate or learned through associations, human communication
is inferential and the meaning of an utterance is reconstructed (Scott-Phillips,
2015). Every human communicative act has two channels—the first makes the
intention to communicate manifest, the second to transmit the content of the
information (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Once the communicative intention is
manifest, the interlocutor can inferentially reconstruct the meaning of the com-
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munication, i.e. the content of the utterance (Scott-Phillips, 2010a, 2010b, 2015;
Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Because the actual content of the message is inferred,
the same message can have a different meaning depending on the context. In-
fants may already be sensitive to a subset of these communicative (ostensive)
signals (Csibra, 2010): direct gaze, infant-directed speech and contingent reac-
tivity. They act as a code-based communicative system that puts infants into a
receptive mode towards acquiring new information through social learning. In
the presence of these signals, infants are more likely to follow gaze (Senju & Csi-
bra, 2008) and imitate actions (Marno & Csibra, 2015; Nielsen, 2006). Further-
more, infants and young children have an expectation for novel and generalis-
able information (L. P. Butler & Markman, 2012, 2013, 2014). This raises impor-
tant questions about how infants use communicative signals to make predictions
about other people’s actions in order to learn from them.
2.1 Infants’ expectations about others’ actions
Infants have a basic understanding of actions in terms of goals and outcomes,
and quickly learn to anticipate the actions of the people around them (Gredebäck
& Melinder, 2010; Henrichs et al., 2012; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010; von
Hofsten & Rönnqvist, 1988). Previous research has used anticipatory looking
(Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010), pupil dilation (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011),
desynchronisation of the µ-rhythm (a neural marker of motor activation) in the
EEG (Stapel et al., 2010), and violation of semantic expectations (Reid et al., 2009)
to investigate whether infants understand and predict everyday actions. Many of
these studies have investigated conventionalised actions with clear goals, such
as drinking from a cup, feeding actions, and similar.
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Pupil dilation and anticipatory looking studies (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011,
2010) suggest that infants show larger pupil dilation for surprising actions, such
as observing other people being fed with a spoon when these actions were di-
rected towards the hands instead of the mouth. These observations were mod-
erated by cultural experience, for example using forks in Western European,
and chopsticks in Asian countries (Green et al., 2016), age (Gredebäck & Melin-
der, 2010, in 6-month-olds), and whether feeding actions are rational by bring-
ing food straight to the mouth, or placing the food on the receiver’s hand first
(Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010, 2011, with 6- and 4-month-old children respec-
tively). However, infants did not show increased pupil dilations if the feeding
action was obstructed by an object (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). Hunnius and
Bekkering (2010) investigated whether 6–16-month-old infants and adults antic-
ipate goal-directed actions, involving different objects—a phone (to the ear), a
brush (to the hair) and a cup (to the mouth). After the first trial, infants only
reliably anticipated the target of the cup. However, over the course of the experi-
ment, all age groups started to reliably predict the other semantically congruent
actions (e.g. brush–hair), but not incongruent ones (e.g. brush–mouth). Only
the adult group quickly adjusted to new, incongruent goal locations. These re-
sults suggest that infants take into account semantic congruence from at least
six months onwards and require multiple exposures to reliably predict congruent
action outcomes. However, they find it difficult to override previous knowledge
and predict incongruent action outcomes.
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2.2 Communicative signals modify expectations
about actions
Although infants are able to form predictions about actions through observa-
tion alone, many actions remain cognitively opaque to the observer. Csibra and
Gergely (2009, 2011) propose that infants are especially attuned to a specific set
of communicative signals that allow them to engage in fast social learning and
copy actions even if they do not fully understand their purpose. Importantly, in-
fants do not simply pay more attention to social partners who ostensively com-
municate with them, they also expect that the information presented to them is
relevant to them and that it conveys novel, generalisable knowledge (Csibra &
Gergely, 2009). Many studies have shown that the presence of communicative
signals can alter children’s understanding and imitation of actions. For exam-
ple, 18- and 24-month-old infants were more likely to copy actions in a social-
communicative context, compared to one where the demonstrator acted aloof
and uninterested in the child (Nielsen, 2006). Fourteen-month-old children are
more likely to imitate an adult turning on a lamp with their head in an ostensive
context, but prefer using their hands after merely observing the adult in a non-
communicative setting. However, they only do this for salient action goals, but
not when the action has no clear effect, i.e. the head touch does not turn on the
light (Király et al., 2013).
Children also make different inferences about the meaning of actions in dif-
ferent communicative contexts: Eighteen-month-olds only copied the manner of
the action when they had been informed about the action’s goal prior to the ac-
tion’s demonstration, but not when they received no prior information about the
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goal (Southgate et al., 2009). A control group that explored the action outcome
on their own did not increase their imitation of the action manner. Therefore,
infants interpret the manner of the action as relevant when the goal has already
been communicated, but focus on the goal when they received no prior infor-
mation. This suggests that they already have an understanding of communica-
tive relevance. In summary, understanding goals and communicative signals are
both important in social learning. Infants are more likely to imitate actions with
clear goals and that are presented communicatively (Adam et al., 2016; Király et
al., 2013; Nielsen, 2006; Southgate et al., 2009).
Alternative accounts to Natural Pedagogy reject the claim that infants are sen-
sitive to communicative signals in early infancy (Gredebäck et al., 2018; Heyes,
2012, 2016a; Szufnarowska et al., 2014). They argue increased rates of gaze fol-
lowing and learning are better explained by general mechanisms of arousal and
attention, and that communication is simply one way of eliciting attention and
arousal in infants. Therefore, infants’ increased gaze following after encounter-
ing communicative signals could also be based on a more general mechanism of
arousal and attention. According to this account, infants are more likely to follow
gaze after arousing or attention-getting events, simply because communicative
signals are more arousing (c.f. Szufnarowska et al., 2014; Gredebäck et al., 2018).
However, Marno et al. (2015) found no increase in four-month-olds’ pupil dila-
tion when comparing normal speech, backwards speech and a no-speech con-
trol condition, indicating that the presence of communication may not lead to
an increase in arousal on its own. Furthermore, there is also evidence of a shared
neural signature of communicative signals, such as infant-directed speech and
direct gaze (Parise & Csibra, 2013), suggesting distinct processing of ostensive
signals from at least as early as five-months onwards.
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2.3 Electrophysiological correlates of action under-
standing and communication
Although studies have shown that the presence of communicative signals in-
creases gaze following, and affects the imitation of actions and the interpretation,
we currently know little about the neural mechanisms of how communication
affects the interpretation of actions, and thereby infants’ learning about and the
imitation of other people’s behaviour. The study of event-related potentials (ERP)
can help to identify the underlying cognitive processes of infants’ understanding
of actions and communication. There have been several ERP components that
have been linked to action understanding, communication and general cognitive
processing, and three ERP components are of particular interest:
• The Pb, an infant-specific ERP component (Webb, Long, & Nelson, 2005)
that has been reported in research on joint attention and recognition (Kopp
& Lindenberger, 2011, 2012). A similar component has also been found in
infants’ processing and integration of ostensive signals (Parise & Csibra,
2013),
• The Nc, an infant-specific marker of attention (Courchesne, Ganz, & Nor-
cia, 1981; Reynolds & Richards, 2017; Richards, 2003; Webb et al., 2005)
• The N400, a marker of semantic expectancy violation (Amoruso et al., 2013;
Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011; Reid et al., 2009)
In the following two experiments, we measured these ERP components to
study how communication changes the interpretation of goal-directed actions.
We presented infants and adults with videos and images in which participants
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were either directly addressed through direct gaze and infant-directed speech,
or observed an actor talking to themselves avoiding direct gaze and using adult-
directed speech (c.f. Yoon et al., 2008). These videos were followed by a series
of images that depicted everyday actions consisting of a picture priming an ac-
tion (e.g. eating with a spoon), followed by an outcome picture that either fits the
semantic context (e.g. spoon going into mouth) or violates it (e.g. spoon going
to ear). According to previous research (Reid et al., 2009; Hunnius & Bekkering,
2010), 9-month-old infants are familiar with these actions. Whereas the first ex-
periment in this paper does not show the actors using referential cues towards
the object, the actors in the second video provide referential signals towards the
objects. ERPs can provide invaluable information on underlying cognitive pro-
cesses of how infants understand these images. In the current study, we will be
looking at the ERP response towards the outcome of such familiar actions. In the
following section, we will discuss these three ERP components in more detail and
draw competing hypotheses based on previous research.
The Pb component
The Positive before (Pb) is an early infant-specific ERP preceding the Negative
Central (Nc) component at around 200–400 ms (Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011; Kar-
rer, Karrer, Bloom, Chaney, & Davis, 1998; Webb et al., 2005) and has been linked
to joint attention and memory (Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011, 2012) and concep-
tual interpretation (Karrer et al., 1998). Webb et al. (2005) report a more positive
Pb amplitude for unfamiliar over familiar faces, but the opposite effect for fa-
miliar over unfamiliar objects. Furthermore, 5-month-old infants show an ERP
central component with selective sensitivity for signals indicating the presence of
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ostensive communication, such as direct gaze and infant-directed speech (Parise
& Csibra, 2013), similar in morphology and scalp distribution to the Pb.
Kopp and Lindenberger (2011, 2012) have found more positive deflections for
the Pb in instances of low joint attention towards objects. In their studies, four-
(Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011) and nine-month-old (Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011)
infants were habituated towards a set of objects in the presence of an adult who
either engaged with the infant and the object (high joint attention) or only the
object (low joint attention). The high joint attention training the model pointed
at the object and looked at the infant and spoke in infant-directed speech. In
the control condition, direct gaze was avoided, actors only looked at the object
and the speech was a recording taken from another session. Therefore, although
both conditions used infant-directed speech, the actor in the low joint attention
condition did not address the infant or engaged in eye contact or referential sig-
nals. Afterwards, infants were presented with the familiar and a novel set of ob-
jects and had their EEG recorded. In a second session, a week later, infants were
presented with the same set of objects again and a new, third set of objects. Dif-
ferences in the Pb component only appeared during the second sessions. Four-
month-olds showed an enhanced positive Pb deflection for the low joint atten-
tion condition, and the nine-month-olds only displayed the more positive Pb for
familiar objects in the low joint attention condition.
Due to its latency, the presence of a Pb would indicate an early sensitivity to-
wards the presence of communication. The findings by Parise and Csibra (2013)
suggest that the Pb response linked to the main effect of communication may
indicate a preparedness-to-learn, in line with Natural Pedagogy (Csibra, 2010).
The results by Kopp and Lindenberger (2011, 2012) and Karrer et al. (1998) sug-
2.3. EEG correlates of action understanding and communication 51
gest that the Pb may also be linked to object processing, after communication,
and potentially reflect a process of knowledge contextualisation.
Based on these findings, we predict that communicatively presented action
outcomes will lead to a more positive deflection in the time windows and scalp
locations associated with the Pb component. However, we may also find that
addressing children leads to differentiated processing of the target of the com-
munication, i.e. the demonstrated actions and their outcomes.
The Nc component as a measure of attention and arousal
The Nc is an infant-specific component sensitive to attention and arousal (Ackles
& Cook, 1998, 2007; Ackles, 2008; Courchesne et al., 1981). The Nc component is
distributed fronto-centrally on the scalp and is expressed as a negative-ongoing
stretched peak between 400 and 800ms (Ackles, 2008; Courchesne et al., 1981).
The Nc is a relatively robust ERP component and has been observed in many
paradigms, with increased responses towards oddball stimuli (Ackles & Cook,
1998, 2007; Ackles, 2008; Courchesne et al., 1981) as well as familiar or novel
items (Hoehl et al., 2008; Reid et al., 2009). The Nc is not just sensitive to odd-
balls, and no increase in the Nc response is found if infants are already famil-
iar with the oddballs (Nelson & Collins, 1991, 1992). The Nc is also linked to a
deceleration of heart rate that correlates with infants’ attendance to the stimuli
(Richards, 2003). Additionally, infants show an increased Nc-response towards
familiar eating actions compared to a potentially novel non-eating action (e.g.
putting spoon to forehead), either because they are more familiar or because of
their interest in food (Reid et al., 2009). Due to this response pattern, it has been
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argued that the Nc reflects a general measure of attention and/or arousal towards
stimuli (Richards, 2003).
It is worth noting that the Nc is also sensitive to ostensive signals, and in-
creased Nc amplitudes have been observed in 5- (Parise, Reid, Stets, & Striano,
2008) and 9-month-old (Striano, Reid, & Hoehl, 2006) infants for objects cued
by gaze. However, infants also show a decreased Nc-response towards objects
that were previously gaze-cued (Hoehl et al., 2008). Therefore, an increase in the
negative deflection for the Nc for communicatively presented outcomes may in-
dicate that ostensive communication facilitates learning through attention and
arousal towards the stimuli. This may lend support to theories that emphasise
the role of attention and arousal in learning (as argued by Gredebäck et al., 2018;
Szufnarowska et al., 2014, but see: Csibra et al., 2018). Such a modulation of the
Nc can provide valuable information on the role that attention and arousal dur-
ing the processing of event sequences. However, the mere presence of differen-
tiated attention and arousal towards communicative contexts does not exclude
the possibility of a specialised system to detect communication and create a ref-
erential expectation, as proposed by Natural Pedagogy (Csibra, 2010).
Given these previous findings, we may observe an increased Nc response for
completed eating actions, replicating Reid et al. (2009). Furthermore, we can
expect an increased Nc for communicatively presented actions if communica-
tion leads to increased attention and arousal towards the action sequence. At
the same time, the Nc may also decrease if infants habituate to communicatively
presented actions faster (cf. object encoding in Hoehl et al., 2008).
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The N400 as a marker of semantic expectancy violations
The N400 component is argued to reflect the activation of semantic predictions.
It is commonly found in priming paradigms, where semantically incongruent
items following a prime show a more negative response compared to items that
are semantically congruent to the prime (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011). Orig-
inally, the N400 was found in studies on language comprehension when a sen-
tence primed the listener for a specific word, but a different, unrelated word
was delivered. The N400 is not only related to language, but also other kinds
of semantic information. It has been found in action observation, but also line
drawings, photographs, faces (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000) and actions sequences
(Amoruso et al., 2013).
The shape and morphology of the N400 varies with the stimuli content and
task, for example tasks involving visual stimuli show a stronger N400 in areas
associated with the processing of visual information. Furthermore, the action
N400 is typically associated with a positive deflection for the unexpected out-
come, rather than the negative deflection found in the linguistic N400 (Amoruso
et al., 2013; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000). Some authors also describe the N400 as
a negative peak within a larger positive deflection for the unexpected condition,
compared to the expected baseline that shows no peak (e.g. Reid et al., 2009).
The interpretation of the action N400 is strongly linked to its interpretation in
linguistic research (Amoruso et al., 2013). The linguistic N400 and action N400 do
not only share characteristics in morphology, timing, and the paradigms used to
elicit them, there are also developmental links between action N400 and linguis-
tic N400: Infants who show a larger action-N400 at 9 months also show a greater
vocabulary scores at 18 months (Kaduk et al., 2016).
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The linguistic N400 has been shown to be sensitive to pragmatic aspects
during communication, such as the listener’s knowledge about the speaker and
instances of false beliefs (Kulakova & Nieuwland, 2016; H. J. Ferguson, Cane,
Douchkov, & Wright, 2014; Hagoort, 2004). The N400 has also been found for
gestures (Amoruso et al., 2013). This indicates that the N400 is tightly linked to
the communicative context, but to our knowledge, there are no studies that have
investigated whether the interpretation of everyday actions is influenced by the
communicative context.
The stimuli used to investigate the linguistic N400 and the gesture N400 are by
definition communicatively presented, however, in the action N400 studies the
presentation is observational only. Although there is some crossover in studies
on gestures, gestures themselves are often conventionalised and communicative.
In the following study, we would like to investigate the effect of modifying the
communicative context on the understanding of everyday actions. Depending
on the interpretation of the N400 effect within the Natural Pedagogy Framework,
there are two alternative hypotheses:
• Since the N400 is linked to semantic processing, and the N400 is commonly
observed in communicative contexts, it is possible that the mean ampli-
tude between expected and unexpected actions is increased after being ad-
dressed.
• However, communicative contexts may prime infants towards novel infor-
mation (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Tatone & Csibra, 2015). Consequently, they
may show a decreased difference between the expected and unexpected
outcomes after being addressed communicatively.
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Because of the different predictions about whether communication primes in-
fants’ expectation towards novel or semantically familiar action outcomes, it is
important to also study the effect of communication on action understanding in
adults to establish a baseline response and identify key areas for analysis and we
will investigate the same hypotheses.
For the current study, we decided to investigate 9-month-old infants. Since
we predict that the presence of communicative signals prior to the action
demonstration potentially modulates the N400 and Nc components, we decided
to investigate an age group that shows a reliable response in these ERP compo-
nents. At the time of writing, the earliest evidence of an action understanding on
the N400 and Nc components has been found in 9-month-old infants (Kaduk et
al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009), but not in younger infants (Michel, Kaduk, et al., 2017;
Reid et al., 2009). Meanwhile, already younger children already have demon-
strated sensitivity towards communication on the Pb component. Therefore,
by the time infants reach 9 months, they should show evidence of all three ERP
components of interest.




Infants: Sixteen 9-month-old infants were included in the final sample (average
age: 278 days; range: 265–296 days; 9 females). They all matched the minimum
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criterion for inclusion of 8 usable trials per condition. An additional 19 infants
were excluded because they did not have enough artefact-free trials (N = 18) or
refused to wear the EEG cap (N = 1). This drop out rate is comparable to similar
research using EEG data with this age group (Hoehl & Wahl, 2012; Stets, Stahl,
& Reid, 2012). Infants were recruited through the Lancaster Babylab database
and received a book for their participation. The parents received £10.00 for their
travel expenses.
A further 12 infants participated in a pilot study to establish the optimal ra-
tio between the trial length and attrition rate and were not included in the final
sample.
Adults: Sixteen adults (average age: 21 years, range: 18–31 years, 6 females)
contributed usable data of more than eight usable trials per condition. An addi-
tional 4 adults were tested, but excluded because they provided less than 8 arte-
fact free trials per condition due to contamination in the alpha frequency band.
Participants were recruited through advertisements on the Lancaster University
campus and through the university’s online participant recruitment system. Par-
ticipants did not know any of the actors in the movies. They received £10 for their
participation.
The study was approved by the Lancaster University Research Ethics Com-
mittee. All participants gave their consent before to start the experiment.
Materials
The stimuli consisted of a video with an actor greeting the participant, followed
by six pairs of still images depicting everyday eating actions (c.f. Reid et al., 2009).
In the video, the actor greeted the participant either greeted the participants (os-
tensive condition) or did not greet them (non-ostensive control condition). In
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the ostensive condition, the actor looked straight, smiled, waved and greeted the
participant in infant-directed speech, saying: “Hello baby! Look!” (similar to
Yoon et al., 2008). In the control condition, the actor adopted a neutral facial ex-
pression, looked slightly below the line of sight without establishing eye contact
with the participant and speaking in a neutral, adult-directed speech “Oh, what’s
that.” (no rising intonation at the end, cf. Yoon et al., 2008).
Each series of images following the video included the action prime (e.g.
holding a spoon, consistent across all conditions), one picture for the anticipated
outcome (moving the spoon to the mouth) and one picture for the unanticipated
action outcome (moving the spoon to the ear). The objects used to prime the
actions were a spoon, an apple, and a cup (all anticipated target: mouth, unan-
ticipated target: hair/ear). We focussed on eating/drinking actions as these are
the actions infants are typically most familiar with (Domínguez-Martínez, Parise,
Strandvall, & Reid, 2015; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Hunnius & Bekkering,
2010; Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid & Striano, 2008; Reid et al., 2009). The total height
of the stimuli was approximately 24cm, which at a distance of 80cm from the
screen results in a visual angle of 17°. The distance between the two goal lo-
cations of the target picture was approximately 5 cm, which resulted in a visual
angle of 3.6°. To minimise eye movements (Hoehl & Wahl, 2012) that potentially
reduce the N400 in this paradigm (Domínguez-Martínez et al., 2015), we used
varying fixation points in the upper centre of the image on the actor’s head be-
fore the target image. The fixation points consisted of 200ms of different rotating
or pulsing images of approximately 0.5°in height. To ensure a clean baseline, the
movement/pulsing was frozen with a varying jitter between 200-400ms before
the onset of the outcome picture. An overview of the procedures and timings is
provided in Figure 2.1. Adults were presented with the same stimuli as infants.




















Figure 2.1: Running order of a block for Experiment 1. During the first trial of a block, the
actor looked at the object. During trials 2–6, children saw a still frame of the video. Within
a block, six trials were presented. All trials of a block showed different object-outcome
combinations.
Procedure
The procedure is based on the study by Reid et al. (2009), with the addition of an
explicit ostensive greeting and the non-ostensive control condition. The study
used a mixed design, in which all participants were exposed to ostensive and
control conditions, and both outcomes, anticipated and unanticipated. Further-
more, participants were presented with all actors and all action types. However,
within a particular combination of actor and action, participants only saw ei-
ther the ostensive or the control condition to avoid spill-over effects from the
ostensive conditions. To keep the presentation time brief and within the typical
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attention span of infants, the stimuli were presented in blocks of six actions per
greeting. Each block started with a yellow star being shown on screen and a pling
noise. This was followed by the greeting and six-picture sequences of each of the
three actions in a random order. The order of blocks was randomised.
Infants were sitting on the lap of their caregiver in front of a CRT screen at
a distance of approximately 80cm. They were wearing a 124-channel Geodesic
Sensor Net (HCGSN 130; EGI, Eugene, OR). A video camera recorded the infant’s
face, and we used the recordings to offline-reject those trials where the infant
was not attending the presentation screen. Caregivers were instructed to watch
their infant and not to talk or point during the experiment. A loop of a black
spiral moving on a grey screen was used as an attention getter if the infants dis-
engaged between trials. If the infant disengaged for longer periods, the experi-
ment would be paused and the experimenter entertained the infant by blowing
bubbles. The presentation ended if the infant became fussy or all blocks were
presented. On average, each infant watched 38 trials per condition of which 14
were usable (Communicative anticipated: 15/38, Communicative unanticipated:
15/38, Control anticipated: 12/38, Control unanticipated: 12/38).
The procedure for the adults was the same as in the infant study, apart from
some minor modifications: We used 128-channel Geodesic Sensor Nets, which
have additional electrodes in the eye region to record eye movements. Partic-
ipants were instructed to sit still and blink on the star image between blocks.
On average adults watched 41 trials per condition. Due to high levels of alpha
contamination and eye blinks, only 22 were usable on average (Communicative
anticipated: 21/41, Communicative unanticipated: 23/41, Control anticipated:
20/41, Control unanticipated: 23/41).
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EEG processing
The EEG signal was recorded using the Net Station Amplifier (Electrical
Geodesics Inc., Eugene, OR, USA) with a high-density EEG net at 500 Hz sam-
pling rate and a low pass filter of 200 Hz. The reference was on the vertex (Cz),
the ground electrode was placed between Cz and Pz.
Data was offline-filtered using a 0.3-30 Hz bandpass filter and segmented into
epochs of 1100 ms based on the onset of the outcome picture. The first 200 ms
of each epoch analysed was used for baseline correction. After stimuli onset the
target period for the ERP analysis is 900 ms (see Figure 2.1). Infants were only in-
cluded in the analysis if they attended at least 8 artefact-free trials per condition.
The segments were extracted with a baseline of 200 ms and a length of 900 ms.
Net Station’s (Electrical Geodesics Inc., Eugene, OR, USA) artefact detection (In-
fants: Data were rejected for body and eyes movements when the average am-
plitude of a 640 ms gliding window exceeded 55µV at horizontal EOG channels,
140µV at vertical EOG channels and 200µV at any other channel, Adults: Data
were rejected when average amplitude of an 80 ms gliding window exceeded
80µV at EOG channels and 50µV at any other channel) was used to filter out bad
trials and channels. Data were also visually edited offline for artefacts and to en-
sure that included trials were those where the infant was attending to the screen.
Bad channels of accepted trials were replaced using Net Station’s bad channel re-
placement spline interpolation and all trials were baseline corrected. Segments
containing more than 13 bad channels were excluded. All trials were averaged
per condition and exported to R statistics software, version 3.4.1 (R Core Team,
2017).
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Statistical analyses
Time windows and EEG channels for each component were analysed based on
previous research (Ackles, 2008; Ackles & Cook, 2007; Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011,
2012; Parise & Csibra, 2013; Reynolds, 2015) and visual inspection of the data.
We investigated the Pb and Nc component in the same fronto-central area
(electrode sites 5, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 24, 106, 112, 118, 124, corresponding
to the area between F3, Fz, F4 and Cz in the 10-20 system). The time window for
the Pb was 200–350 ms, and 350-700 ms for the Nc, and we analysed the average
deflection within these time windows.
The N400 was similar location to previous research (Reid et al., 2009; Kaduk
et al., 2016; Domínguez-Martínez et al., 2015) on the electrodes 60, 61, 62, 66,
67, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 84, 85, corresponding to the area around Pz in the 10-
20 system. The N400 in previous research (Reid et al., 2009; Kaduk et al., 2016;
Domínguez-Martínez et al., 2015) was expressed as a negative peak in the unex-
pected condition, but no peak in the expected condition. In order to analyse this
effect, these studies used the window analysis technique of Hoormann, Falken-
stein, Schwarzenau, and Hohnsbein (1998), as it is suitable for analyses that con-
tain a peak in one but not the other conditions. For this analysis, the ANOVA
includes time as an additional within-subjects variable, with 11 samples of 12ms
length across the time window of interest and allows to establish whether the dif-
ference between the ERPs changes over time. However, in our data, there was
no discernible peak apparent in the unexpected conditions that would warrant
the use of this analysis technique and we analysed the averaged voltages for each
condition.
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We conducted 2× 2 repeated measures ANOVAs with Communication (os-
tensive vs. control) and Outcome (expected vs. unexpected) as within-subject
factors for all components using the aov and the ezANOVA package. Effect sizes
are reported using Generalised Eta Squared (η2G , see Bakeman, 2005, for details).
Contrast codings were calculated with the lsmeans package by Lenth (2016).
In addition to the ANOVA, we also used Bayesian Factor analyses. Bayes
Factors allow us to evaluate whether the evidence supports the null hypothesis
(Dienes, 2008, 2014, 2016; Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018; Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). Bayes
Factors can be interpreted like null hypothesis testing with a cut-off of p < .05: A
Bayes Factor of less than 1/3 can be interpreted as evidence in support of the null
hypothesis, a Bayes Factor of 3 or larger can be interpreted as evidence in favour
of the alternative hypotheses. Values between 1/3 and 3 can be interpreted as in-
sufficient evidence for either hypothesis (Dienes, 2016). Bayes Factors also have
an intuitive interpretation of denoting the likelihood of one hypothesis over an
alternative hypothesis. For example, a Bayes Factor B(H1|H0) = 10 indicates that
H1 is ten times more likely than H0. Jeffreys (1961) offers a scale to interpret the
strength of evidence. According to this scale, Bayes Factors between 1–3 offer
only anecdotal evidence, between 3–10 Bayes Factors offer substantial, between
10–30 strong and between 30–100 very strong evidence. Bayes Factors of 100 or
larger show decisive evidence in favour of the hypothesis (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014).
We calculated Bayes Factors to identify whether theoretically motivated dif-
ferences observed between ERP components were meaningfully different. These
analyses were carried out using a uniform distribution (BU (H1|H0)), specifying the
lower and upper boundaries of an expected ERP effect. To set these boundaries,
we surveyed the literature. Fu, Bin, Dienes, Fu, and Gao (2013) have used 1µV
as the smallest difference in an ERP component between conditions. Previous
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studies investigating similar components (Reid et al., 2009; Kaduk et al., 2016)
typically revealed differences of up to 7.5µV and we set 10µV as a cautious up-
per limit on any predicted effect.
For the analysis of the N400, we also had specific predictions about the rela-
tion of the N400 between communicative and control conditions. We conducted
a series of follow up tests using the difference between anticipated and unantic-
ipated outcomes in the control condition to predict the differences in the com-
municative condition. Bayes Factors (BN (H1|H0)) were calculated assuming two-
tailed normally distributed mean differences between anticipated and unantici-
pated outcomes in the control condition to predict whether the presence of com-
munication: (1) does not affect the N400 deflection (2) enhances the N400 de-
flection or (3) attenuates the N400 deflection. These hypotheses predicted the
difference in the communicative condition by taking (1) the mean of the control
condition (2) doubling the mean or (3) halving the mean.
Results
Pb component
A 2×2 ANOVA shows no significant effects in the Pb-response (all ps > .26, see
Table A.1 for details and Figure 2.2 for the ERP plot).
For the Bayes Factor analysis, we investigated the main effect of Communi-
cation using a uniform distribution. We predicted a difference between the com-
municative and control condition of 1 to 10µV and find evidence of an absence
of a main effect for Communication (∆MCOM−C T L = 0.07µV ,SE = 0.93,BU (1,10) =
0.04).
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Nc Component
The 2× 2 ANOVA showed no significant main effects or interaction on the PB
response between Communication and Outcome (all ps > .49, see Table A.2 for




























































































































Figure 2.2: ERP waveforms for the Pb (200-400 ) and Nc (350–700 ms) of the infant data in
Experiment 1.
Furthermore, the analysis of the main effect of Communication (∆M =
−0.44,SE = 0.91) found evidence against the hypotheses that communicatively
presented action outcomes are more positive (BU (−1,−10) = 0.08) or more more
negative than (BU (1,10) = 0.02) compared to the control stimuli. The Bayes Factor
analysis for Outcome showed evidence against a more negative Nc response
compared for anticipated action outcomes (BU (1,10) = 0.01). Finally, investigating
potential interaction effects, we found insufficient evidence to suggest that the
difference between anticipated and unanticipated Outcomes is the same in the
communicative condition (∆M = −1.34,SE = 1.42) and the control condition
(∆M =−0.01,SE = 1.42,BN (−0.01,−1.34) = 1.0).
N400 component
Infants: The ANOVA showed a significant main effect for Outcome (F (1,15) =
10.03, p = .006,η2G = 0.20). This effect is driven by a more negative deflec-
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tion for anticipated (M = −3.29µV ,SE = 1.28) compared to unanticipated (M =
1.13µV ,SE = 1.28) outcomes. All other effects did not reach significance (all
ps > .25, see Table A.3 for details).
The Bayes Factor analysis supports these results by indicating strong sup-
port for a statistically meaningful main effect of Outcome (∆M =−4.43µV ,SE =
1.40,BU (−1,−10) = 58). For the planned contrasts, we find decisive evidence in
support of a meaningful outcome effect as expressed through the difference be-
tween anticipated and unanticipated outcomes in the communicative condition
(∆M = −5.50µV ,SE = 1.65,BU (−1,−10) = 110) and moderate evidence in the con-




























































































































Figure 2.3: ERP waveforms for the N400 component (600-800 ms) of the infant sample in
Experiment 1
In a follow-up analysis, we investigated the effects in more detail, as there are
three potential hypotheses: (1) Communication and Control show the same dif-
ference between anticipated and unanticipated outcomes (BN (−3.3|−5.50) = 112)
(2) Communication enhances the N400 response and infants show twice the dif-
ference between anticipated and unanticipated in the communicative condition
(BN (−6.6|−5.50) = 147) (3) Communication attenuates the N400 response, and in-
fants only show half the difference between anticipated and unanticipated in the
communicative condition (BN (−1.7|−5.50) = 46). The Bayesian analysis also allows
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us to directly compare these hypotheses, suggesting that Hypothesis 2 that in-
fants show an enhanced N400 response has the strongest support. It is 1.3 times
more likely than Hypothesis 1, and 3.2 times more likely than Hypothesis 3.
Adults: There was a significant interaction between action Communi cati on
and Outcome (F (1,15) = 15.06, p = .001,η2G = 0.12) and a main effect of
Outcome (F (1,15) = 7.17, p = .002,η2G = 0.23) that was driven by the dif-
ference between anticipated (M = 0.88µV ,SE = 0.38) and unanticipated
(M = 1.88µV ,SE = 0.38) action outcomes. The main effect of Communica-





























































































































Figure 2.4: ERP waveforms for the N400 component (300–500 ms) of the adult sample in
Experiment 1
We conducted t-tests on the contrasts of each level of Communication to
analyse the interaction. In the communicative condition, unanticipated ac-
tions were more positive (M = 2.18µV , SE = 0.41) compared to anticipated ones
(M = 0.53µV , SE = 0.41) and this difference is statistically significant (t (20.83)=
−4.034, p = .0006). However, in the control condition, anticipated outcomes
(M = 1.23µV , SE = 0.41) were not significantly different to unanticipated out-
comes (M = 1.58µV , SE = 0.41, t (20.83)=−0.85, p = .40).
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The Bayes Factor shows only anecdotal evidence for a potentially meaningful
effect of Outcome (BU (−1,−10) = 1.9). Further analyses on subsets of communica-
tive and control condition reveal strong evidence support of the hypothesis of a
statistically meaningful difference between anticipated and unanticipated out-
comes in the communicative condition (∆M = −1.66µV ,SE = 0.41,BU (−1,−10) =
369. However, there is evidence against this effect in the control condition
(∆M =−0.35µV ,SE = 0.41,BU (−1,−10) = 0.009).
We conducted the same follow-up analysis as we did for the infant sam-
ple, to investigate the effect of Communi cati on on the N400 ERP compo-
nent. (1) Communication and Control show no difference in their N400 re-
sponse (BN (−0.35|−1.66) = 43) (2) Communication doubles the N400 response as
measured by the difference between anticipated and unanticipated outcomes
(BN (−0.70|−1.66) = 315) (3) Communication attenuates the N400 response, and in-
fants only show half the difference between anticipated and unanticipated in
the communicative condition (BN (−0.17|−1.66) = 12.7). The Bayes Factor analysis
suggests that once again that Hypothesis 2, predicting that the presence of com-
munication increases the N400, receives the strongest support. It is 7 times more
likely than Hypothesis 1 suggesting that both values are the same and 24 times
more likely than Hypothesis 3 predicting an attenuating effect of Communica-
tion on the N400.
Discussion: Experiment 1
Infants in Experiment 1 did not show any evidence that the presence of commu-
nication or unexpected outcomes modulates their Pb or Nc components. Even
though an interaction effect of Communication and Outcome on the N400 is
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not detected by traditional ANOVA in the infant sample, we were able to detect
meaningful differences between anticipated and unanticipated Outcomes in the
communicative and the control condition. By comparing specific hypotheses on
the directions of the effect, we were able to establish that it is most likely that
communication enhances the N400 response, whereas unanticipated action out-
comes show a more negative deflection in the communicative condition, com-
pared to the control. The adults in Experiment 1 show an interaction between
Communication and Outcome on the N400. By looking at this effect in more
detail, we were able to establish that adults, like the infants, appear to show
a larger difference between anticipated and unanticipated outcomes for com-
municatively presented outcomes. But unlike the infants, there is evidence that
adults did not show such a difference in the control condition.
2.5 Experiment 2: Ostensive-referential communi-
cation and action semantics
Experiment 1 investigated whether communication helps infants to interpret ev-
eryday actions, such as eating. The absence of an effect of communication may
be explained by the absence of the object and/or referential signals that link the
communication with the object-action the actor is about to perform. In particu-
lar, research with toddlers has shown that parents use more referential but fewer
ostensive signals during sincere and pretence interactions, compared to humor-
ous ones (Hoicka, 2016). It is possible that 9-month-old infants need a reference
to the object in order to focus their attention during the action. Alternatively, a
referential signal to the object might create a referential expectation of how that
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object will be used and that ostension has an effect only if it is followed by a refer-
ential signal to the object (Senju & Csibra, 2008; Senju, Csibra, & Johnson, 2008).
To investigate this possibility, we conducted a second experiment and changed
the procedure in the following ways: (1) the object is now present during the
greeting and during the first block of the trial, the actor looks at the infant and
at the object; (2) each block depicts only one action to retain the first referential
look towards the object.
We were also concerned that the infants in our paradigm may be less likely to
learn from actors that are doing something that they know is wrong. Numerous
studies with toddlers and older children have shown that infants are less likely
to imitate in such conditions (Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Poulin-Dubois, Brooker,
& Polonia, 2011; Tummeltshammer et al., 2014; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, &
Daum, 2010). It is possible that observing the very same actor performing con-
gruent and incongruent actions lead to the null result on the N400 component as
a function of communication. In Experiment 2 each actor only presented either
congruent or incongruent trials.
Method
Participants
Infants: The final sample contained 16 infants 9-month-old infants (average
age = 270 days, range = 254–282 days, 7 female). An additional 18 infants did not
provide 8 usable trials per condition.
Adults: The sample contained sixteen adults (average age = 35 years,
range =19–62 years, 8 female). Two additional adults were tested but did not
provide usable data because they did not provide the minimum number of
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usable trials due to contamination in the alpha frequency band (1) and due to
technical problems with the experimental procedure (1).
Stimuli
As in Experiment 1, we recorded four new actors (four female) engaged in every-
day actions, as well as the greetings clips. We also created a transparent image
of the action-related objects, so that the object could be superimposed onto the
greeting. Furthermore, during the first greeting of a block, after looking at the
child (communicative condition) or looking below the child’s line of sight (con-
trol condition), the actor always looked at the object. This required that the ob-
ject is kept constant during each block, rather than cycling through different ob-
jects as in Experiment 1. Actors used short verbal greetings before each of the
trials. An overview of the procedures and timings is provided in Figure 2.5. Apart
from these changes, the stimuli were the same.
Procedure
We made the following changes to the procedure:
• Actors were consistently congruent or incongruent to make it easier for in-
fants to follow the procedure. Once again, an actor was either ostensive
or control. The way an actor communicates to the infant (ostensive/non-
ostensive) was counterbalanced across participants
• Instead of showing a still frame from the greeting at the beginning of each
trial, we showed a short video of the actor greeting the child with a single
word (Communicative: “Hey”, “Look”, “Hello”, “Wow”, Control: “Ok”, “Well”,
“Yeah.", “Hmm")






















Figure 2.5: Running order of a block for Experiment 2. During the first trial of a block,
the actor looked at the object. During trials 2–6, the actor only addressed the child with
a short phrase. Within a block, six trials were presented. All trials of a block showed the
same object-outcome.
Apart from these changes, the procedure, the processing of the EEG signals
and the statistical analyses of the results were just as in Experiment 1.
On average, each infant watched 38 trials per condition of which 14 were us-
able (Communicative anticipated: 13/37, Communicative unanticipated: 12/37,
Control anticipated: 11/37, Control unanticipated: 11/36).
Adults watched 83 trials per condition on average, of which 32 were us-
able (Communicative anticipated: 43/83, Communicative unanticipated: 43/83,
Control anticipated: 39/83, Control unanticipated: 45/83).
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Results
Pb
The infant-specific Pb effect in the second study showed a significant interaction
between Communication and Outcome (F (1,15) = 9.609, p = .007,η2G = 0.135,
see Figure 2.6). In the presence of infant-directed communication, anticipated
outcomes (M = 3.64µV ,SE = 0.93) lead to a more positive deflection compared
to the unanticipated (M = 1.43µV ,SE = 0.93, t (29.10) = 1.88, p = .07). In the
control condition, this effect is reversed, and unanticipated outcomes (M =
3.72µV ,SE = 0.93) show a more positive deflection compared to anticipated out-
comes (M = 1.26µV ,SE = 0.93, t (29.10)=−2.10, p = .045).
In the Bayes Factor analysis on the communicative of control conditions on
each of the levels of Outcome, we found evidence against communicatively pre-
sented action outcomes being more positive than control (∆M = 0.04µV ,SE =
0.98,BU (1,10) = 0.04). This is due to the interaction that we also found in the
traditional analysis: In the communicative condition, there is moderate evi-
dence that anticipated outcomes are more positive than unanticipated outcomes
(∆M = 2.47µV ,SE = 0.98,BU (1,10) = 4.91). In the control condition, there is mod-
erate evidence for a reverse effect (∆M = −2.29µV ,SE = 0.98,BU (−1,−10) = 3.82).
We directly contrasted both values by running an additional analysis by using
the difference between Anticipated and Unanticipated Outcomes in the Commu-
nicative condition to predict the values in the Control condition. We found strong
evidence against the hypothesis that these differences are the same BN (2.47,−2.2) =
0.10), thereby supporting the presence of an interaction.
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Nc Component
We found a marginally significant interaction of Communi cati on and
Outcome (F (1,15) = 4.18, p = .06,η2G = 0.049). There were no significant
main effects (all ps > 0.20, see Table A.6 for details and Figure 2.6 for the
ERP plot). In order to investigate this interaction, we conducted conducted
t-tests on the contrasts of the two levels of Communi cati on. In the com-
municative condition, there was no significant difference between anticipated
(M = 3.12µV ,SE = 0.99) and unanticipated outcomes (M = 2.91µV ,SE = 0.99,
t (28.07) = 0.18, p = 0.86). However, in the control condition anticipated out-
comes showed a less positive response (M = 1.90µV ,SE = 0.99), compared to
unanticipated ones (M = 4.51µV ,SE = 0.99, t (28.07)=−2.30, p = 0.03).
The Bayes Factor analysis found evidence against a main effect of Outcome,
suggesting that there is no meaningful, more negative Nc response for antici-
pated compared to unanticipated outcomes (∆M = −1.20,SE = 0.90, BU (1,10) =
0.004). Furthermore, the analysis of the main effect of communication (∆M =
−0.19,SE = 1.12) found evidence against the hypotheses that communicatively
presented action outcomes are more positive (BU (1,10) = 0.05) or more more neg-
ative than (BU (−1,−10) = 0.07) compared to the control stimuli.
By looking at each of the levels of communication, we found evidence against
a meaningful difference between anticipated and unanticipated outcomes in the
communicative condition (∆M = 0.20,SE = 1.13,BU (−1,−10) = 0.046). However, in
the control condition, anticipated outcomes are less positive than unanticipated
outcomes (∆M = −2.61,SE = 1.13,BU (−1,−10) = 4.13). Furthermore, there is evi-
dence against the hypothesis that the difference between anticipated and unan-
74 Chapter 2. Action semantics during communication
ticipated outcomes in the communicative is the same as in the control condition




























































































































Figure 2.6: ERP waveforms for the Pb (200-400 ) and Nc (350–700 ms) of the infant data in
Experiment 2.
N400
Infants: The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Outcome (F (1,15) = 7.09, p =
0.02,η2G = 0.15) with anticipated action outcomes (M = −4.09,SE = 1.14)
eliciting a more negative deflection compared to unanticipated action out-
comes (M = −0.04,SE = 1.14, see Figure 2.7). We did not find a main effect
of Communi cati on and the Communi cati on ×Outcome interaction (all
ps > .15, see Table A.7 and Figure 2.7) for details.
For the Bayes Factor analyses, we found some evidence for an effect of
outcome (∆M = −4.05µV ,SE = 1.52, BU (−1,−10) = 14). Analyses of the con-
trasts showed moderate evidence that communicatively presented images
had a greater difference between anticipated and unanticipated outcomes
(∆M = −5.06µV ,SE = 2.16, BU (−1,−10) = 9), but only anecdotal evidence
of such an N400 effect for the control stimuli (∆M = −3.03µV ,SE = 2.16,
BU (−1,−10) = 1.33)




























































































































Figure 2.7: ERP waveforms for the N400 component (600-800 ms) of the infant sample in
Experiment 2
To test the specific hypotheses on the modulation of communication on the
N400, we ran a Bayesian analysis and one sample t-tests for the communica-
tive condition using the mean of the control condition to predict the mean of
the communicative condition. All models show moderate evidence by the data.
The best model is once again Hypothesis 2 predicting an increased N400 re-
sponse in the presence of communication (BN (−6.08,−5.06) = 11.7). This is fol-
lowed by Hypothesis 2 predicting that the mean amplitude in the communica-
tive condition is the same as the control condition (BN (−3.03,−5.06) = 9.4). Hypoth-
esis 3, predicting an attenuated N400 response, is the lowest-performing model
(BN (−1.51,−5.06) = 5.1). However, these effects are small and Hypothesis 2 has only
anecdotal evidence in favour of an enhanced over Hypothesis 3 predicting an
attenuated N400 response (B(H2,H3) = 1.24) and Hypothesis 1, predicting no dif-
ference between conditions (B(H2,H1) = 2.29).
Adults: No main effect or interaction was significant (all p > .16, see Table A.8
and Figure 2.8 for details, Figure 2.8 for the ERP plot).
The Bayesian analysis supports this conclusion: There is evidence against
a main effect of outcome (∆M = −0.33µV ,SE = 0.22,BU (−1,−10) = 0.0002) and
there is evidence against a difference between anticipated and unanticipated





























































































































Figure 2.8: ERP waveforms for the N400 component (300–500 ms) of the adult sample in
Experiment 2.
outcomes in the communicative (∆M = −0.20µV ,SE = 0.30,BU (−1,−10) = 0.008)
and the control condition (∆M = −0.44µV ,SE = 0.30, BU (−1,−10) = 0.0003). Be-
cause of the absence of a meaningful N400 effect altogether and for both condi-
tions, no further analyses have been conducted.
Additional analyses
Cross experiment comparison—Pb: To investigate whether the different results
in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 on the Pb component reflect a difference
between the two experiments, we conducted a three-way ANOVA with Experi-
ment as a between-subject factor, and Outcome and Communication as within-
subjects factors. We found a significant interaction of E xper i ment×Outcome×
Communi cati on as within-subjects factors (F (1,30)= 8.86, p = .006,η2G = 4.83,
see Table A.9) in addition to a main effect of Experiment (F (1,30) = 4.20, p =
.05,η2G = 4.58).
Cross experiment comparison—Nc: To investigate whether the differ-
ent results in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 on the Nc component re-
flect different ERP responses, we also conducted a three-way ANOVA
with E xper i ment as a between, and Outcome and Communi cati on as
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within-subjects factors. The only significant main effect was of Experiment
(F (1,30)= 15.16, p = .0005,η2G = 0.17), with Experiment 1 giving a more negative
Nc response overall (∆ME xp.1−E xp.2 =−3.80,SE = 0.97, t (30)= 5.218, p = .0005).
Cross experiment comparison—N400 Infants: We found main effects of Out-
come for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 on the parietal N400 component. How-
ever, the Bayesian analysis showed that there is a potential interaction with Com-
munication, whereas communicatively presented action outcomes lead to an
increased N400 effect (as measured by the difference between anticipated and
unanticipated outcomes), compared to the non-communicative control condi-
tion. It is possible that this interaction might reach significance when both data
sets are pooled. Therefore, we conducted a three-way ANOVA E xper i ment as a
between, and Outcome and Communi cati on as within-subjects factors. The
analysis revealed no effect of Experiment as a main effect or interaction (See Ta-
ble A.11 for details). Once again, the main effect of Outcome is the only main
effect reaching statistical significance (F (1,30)= 11.95, p = .002,η2G = 0.086), with
unanticipated outcomes (M =−3.41,SE = 0.86) showing a more negative deflec-
tion than anticipated outcomes (M = 0.10,SE = 0.86).
Cross experiment comparison—N400 Adults: The adults in Experiment 1
demonstrated an interesting interaction between Communication and Out-
come, whereas the adults in Experiment 2 did not show any effect of Com-
munication and Outcome. We were interested whether this difference reflects
a genuine, statistically reliable difference between both experimental groups
and conducted a three-way ANOVA E xper i ment as a between, and Outcome
and Communi cati on as within-subjects factors. This analysis showed a sig-
nificant interaction of the highest order (F (1,30) = 8.96, p = .005,η2G = 0.022)
in addition to the second-order interaction involving Communication and
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Outcome (F (1,30) = 4.19, p = .049,η2G = 0.01) and the main effect of Outcome
(F (1,30)= 9.32, p = .005,η2G = 0.062), See Table A.12 for details).
Discussion Experiment 2
One of the key findings of Experiment 2 is the interaction effect at the Pb. We
found a more positive deflection towards communicatively presented outcomes
in the anticipated condition. However, for the unanticipated condition, this ef-
fect was reversed. Assuming that this component is related to the one observed
by (Parise & Csibra, 2013), the presence of this component may reflect a process
of information seeking and already by 9 months, infants potentially take into
account both, communication and action outcomes. Furthermore, our cross-
experiment analysis has shown that this effect differs between Experiment 1, and
Experiment 2.
The findings on the Nc tentatively replicate and extend previous findings by
Reid et al. (2009) as they indicate that in non-communicative contexts, infants
show greater arousal towards familiar or eating actions when infants are not di-
rectly addressed, but in the presence of communication this difference disap-
pears. Notably, the cross-experiment comparison cannot rule out that this effect
is limited to Experiment 2 only.
We have been able to replicate the results of the N400 effect of Outcome for
the infant sample. Once again, we found a main effect of Outcome using tradi-
tional analyses. Additionally, the Bayes Factor analysis revealed a similar pattern
in Experiment 2 that we already found in Experiment 1, supporting the hypoth-
esis that communication leads to an enhanced N400 effect as expressed through
a larger difference between anticipated and unanticipated outcomes in the com-
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municative compared to the control condition. We have found this pattern in
three of the four data sets, with the exception of the adults in Experiment 2. The
adults in Experiment 2 did not show any evidence in support of an N400. It is
likely that the revised, predictable relationship between actors and action out-
comes allowed adults to predict even the unanticipated action conclusions and
attribute meaning to them.
2.6 General discussion
In the current study, we investigated three ERP components that are known to
be associated with infants’ semantic understanding of events (N400), allocation
of attention and arousal (Nc) and the presence of communicative signals and/or
contextual interpretation (Pb). The ERP components in this study showed a com-
plex pattern in infants’ response towards congruent and incongruent action out-
comes in communicative and non-communicative contexts. Infants in both ex-
periments showed a clear effect of action outcome on the N400, replicating previ-
ous research on the N400 ERP in infants (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009) and
adults (Amoruso et al., 2013; Domínguez-Martínez et al., 2015). Furthermore, we
observed a potentially enhanced response towards communicatively presented
action outcomes. Effects on the Pb and the Nc components were only visible in
Experiment 2, when ostensive signals were combined with referential signals and
action outcomes were more predictable.
The results of the Nc component are important in assessing whether com-
munication helps to facilitate processing by allocating more attention or arousal
towards the processing of action outcomes. In Experiment 1 we did not repli-
cate previous findings that congruent eating actions lead to an increased Nc re-
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sponse and we used Bayesian Factors to establish the absence of an effect. In
Experiment 2, we also did not find a reliable Nc effect of Communication for ei-
ther Communication or Outcome. However, the interaction term only marginally
missed significance. Planned comparisons using Bayes Factors indicated a dif-
ferentiated response between communicatively and non-communicatively pre-
sented actions. For the communicatively presented action outcomes, no differ-
ence is detectable. However, non-communicatively presented action outcomes
elicited a more negative deflection for anticipated action outcomes. These re-
sults provide an indication that infants may only show heightened arousal to-
wards completed eating actions in non-communicative conditions, replicating
previous research by Reid et al. (2009). However in the presence of communi-
cation show similar levels of arousal and attention. Importantly, this difference
only came into play when the stimuli were sufficiently predictable and or actors
used referential signals to establish a link between the communication and the
object-action relationship. Since the Nc reflects novelty or arousal and decreases
with repeated stimuli presentation (Nikkel & Karrer, 1994; Wiebe et al., 2006), it is
possible that the communicative presentation lead to increased habituation to-
wards unexpected action outcomes, however in the non-communicative control
habituation is slowed down. Similar effects have been observed by Hoehl et al.
(2008) for objects cued by gaze, compared to those that were not cued. Such an
effect would be indicative of communication modulating arousal across a num-
ber of trials, rather than arousal modulating learning. Further research will be
needed to tease apart the specific effects of referential signals and action struc-
ture. Furthermore, a trial-level analysis of the progression of Pb and Nc compo-
nents could potentially shed light on processes of learning and novelty detection
that may have been masked by the averaging of ERP components.
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Previous studies on the Nc component have found effects of communi-
cation on infants’ object processing (Hoehl et al., 2008; Parise et al., 2008).
However, in these studies infants received a live training with an actor that was
either communicative or non-communicative. It is possible that only real life
communication is sufficient in boosting infants’ arousal to support learning.
However, previous research using screen-based paradigms has demonstrated
that infants use communicatively presented information differently to non-
communicatively presented information (eg. Hernik & Csibra, 2015). Further-
more, neither of the studies revealed a main effect of communication in the Nc
component. Therefore, they provide evidence against a purely attention-driven
account of infants’ understanding of everyday actions during communication.
On the N400 ERP component, both infant samples show a clear main effect
of outcome. The findings on the N400 component show a complex response pat-
tern for infants. Both infant groups show main effects of outcome in the ANOVA.
This replicates previous research on infants’ action understanding that found a
sensitivity towards incongruent action outcomes from at least 9 months onwards
(Reid et al., 2009), or possibly even at the age of 5 months with simplified stimuli
that only showed the outcome of the action (Michel, Kaduk, et al., 2017).
The results of the adult N400 ERPs show a complex pattern: The ANOVA in Ex-
periment 1 indicated a main effect of outcome. However, the planned contrasts
using Bayes Factors indicated a meaningful difference between anticipated and
unanticipated conditions in the communicative condition only. In the control
condition, the difference between both conditions was smaller than the 1–10µV
difference. These divergent results are due to both analyses asking different ques-
tions: Whereas the ANOVA is testing for an overall effect of each of the factors and
the interaction term, the Bayes Factor analysis looks at the difference between
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anticipated and unanticipated outcomes on each level of communication indi-
vidually, testing whether the difference between these conditions is within the
parameters typically expected for ERP effects. But what about adults in Exper-
iment 2 who showed no evidence of an N400 effect overall? It is likely that the
more predictable design, in particular actors having clear, distinct roles either
anticipated or unanticipated outcomes, allowed participants to anticipate the
incongruent action outcomes. This effect mirrors previous research that found
adults quickly learn to anticipate unexpected action outcomes, but children be-
tween 6 to 16 months do not (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). It is possible that
adults find it easier to process a change in the goal outcome. In fact, adults are
aware of the experimental context and may perceive the incongruent action out-
comes as being meaningful within the experimental context (Watzlawick, Bave-
las, & Jackson, 1967).
Another key finding of the N400 is related to the predictions that we can de-
rive from Natural Pedagogy. As we discussed in the introduction, we can derive
two distinct predictions of the effect of communication on the N400 ERP. The
presence of communication might prime meaningful information, and children
are even more likely to anticipate the congruent action outcomes. This is also the
interpretation that is most closely linked to the linguistic N400, since it appears
in communicative contexts. Alternatively, infants may expect adults to provide
novel information that they can learn and generalise from. Of course, it is also
possible that the presence of communicative signals does not influence the N400
ERP, either because children do not process pedagogically presented actions dif-
ferently to non-pedagogically presented ones, or Natural Pedagogy uses a differ-
ent neural mechanism to alter infants’ learning. However, three of the four data
sets provide evidence that the presence of communication enhances the N400
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response. Furthermore, the overall pattern of results in the adult sample of Ex-
periment 1 mirrors the results we found in the infant samples, and the hypothe-
sis that the presence of communication enhances the N400 response was more
likely than the hypothesis that both differences are the same for control or com-
municative conditions, or that communication attenuates the N400 response. In
summary, we have found some evidence of an enhanced N400 effect for com-
municatively presented action outcomes, strengthening accounts that support
enhanced semantic processing in the presence of communicative signals.
The results of the Pb indicate that this component is responsive to the pres-
ence of communication and action outcomes, which suggests it is not a direct
index of pedagogical or domain-general learning mechanisms. We did not ob-
serve a Pb effect in Experiment 1, and, using Bayes Factors, were able to establish
its absence for this sample. However, in Experiment 2 we found evidence of a
Pb component preceding the Nc. The location and timing are similar to a com-
ponent identified in previous research on infants’ understanding of multimodal
communicative signals (Parise & Csibra, 2013) and object memory in low and
high joint attention contexts (Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011, 2012). However, the
ERPs investigated in our study are time-locked to the outcome of the action, after
the infant has been, or not been, ostensively addressed. Therefore the paradigm
is different from previous research on Pb and Pb-like components (Parise & Csi-
bra, 2013; Kopp & Lindenberger, 2011, 2012).
The Pb has been linked to to the contextual interpretation of events (Karrer
et al., 1998). In our study, the Pb shows sensitivity towards action outcomes, be-
yond the sensitivity towards the presence of communication. The latency of the
Pb indicates that this process precedes the semantic understanding indexed by
the N400. It is possible that the Pb reflects a general information-seeking process
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that takes into account familiarity (of the action), and the presence of communi-
cation.
It is possible that the reduced complexity and higher predictability in Exper-
iment 2 poised infants to process take into account both sources of information
accordingly. We may have observed the interaction in the Pb component only be-
cause the presentation in Experiment 2 is more predictable and allowed infants
to link actors and outcomes to learn about their reliability. Prior research indi-
cates that the Pb increases over repeated presentations (Nikkel & Karrer, 1994).
Any such effect would disappear in Experiment 1, where actors were engaged in
expected and unexpected action outcomes within one experimental session.
The other key manipulation in Experiment 2 was the addition of referential
signals before each block of action presentations, and may have had an effect on
the Pb component. Parents use more referential signals in instances of general-
isable interactions with their children, such as sincere demonstrations and pre-
tence, but they use more ostensive signals when engaging in non-generalisable
demonstrations, such as joking (Hoicka, 2016; Hoicka, Butcher, Malla, & Harris,
2017). Therefore, the presentation in Experiment 1 might have primed children
to expect a non-generalisable joking context, and show a non-differentiated re-
sponse towards actions and communication. However, the addition of referential
signals in Experiment 2 might have initialised infants’ expectation that the pre-
sentations are sincere, and the resulting pedagogical context may have lead to
the differentiated response on the Pb. So far, studies with older children of 3 to
4-years have shown that children avoid trusting informants with humorous in-
tentions, but are willing to trust a previously humorous informant in a sincere
context(Hoicka et al., 2017).
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If the actor is communicative and engages in a familiar action, infants may be
looking for novel, relevant information to interpret the meaning of the commu-
nication. If they are then presented with the unexpected action outcome, they
may perceive this outcome as the resolution of the informative intention. How-
ever, seeing the familiar action may be insufficient to resolve the communicative
intention, and infants continue looking for the meaning of the shown action.
An alternative explanation of the reduced Pb response in the communicative
condition reflects is an early marker of epistemic vigilance (Mascaro & Sperber,
2009; Mascaro, Morin, & Sperber, 2017). According to this interpretation, infants
are less interested in learning from people that they know to be wrong, mirroring
research in 9-month-olds (Tummeltshammer et al., 2014) older children (Poulin-
Dubois et al., 2011; Zmyj et al., 2010), in order to avoid being manipulated by
others. However, if the actor makes no effort to address the infants, their unex-
pected actions are unlikely to reflect attempted manipulations and potentially
worth contextualising.
In addition to an enhanced Pb for anticipated action outcomes in the com-
municative condition, we observed the reverse effect in the control condition.
This suggests that Pb response is not indexing an understanding of communica-
tive relevance on its own. In the control condition, infants may not be look-
ing to integrate the anticipated action outcomes into the wider context. By the
age of 9 months, infants are already highly familiar with eating actions (Green
et al., 2016), and observing actors eat is unlikely to require a contextual (re-
)interpretation of the event. However, the opposite may be true for actors’ re-
peated and consistent presentations of the unanticipated action outcomes, in
line with proposals on the importance of prediction errors in learning (Niv &
Schoenbaum, 2008; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015, 2017). General cognitive theories
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have argued that an organism continuously attempts to predict regularities in
the environment (A. Clark, 2013). Learning is facilitated in contexts where pre-
dictions and inputs do not match, and the predictions have to be revised (Niv
& Schoenbaum, 2008; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015, 2017). Because the stimuli con-
sisted of familiar actions with unexpected action outcomes, an enhanced pro-
cessing of unexpected action outcomes is also compatible with accounts of cu-
riosity learning (Gottlieb et al., 2013; Twomey & Westermann, 2015, 2017). These
theories predict that infants actively look for information that is sufficiently sim-
ilar to integrate, but sufficiently different to extend it into existing knowledge. If
this is the case, infants may show an enhanced Pb towards the unexpected out-
comes because they are different enough to warrant curiosity. However, the an-
ticipated outcomes are already too predictable to be interesting. Although this is
a potentially powerful learning mechanism (Oudeyer & Smith, 2016), on its own,
it cannot explain why infants in the communicative condition showed the re-
versed pattern, without appealing to prior experience that primes infants to pro-
cess communicatively presented information differently. By the age of 9 months,
infants already combine information from communicative signals with object
knowledge (Pauen, Birgit, Hoehl, & Bechtel, 2015).
In our study, we investigated action sequences that either concluded with an
outcome congruent to the preceding prime picture, or that depicted an incon-
gruent action outcome. Some studies have manipulated the prime with regards
to its fitness for purpose, but kept the outcome image constant. Reid and Stri-
ano (2008) used action sequences of objects that either warranted a use or not
(e.g. putting an empty vs. a full spoon to the mouth, putting on only one shoe
before walking). However, using this paradigm adults only showed an N400 ERP
effect for a subset of the actions, the eating actions. Such paradigms are percep-
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tually complex and it remains an open question whether and how infants would
understand such violations.
Another important question relating to the processing of outcomes in the
current study relates to infants’ understanding of the unexpected outcomes
themselves. The unanticipated outcomes shown in our study were largely de-
void of meaning, with the actor simply putting the objects to their forehead. It is
possible that infants have a different understanding about of novel but meaning-
ful action outcomes, for example, when a spoon is used to turn on a light. Such
a use would be meaningful on its own (albeit different from the associated use
for the object), but would also be more salient Prior research has shown that the
saliency of a goal is important in helping infants to anticipate action outcomes
(Adam et al., 2016) and that older children only imitate otherwise irrational
actions if they have clear effects (Biro, Verschoor, Coalter, & Leslie, 2014; Király et
al., 2013). Both points are similar in their conceptualisation, but future research
should aim to further disambiguate such differences goal processing in the
context of communication.
One of the disadvantages of such a paradigm is that parts of the analysis re-
quire the comparison of perceptually different outcome pictures in order to elicit
the semantic violation we were interested in. Because of this, the effects ob-
served could also be attributed to a perceptual difference between the two pic-
tures (Luck, 2014). However, despite this, our study also revealed differences in
the processing of all three components based on the presence of communicative
signals prior to the outcome picture. Because between both communicative con-
ditions, the analysed images are exactly the same, any differences in the results
cannot be explained by perceptual differences for the pictures alone.
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Conclusion
Although the underlying motivation behind infants’ differentiated processing
of expected and unexpected action outcomes in communicative contexts re-
mains unclear, the results on the Pb provide further evidence that by the age of
9 to 12 months, infants can integrate social signals and object knowledge to direct
their attention (Pauen et al., 2015). By comparing specific ERP components asso-
ciated with different mechanisms of perception and learning, we aimed to shed
light on infants’ understanding of everyday actions, and how it is influenced by
communicative signals. The two experiments have revealed the importance of
referential signals and/or the structure of information in children’s understand-
ing of actions. Most importantly, key modulations associated with signals indi-
cating the presence of communication occurred comparatively early in process-
ing at 200-350 ms after stimulus onset. It is likely that at this point in time, the in-
formation is being contextualised for further interpretation. However, there was
no evidence for a direct modulation of attention in the presence of communica-
tion. Both studies revealed evidence against an increased Nc response for com-
municative conditions. If communication does not increase markers of arousal,
we can exclude purely attentional and arousal driven accounts as explanations
for infants’ learning in social contexts with some degree of confidence. Likewise,
we only found limited evidence that communication modifies the meaning of
actions as indexed by the N400 ERP component. Furthermore, even if commu-
nication increases the semantic understanding of actions, the analyses showed
meaningful effects for the N400 component even in the absence of communica-




The effect of communicative signals
on the anticipation of familiar, novel
and unexpected action outcomes in
7-month old infants: Evidence from
anticipatory looking and pupil
dilation
Infants are apt social learners and learn about other people’s actions through own
experience, observational learning and pedagogical demonstrations. The abil-
ity to predict actions and anticipate their outcomes is an integral part of com-
munication (Pickering & Garrod, 2009, 2011, 2013) and joint action (Sebanz &
Knoblich, 2009). Therefore, anticipatory looking is not only an important mea-
sure of infants’ understanding of actions, but is also an important marker of their
ability to engage with others.
Previous studies have shown that infants are already able to anticipate a wide
range of everyday actions (e.g. Green et al., 2016; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010;
Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). Furthermore, infants are skilled social learn-
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ers and are sensitive to communicatively presented information. They priori-
tise (Marno & Csibra, 2015) and are more likely to learn enduring information
in the presence of communicative signals (Hernik & Csibra, 2015), such as direct
gaze and infant-directed speech. According to Natural Pedagogy theory (Csibra
& Gergely, 2009, 2011), this is because communicative signals create a learning
context in which infants expect novel, generalisable information. In the previ-
ous chapter, we investigated whether the presence of communicative signals in-
fluences the neural correlates of infants’ (and adults’) understanding of action
outcomes. Following on from this, we turn our attention to another measure
of learning and investigate whether ostensive signals help infants to anticipate
action outcomes. In the following study, we investigated whether addressing in-
fants in a communicative way can help them to anticipate familiar congruent
actions on the one hand and on the other hand, can help them to change their
predictions about already familiar actions and learn novel actions. We also in-
vestigated whether ostensive signals increase arousal as measured through the
pupillary light reflex.
The ability to anticipate the outcome of an action before its conclusion is
an important marker of action understanding (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). A
number of factors play a role in infants’ ability to predict the outcome of an ac-
tion: Infants show an early understanding of teleological actions and they expect
actions to be carried out in an efficient manner (Csibra et al., 1999; Gredebäck
& Melinder, 2011; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005, but see Paulus et
al., 2011 for a statistical learning account). Furthermore, they are more likely to
predict actions that they have previously carried out themselves (Ambrosini et
al., 2013; Cannon, Woodward, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & Turek, 2012; Gerson &
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Woodward, 2014). However, through observational learning, they also learn to
predict a wide range of actions that they are beyond their own abilities.
In their daily life, infants show an understanding of a wide range of actions
and their associated outcomes. Eating actions are some of the earliest actions
predicted by infants (e.g. Green et al., 2016; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Reid et
al., 2007, 2009) and infants get their own motor experience with spoons and food
items, for example by holding, banging and moving them. From 3 months on-
wards, infants understand movements of abstract agents as goal-directed. Once
they have performed a reaching action themselves, they are able to anticipate
other people’s reaching actions (Sommerville et al., 2005). Furthermore, they pre-
dict the use of cutlery, hands or chopsticks to bring food to their mouth depend-
ing on their cultural experience (Green et al., 2016). Already by the age of four
months, infants can track the use of simple tools after having observed their use
(Stavans & Baillargeon, 2016). Infants from 6 months onwards are able to antici-
pate everyday actions such as eating or drinking after a few repetitions (Hunnius
& Bekkering, 2010).
There is evidence that infants can predict adults putting spoons to their
mouth from 6 months onwards (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). However, only
by the age of 10-months do infants predict self-propelled spoons, suggesting that
at least during the early months, seeing a human agent is an important clue in the
prediction of goal-directed actions (see also Biro & Leslie, 2007). Meanwhile, 6-
and 10-month-olds do not predict spoons going to the top of the head, suggest-
ing that they have tool-specific knowledge (Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010).
Around this age, there is also some tentative evidence that infants have the
first expectations about eating actions coming from ERP studies. Michel, Kaduk,
et al. (2017) found evidence that already 5-month-olds distinguish between ex-
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pected and unexpected actions when looking at pictures of action outcomes only.
However, Reid et al. (2009) have found an N400 ERP towards unexpected action
outcomes for 9-month-olds and adults, but no such evidence was found for 7-
month-olds.
There is also tentative evidence for tool specific knowledge for other actions,
too. Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) investigated whether 6, 8, 12, 14, and 16
month-old infants and adults understand the use of a variety of goal-directed
actions, involving different objects—a phone (ear), a brush (hair) and a cup
(mouth). After the first trial, infants only anticipated the target of the cup; the
other two items were not reliably predicted. Over the course of the experiment
however, all age groups started to reliably predict semantically congruent actions
(e.g. brush–hair), but not those that were semantically incongruent (e.g. brush–
mouth). Only the adults quickly adjusted to new outcomes (see also Paulus et
al., 2011, for similar results in a different paradigm). By the age of 12 months,
infants show more evidence of tool-specific knowledge. For example, they are
able to categorise objects according to their function, rather than visual simi-
larity (Träuble & Pauen, 2011). Infants also expect that each tool has only one
single purpose (Casler, 2013; Casler & Kelemen, 2005) and persist in anticipat-
ing frequently observed actions even if the circumstances have changed (Paulus
et al., 2011). Twelve and 18-month old infants also insist to hold a spoon by the
ladle, even when it prevents them from successfully using the spoon to activate
a lamp by putting the ladle through a hole. However, they made no such infer-
ence when they used a novel tool (Barrett, Davis, & Needham, 2007). Therefore,
infants’ expectations about familiar action outcomes may be resilient towards
counter evidence and they are not able to learn the novel, alternative outcomes
very easily.
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Natural Pedagogy Theory (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 2011) proposes that infants
are attuned to a specific set of communicative signals that allow them to engage
in fast social learning. Natural Pedagogy argues that infants respond to specific
social cues by giving their sources preferential attention and expecting generalis-
able knowledge in their presence Csibra+Gergely:2009. By the age of 18 months,
children take into account information that is relevant in the communicative
knowledge between the caregiver and the infant, rather than engaging in indi-
vidual learning only (Southgate et al., 2009). This ability allows infants to quickly
acquire and generalise skills and behaviours (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015).
To this point, only few studies have investigated the effect of communication
on infants’ learning of actions (e.g. Hernik & Csibra, 2015; Király et al., 2013). In-
fants are able to learn about actions through observational learning, but the pres-
ence of communicative signals can lead to more enduring expectations about the
tools and actions that infants observe. For example, 13.5-month-old infants pre-
sented with a box that peeled or unpeeled bananas were more likely to learn the
function of the box when hearing infant-directed speech (Hernik & Csibra, 2015).
More importantly, they were also more likely to adhere to communicatively pre-
sented information when they observed multiple trials of that contradicted the
communicatively presented function of the object.
Most research on action understanding in infancy has looked at actions in
isolation. For example, in the study by Hunnius and Bekkering (2010), infants ob-
served the actions incidentally. The actors in these stimuli did not engage in any
communicative behaviour, the movies did not have sound and the actor avoided
looking directly into the camera. The adult control group was fully aware of the
experimental context and came into the study knowing that the stimuli are po-
tentially meaningful. Therefore, their awareness of the experimental context may
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have given meaning to otherwise non-meaningful action outcomes by creating
a communicative context (c.f. Watzlawick et al., 1967). Because adults were able
to assign meaning to the actions, they might have been able to anticipate even
the incongruent action outcomes. The same may not be true for the infants and
toddlers taking part in the Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) study. However, if com-
municative signals create a referential expectation about an action by marking
the following demonstration as meaningful, infants may be more likely to antic-
ipate action outcomes. It is possible that the presence of communicative signals
poises infants to actively retrieve primed action representations and anticipate
action outcomes beyond what they would do in observational contexts.
In the following study, we were interested in whether infants can learn to an-
ticipate congruent and incongruent action outcomes if they are addressed com-
municatively before being shown the action demonstration. However, infants’
expectations about familiar actions may be too ingrained, even in the presence
of communication. It is also possible that they perceive communicatively pre-
sented actions with unexpected outcomes as joking interactions (cf. Hoicka &
Gattis, 2008; Hoicka & Martin, 2016; Hoicka & Wang, 2011) or show epistemic vig-
ilance towards adults that present information they know to be false (see Mascaro
& Sperber, 2009; Poulin-Dubois et al., 2011; Zmyj et al., 2010, for older children
and the previous Chapter for 9-month-olds). Therefore, we included additional,
novel action-object relations that were used in the same way as the familiar and
unexpected goal locations.
In addition to tracking infants’ gaze, we also investigated their Pupillary Light
Response (PLR, Hepach et al., 2012; Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2015; Hepach &
Westermann, 2016; Hepach et al., 2017). The PLR is a slower and more persistent
response towards differences in arousal that spans over several seconds and mea-
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sures a baseline arousal state (Hepach et al., 2015; Hepach & Westermann, 2016).
The PLR is evoked in response to a bright stimulus on a dark background. An
initial pupillary constriction is followed by pupillary redilation, lasting approxi-
mately 5 s (Hepach & Westermann, 2016). Although the pupil mainly responds to
the brightness of the surrounding, it is also sensitive to emotional and cognitive
processes. This includes immediate on-line responses to unexpected events, but
also longer-term changes in arousal (Hepach et al., 2015).
Pupillary measures have not commonly been used in the study of commu-
nicative signals, with a few exceptions (Marno et al., 2015; Rigato, Rieger, &
Romei, 2016). Alternative accounts to Natural Pedagogy (Gredebäck et al., 2018;
Szufnarowska et al., 2014) argue that the effect of communicative signals on in-
fants’ action learning is due to an increase of arousal. Previous research on four-
month-olds presented with different types of speech did not find any evidence
that (infant-directed) speech increases their pupil dilation on-line (Marno et al.,
2015), compared to reverse speech or no speech at all. However, it is not clear
whether the presence of communicative signals influences the immediate re-
sponse indicated by on-line pupillary measurements, or whether it affects the
tonic pupillary response indicating a long-term response in arousal. Therefore,
it is interesting to look at the effects of the slower pupillary light reflex (Hepach
et al., 2015) to investigate whether the presence of communicative signals influ-
ences infants’ arousal.
Pupillary responses have also been involved in a variety of violation of ex-
pectancy paradigms to investigate action understanding (e.g. Gredebäck &
Melinder, 2011) and object permanence (Sirois & Jackson, 2012; Jackson & Sirois,
2009) and the congruence between actions and emotions (Hepach & Wester-
mann, 2013). However, currently only Hepach and Westermann (2013) have
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used the PLR to study expectancy violations, whereas the other studies have
used on-line measures.
For the current study, we were interested in the effect of communication on
early action understanding in seven-month-olds, as previous research has shown
that between 5–9 months of age infants show evidence of being able to anticipate
action outcomes, but do not yet show a full semantic understanding of these ac-
tions. Five-month-olds show evidence of increased familiarity for congruent ac-
tions, such as bringing food to the mouth (Michel, Kaduk, et al., 2017) and infants
from 6 months onwards are able to anticipate a number of other object-related
actions (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). Other
studies have found no evidence of semantic processing of these action sequences
and Reid et al. (2009) have found an N400 ERP component for unexpected ac-
tions at nine months but not seven months of age. Likewise, Michel, Kaduk, et
al. (2017) have also failed to find evidence of an N400 ERP in five-month-olds.
Therefore, it appears that before nine months, infants are able to anticipate fa-
miliar actions, but do not yet have a fully semantic representation of the actions.
Hypotheses
Anticipatory Looking
If the presence of communicative signals contributes to infants’ learning of new
actions, we can hypothesise that when infants are addressed communicatively,
they either (1) show increased anticipatory looks towards the incongruent ac-
tion outcomes and the novel action outcomes, or (2) show increased anticipatory
looks towards novel action outcomes only, but not incongruent action outcomes,
since their previous knowledge of these action outcomes is still strong.
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Pupil Dilation
If communication facilitates learning through arousal we should observe an in-
creased pupillary light reflex after infants have observed a communicative ac-
tor. In addition, incongruent and novel actions may lead to greater arousal as
measured by the pupillary light reflex, too. We may also observe an interaction
of both factors. For example, communicatively presented actions may lead to
greater arousal, when they show novel outcomes. Alternatively, infants may also




We included 43 7-month-old infants (average age: 214 days; range: 191–230 days;
20 females) in the anticipatory looking analysis. Infants were included in the
analysis if they watched at least two experimental blocks and showed reliable
tracking during calibration and in response to fixation points shown throughout
the study. An additional 3 children were tested but excluded from the analysis,
because of technical issues during the recording (N = 1), or unreliable calibration
(N = 2). For the pupil dilation analysis, we investigated a subset of the previous
sample and 34 infants were included in the final sample. Nine children were ex-
cluded due to abnormally large pupil measurements (N = 2), insufficient pupil
size tracking during the pupil measurement (N = 4) or insufficient data during
baseline measurement (N = 3).
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A further 6 infants participated in a pilot study to establish the optimal length
of the experiment.
Parents were recruited through the Lancaster Babylab database and received
a book for their participation and £10.00 for their travel expenses. The study was
approved by the Lancaster University Research Ethics Committee. Participants’
parents gave their consent before to start the experiment.
Materials
The procedure of our study is based on Hunnius and Bekkering (2010). Each
trial consisted of a video of an actor greeting the participant either communica-
tively (ostensive condition) or non-communicatively (control condition), be-
fore demonstrating an object-related action. The communicative actor looked
straight ahead, smiled, waved and greeted the participant in infant-directed
speech, with three longer greetings of approximately 2-3s: “Right, there we go!”,
“Oh, what’s that!”, “Hello there, look!” (similar to Yoon et al., 2008) and four short
greetings of approximately 1s: “Wow!”, “Hello!”, “Look!”, “Hey!”. In the control
condition, the actor adopted a neutral facial expression, looked slightly below
the line of sight without establishing eye contact with the participant and speak-
ing in a neutral, adult-directed speech “Oh! What’s that.”, “Right, there we go.”,
“Well then, look.” (no rising intonation at the end, cf. Yoon et al., 2008). The
short greetings were “Hmm”, “Ok.", “Well.", “Yeah” (all approximately 1s). Dur-
ing the greeting, the object associated with the action was superimposed onto
the video.
In the second part of the video (length: 6.1s), each actor presented the object
by picking it up and putting it either to the mouth or their ear/hair. The ob-
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jects consisted of two typically mouth-directed (spoon, cup), two head-directed
(phone, hairbrush) and two novel objects (blue and green dog toys). An overview
of the trial order is shown in Figure 3.2 and a selection of still frames from the
videos is shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Example still frames of the stimuli, depicting the three different actors, the six
different objects with one outcome. Note that for the study both outcomes were shown. Red
and green areas show AOIs (red = head, green = mouth).
Procedure
Infants were sitting on their parents’ lap, approximately 60 cm away from the
screen. Parents were instructed to sit facing away from the screen by turning
either to the left or right side. The direction that the parent was sitting was ran-
domised. They were instructed to not look at the screen during the presentation.
Eye movements and pupil dilation were recorded at a sampling rate of 120 Hz
and 0.4° accuracy using a Tobii X3-120 eye tracker (Tobii technology, Danderyd,
Sweden). A custom Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) script was used for
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stimuli presentation using PsychToolBox version 3.0.12 and eye tracking data ac-
quisition using Tobii SDK 3.0.
Sequence: 

















Figure 3.2: Trial order and order of one experimental block. The first, fourth and sixth
greeting video used a longer greeting, the other greetings were short and consisted of one
word only. Each block consisted of nine trials and PLR measurements were taken every 6th
and 9th trial.
The stimuli presentation was initiated by a custom five-point calibration pro-
cedure of a blue dot moving across the screen. The dot made a sound at each
calibration point, before moving to the next. The calibration was repeated until
at least four of the five dots were successfully calibrated.
The videos described in Materials were shown in blocks of nine trials. The
first, fourth and seventh greeting were long greetings and the greeting used for
each trial was randomised. The action-object relationship during each block was
kept constant. Between blocks, the study used a mixed design, during which the
first actor presented two objects congruently, e.g. by picking up the spoon and
putting it to their mouth. The second actor used the objects incongruently, e.g.
put the spoon to the ear. The third actor used the novel objects. The order of pre-
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sentation of each block was randomised and the combinations of actors/objects
were counterbalanced. Therefore, infants were presented with all actors and all
objects. However, within a particular combination of actor and action, infants
only saw either the ostensive or the control condition to avoid spill-over effects
from the ostensive conditions (c.f. Gliga & Csibra, 2009). Furthermore, each actor
either presented the novel, congruent or incongruent conditions. Infants’ look-
ing behaviour was recorded continuously during the stimulus presentation.
Pupil dilation measurements were taken at the start of the presentation to es-
tablish a baseline measure and then every 6th and 9th trial within a block. Dur-
ing pupil measurements, an animation of blue bubbles interrupted by a black
screen with a white fixation point was presented to ensure luminance was the
same across all conditions (Hepach et al., 2012; Hepach & Westermann, 2016).
3.2 Data Preparation and Analysis
The data was imported and analysed using a custom script in R version 3.5.1 (R
Core Team, 2018). The pupil dilation and gaze point data was filtered and inter-
polated using the scripts and procedures by Hepach et al. (2012). For the statis-
tical analysis, we used linear mixed effects models using the lme4 package ver-
sion 1.1-17 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Significance tests for model
comparisons were carried out using the anova() function.
Anticipatory looking:
For each actor-object-outcome combination, Areas of Interest (AOI) were de-
fined at the final destination of the object. The AOIs of all target areas were of
the same size (80×50px on a 600×800px upscaled image). Fixations were only
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analysed for the time after the onset of the grasp during the lifting phase, but
before the object or the actor’s hand reached the AOI (cf. Hunnius & Bekker-
ing, 2010). Since we are not interested in the processing of the individual objects
and to achieve greater consistency, the AOIs contrasted were only the head and
mouth regions (See Figure 3.1)
Data was filtered and interpolated using the procedure described by (Hepach
et al., 2012) and trials were removed if 50 % of the data was missing. The data
was imported into the EyetrackingR package (Dink & Ferguson, 2015, www
.eyetracking-r.com). Looks outside of the AOIs were included/excluded. The
proportion variable was converted into the empirical logit (elog) to ensure a ran-
dom distribution of the residuals vs. fits in the models (c.f. Dink & Ferguson,
2015).
We tested three mixed effects models predicting the proportion of looks to-
wards the Target over the Competitor. The maximal model tested the interaction
between Communi cati on (communicative, control), Cong r uenc y (congru-
ent, incongruent, novel) and the Tr i al Number . Acti onTar g et (head, mouth)
was included as a control factor. We compared the maximal model to a model
testing the Cong r uenc y×Tr i al Number interaction to assess the effect of com-
munication specifically and a null model that only contained Acti onTar g et as a
predictor (to control for the theoretically non-meaningful prediction that infants
prefer to look at the mouth regions over the head regions). The full model speci-
fications are shown in Table 3.1. This approach was chosen to reduce the overall
number of comparisons and avoid multiple comparison problems of testing the
significance of each factor separately (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011; Mundry &
Nunn, 2009).
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All models contained the same random effects structure and Participant ID
and Object were specified as random effect levels. Communication and Con-
gruency were specified as slopes on the participant level, no slopes were speci-
fied on the Object level, corresponding to the maximally converging random ef-
fects structure (Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Bell, Fairbrother, &
Jones, 2018).
Pupil dilation
The baseline score of the pupil dilation measurement was taken at the beginning
of the experiment, before any other stimuli were presented. Subsequent mea-
surements were taken on the sixth and ninth trial for each block (c.f. Hepach et
al., 2012, for details on the methodology). The data was averaged and a running
baseline correction was applied by subtracting the baseline measure of each trial
from each subsequent pupil measurement (Hepach et al., 2012), resulting in a
measure of the change in pupil dilation. The averaged time series graph is shown
in Figure B.7.
Pupil measurements were removed if there was less than 50 % tracking data
available during the pupil dilation recording or the child did not watch at least
five trials during the action presentation. The final sample contained 182 data
points (see Table B.2 for a distribution of the original and the included data sets).
For the statistical analysis, we took the mean of the time series for each mea-
surement and computed a mixed effects analysis using the lme4 package. We
compared the full interaction term of the Communi cati on×Cong r uenc y in-
teraction to a null model that contained the intercept only. Subject ID and Actor
were specified as random effects. Object was not specified as a random effect due
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to the high correlation with the intercept. Congruency and Communication were
defined as slopes in the Subject ID effect, but not on the Actor level (full model
specifications are shown in Table 3.2. This represented the maximal converging
random effects structure (Barr, 2013; Barr et al., 2013; Bell et al., 2018). The model




The analysis suggests that the null model containing only the Action Target is
the best representation of the data. Neither the model containing the interaction
with Communication, Congruency and the Trial number (χ2(6)= 3.287, p = .772,
see Figure B.5), nor the model testing the interaction between Communication
and Congruency (χ2(5)= 3.442, p = .632) were significantly better. Therefore, we
did not find any evidence that infants are able to anticipate the action outcomes,
or that communication affects the anticipation of action outcomes over time.
However, the Action Target term in the null model showed a significant ef-
fect (β = 3.7592,SE = 0.4965,χ2(1) = 36.187, p < 0.0001), suggesting that infants
strongly prefer looking at the mouth over the upper head region (See Figure 3.3
for details).
Pupil Dilation
We found no evidence that the model containing the Outcome by Communica-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.3: Predicted proportions based on the complex model for the Acti onTar g et
main effect. Error bars represent confidence intervals.
3.4 Discussion
We were interested in how infants understand the use of everyday objects in com-
municative and non-communicative contexts. In particular, we were interested
in whether the presence of communicative signals prior to an action demonstra-
tion can help anticipate familiar action outcomes by marking the shown action
as potentially relevant. We were also interested in whether the presence of com-
municative signals can override prior action expectations for already familiar ac-
tions and can help infants to anticipate novel action outcomes. The results of the
anticipation analysis show that infants may not be as proficient in anticipating
action outcomes as indicated by previous research (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010),
as we found only little to no evidence for the anticipation of action outcomes. We
did, however, replicate a general preference for the mouth, over the head.
There are multiple reasons why infants showed more fixations to the mouth,
compared to the head. In standard face-scanning tasks, the mouth area draws
considerably more looks compared to the ear and temple regions, albeit not as
many as the eyes (Kato & Konishi, 2013; Senju, Vernetti, et al., 2013). Further-
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more, the mouth area is perceptually more salient and infants’ ability to predict
actions also depends on the saliency of the goal (Adam et al., 2016; Biro, 2013;
Elsner, 2007). For example, infants’ anticipations of an action sequence declined
when the goal location was a black square blending into the background, com-
pared to a salient red dot that was clearly distinguishable from the background
(Biro, 2013). The action of putting things to the mouth also has clear outcome
effects (i.e. mouth opens). Previous research has highlighted the importance of
action effects in infants’ anticipation of outcomes (Elsner, 2007). For example,
simply touching an object without causing any effect does not lead infants to an-
ticipate a similar touching action in the future (Woodward, 1998). Only when the
actor actually grasps the object or there are noticeable action effects do infants
anticipate these actions in the future (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Elsner, 2007) or
imitate them (Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003).
Infants may have also shown an increase in looks towards the mouth area be-
cause putting an object to the mouth is a meaningful action on its own or because
they have experience with oral exploration of objects themselves. The purpose
of the head directed actions may have been less clear to the seven-month-old
infants in our study and it is perceptually less salient, since there is no clearly-
defined target for the action. Although Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) investigat-
ing children between the ages of 6–24 months found anticipatory effects even for
actions like using a hairbrush, research on 3-year-olds has found that children
struggle to imitate actions terminating at body parts correctly (Gleissner, Bekker-
ing, & Meltzoff, 2000) and younger infants may find these actions more difficult
to predict as well.
Furthermore, the effects of communication may be expressed in other ways
than increased anticipations towards outcomes. The study by Hernik and Csibra
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(2015) showing that children form enduring tool functions used external tools
(the banana peeler/unpeeler) in teaching 13.5-month-old children and thereby
avoided the use of body-directed actions. However, even in this study, infants did
not show increased looking times after being addressed in infant-, rather than
adult-directed communication. These studies suggest that the low levels of an-
ticipations in our study may be due to too complex or opaque stimuli given the
age group investigated. It is also possible that successful anticipations require a
clear goal to be learned in such a relatively short time and that particularly our
head-directed actions were not easily identifiable as potential action targets.
An important difference to the study by Hunnius and Bekkering (2010) is that
our study manipulated congruency in a within-subjects design and that this pre-
sentation might have been confusing for infants and we may have not observed
an effect of communication on infants’ anticipation of action outcomes for the
same reason. Overall, the actions were of similar configuration and timing to
the actions presented by Hunnius and Bekkering (2010). Daum, Gampe, Wron-
ski, and Attig (2016) found that infants were more likely to anticipate actions that
were carried out over a greater distance or were presented slower. In our stimuli,
we controlled the timing so that the movement to the head and the movement to
the mouth took approximately the same time. Overall, the changes in the speed
of the action may have balanced out the shorter distance of the mouth-directed
action, however the editing of the videos may have made them appear less nat-
ural and led to a decrease of object-associated anticipations and the observed
effects may have been due to the processes discussed in the previous paragraph.
Finally, infants may have shown relatively few anticipations during the move-
ment of the actions since they may have already anticipated the outcome loca-
tions during the greeting and therefore did not need to anticipate the action again
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after the onset of the movement. Unfortunately, previous studies do not allow
us to draw conclusions on the timing of the anticipations. To control these con-
founds, it may be possible to use still images of the actors during the greeting and
only modify whether or not the speech is infant-directed. This would make the
stimuli less naturalistic but allows a more controlled presentation and analysis of
the anticipations during the greetings.
In addition to infants’ anticipation of action outcomes, we were interested
in their excitatory arousal as measured through their pupil dilation after seeing
the action-outcome pairings and being addressed communicatively (c.f. Hepach
et al., 2012; Hepach & Westermann, 2016). We hypothesised that infants would
show greater arousal in communicative compared to non-communicative con-
texts and might also take into account their expectations about these actions by
showing greater arousal towards unexpected or novel action outcomes. How-
ever, the infants in our sample did not show an increase in arousal when they
were communicatively addressed. Previous research has shown that multimodal
combinations of visual and auditory signals can lead to increased pupil dilation
(Rigato et al., 2016) and that pupil dilation does not increase for infant-directed
compared to reverse speech (Marno et al., 2015). In our study, both greetings
included a multimodal presentation that included speech and therefore these
differences may not have influenced infants’ affective response. However, the
pupil dilations found by Rigato et al. (2016) were in direct response to the stim-
ulus and may not have have been sufficiently long-lasting to affect the slower
pupillary light reflex (Hepach et al., 2015). Therefore, a promising route for fu-
ture research might look at infants’ online response to expected, unexpected and
novel action outcomes. Such an analysis is not possible with our data since the
brightness of each video is not controlled over time (except during the bubbles-
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presentation during the pupillary light reflex measurement) and therefore any
changes observed may be related to the brightness of the images. This is further
complicated by the different trajectories of head- and mouth-directed actions,
which may lead to artefacts in the pupil dilation measurements of commonly
used eye trackers (Brisson et al., 2013).
In the light of these challenges, it may be more appropriate to investigate ab-
stract, novel actions and to teach infants new actions to create the expectations
about actions (Kaduk, 2017). Furthermore, a wider age range may be necessary to
determine whether seven-months-olds’ failure to anticipate even familiar, con-




Communicative signals as action
segmentation markers in
18-month-old children
When learning about actions, children do not only need to learn about the goals
and outcomes of an action, but also its structural properties. Actions are hi-
erarchically organised, with simpler action units nested in higher-order action
plans (Elman, 1990; Maffongelli, Antognini, & Daum, 2018; Zacks & Tversky,
2001). To understand the meaning of actions, it is necessary to segment them
into appropriately-sized units, so that they can be integrated into existing knowl-
edge or generalised to create new predictions. Such a process shares many simi-
larities with the segmentation and processing of linguistic information (cf. Chris-
tiansen & Chater, 2016).
There are many perceptual properties that provide natural boundaries and
allow a learner to identify many action units and subunits. For example, goal-
directed actions have distinct endpoints, when the goal state is achieved. Already
from an early age, infants show an understanding of actions as goal-directed
(Biro et al., 2014; Csibra, 2003; Verschoor, Spapé, Biro, & Hommel, 2013) and dis-
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tinguish between actions that are carried out in an efficient and non-efficient
manner (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). However, not all
action units are relevant to any given task, whilst some relevant actions may be
difficult to identify because they are not salient on their own.
During child-directed interactions, parents engage in a wide range of be-
haviours that can potentially help children to break up actions into smaller,
meaningful units, and highlight those that are relevant to the task. For example,
infant-directed actions are often presented in an exaggerated manner, highlight-
ing event boundaries (Brand et al., 2002; Koterba & Iverson, 2009; Rutherford &
Przednowek, 2012) and are also highly repetitive (Brand et al., 2009). Further-
more, parents are more likely to look and address children at action boundaries
(Brand et al., 2007, 2013; Williamson & Brand, 2014). Because of this, commu-
nicative signals are a potentially valuable source of structural information that
can be used to break up actions into smaller segments. Previous research has
shown that young children prefer looking at infant-directed actions (Brand &
Shallcross, 2008), and show different patterns of exploration (Koterba & Iverson,
2009) and higher rates of imitation for such actions (Williamson & Brand, 2014).
However, we currently do not know whether the position of communicative sig-
nals within a continuous action sequence affects infants’ understanding of ac-
tions. The following paper will investigate whether toddlers use the position of a
social signal to segment actions and change which part of an action they imitate.
4.1 Teleology as a foundation of action units
Children show a basic understanding of goal-directed actions from early on, also
called Teleology. Children attribute goals to i) actions with an equivalent out-
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come, ii) actions that have an effect, iii) if the agent shows signs of animacy (Biro
& Leslie, 2007). According to some theoretical accounts (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Csi-
bra et al., 1999; Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011) infants also
expect that actions are carried out rationality. For example, they assume that
an agent will take the shortest path to reach a goal, and only expect the agent
to take a longer path when the shortest is blocked. For example, by the age of
9 months, infants show an understanding of rationality in understanding actions
and expect that an abstract object takes the direct path when moving to a goal lo-
cation (Csibra et al., 1999). Once infants have been able to attribute a goal, they
are also able to generalise this to other actions (Biro, Verschoor, & Coenen, 2011;
Biro et al., 2014). Although this ability has been argued to be an innate core prin-
ciple (Csibra & Gergely, 2007), there is also evidence that it may be learned. If
9-month-old infants are repeatedly shown an agent taking a longer path because
the shorter path has been blocked, they will keep anticipating that the agent takes
the longer path even when the obstacle has been removed (Paulus et al., 2011).
This suggests that their predictions may not be driven by rationality or are easily
affected by frequency information. Irrespective of its origin, infants appear to be
sensitive to basic relationships between actions and goals from at least 9 months.
Infants also interpret the behaviour of others according to the same principle.
For example, by the age of four months, infants show different pupil dilation for
rational and irrational feeding actions (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). When an
actor feeds another actor, infants show greater pupil dilations (indicating arousal
or expectancy violations) to the actor putting food into the others’ hand, instead
of feeding them directly. However, the pupil dilation is at baseline when an ob-
stacle prevents the expected feeding action (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011).
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An interesting case of infants’ attribution of goals is revealed in their imitation
of an action’s manner compared to its outcome (Carpenter et al., 2005; Southgate
et al., 2009). Twelve- and 18-month-old toddlers are more likely to imitate the
manner of an action in the absence of a clear outcome. When an experimenter
moved a toy animal either in a hopping or sliding movement, toddlers were more
likely to imitate the manner when they saw the action performed on its own, but
not when they were shown the animal go into a house (Carpenter et al., 2005). If
they observe the sliding/hopping action on its own, toddlers interpret the man-
ner of movement is the goal of the action. However, when the action has another,
clearer goal, toddlers see the manner as merely instrumental, but not essential in
achieving the goal of putting the animal into the house.
4.2 Meaning through communication
Caregivers often use so-called ostensive signals, such as direct gaze and infant-
directed speech, to transmit new and relevant information. According to Natural
Pedagogy Theory (Csibra & Gergely, 2009, 2011), infants have an innate sensi-
tivity towards the sources of these signals. In their presence, infants will learn
and generalise information faster and will form enduring representations, even
if presented with counter-evidence (Csibra, 2010; Hernik & Csibra, 2015; Marno
& Csibra, 2015).
Numerous studies have found evidence that communicatively-presented in-
formation is perceived differently to the non-communicatively presented infor-
mation. For instance, 18- and 24-month-old children are more likely to imitate
unnecessary actions in a communicative context, compared to a non-social con-
text (Nielsen, 2006). In a situation where an experimenter had their hands occu-
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pied (e.g. holding a blanket), Király et al. (2013) found that 14-month-old chil-
dren would imitate a non-rational action such as using one’s head to turn on
a light if they had been ostensively addressed. Two-year-olds are more likely
to demonstrate a pedagogically demonstrated action over a non-pedagogically
demonstrated action to a stranger (Vredenburgh, Kushnir, & Casasola, 2015). Al-
though five-year-olds do not only overimitate in pedagogical contexts, but also
in non-pedagogical demonstrations (Hoehl, Zettersten, et al., 2014), they reduce
their levels of overimitation only when they subsequently see a communicative
model perform the more efficient action.
According to Natural Pedagogy, social signals act as a reference in time when
an event might be relevant to the child. In the presence of social signals, they
will actively look for the meaning of an action to learn and generalise its effects
(Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). But how do they infer which parts of an action
sequence presented to them in a pedagogical context are relevant?
4.3 Meaning through action segmentation
According to Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks & Swallow, 2007; Zacks et al.,
2009; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Kurby & Zacks, 2008) segmenting a stream of events
plays an important role in the comprehension and anticipation of event se-
quences (Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001; Zacks et al., 2007, 2009; Sonne et al., 2016;
Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001). Events can be segmented based on low-
level features, such as motion cues, or prior, higher-order knowledge of the event
(Zacks & Swallow, 2007). For example, the action Paul is making tea can be de-
scribed in different ways:
a) Paul makes tea,
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b) Paul puts water in kettle, boils the water, rinses the teapot with hot water,
puts a tea leaves into the pot and pours boiling water over it, or
c) Paul’s right hand grasps kettle, his right hand moves the kettle to sink, the
left hand turns the tap, water is running, hand turns tap, the kettle is moved
to the previous location, the right hand touches the button on kettle, Paul
picks up a newspaper, holds the newspaper in front of his face. Then Paul
gets up, his right hand picks up the teapot, pours water into the tea pot,
pours water out of the tea pot. Paul’s hand moves away from tea pot,
his hand picks up a spoon, the hand scoops up tea with the spoon, the
hand holding spoon moves tea, hand holding spoon drops tea into tea pot,
tealeaves fall into the teacup, and so on. . .
Whereas (a) would usually not be a helpful description of how to make a cup
of tea, (b) would provide a reasonable instruction for someone familiar with the
use of a kitchen. The final option, (c) is confusing despite the detailed descrip-
tion. It provides too much information to be remembered and it does not in-
dicate which steps are essential to the action. Therefore, in order to learn the
meaning of complex actions, segmenting events into appropriately-sized chunks
is essential. Already from 10-months onwards, infants demonstrate sensitivity to
event structures. Ten to 11-month-old infants look longer at actions paused mid-
stream, compared to those where the pause coincided with an event boundary,
suggesting that they perceive these videos as more different to the ones they were
familiarised (Baldwin et al., 2001).
Events can be segmented based on repetitions and structural properties
(Swallow & Zacks, 2008), or salient event boundaries (Adam et al., 2016). Ac-
tions in pedagogical demonstrations share certain properties that make them
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particularly suitable for the segmentation of events, for example, exaggerated
movements (Brand et al., 2002; Williamson & Brand, 2014), repetition and vari-
ation (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Brand et al., 2009; Goldstein et al., 2010) and the
provision of direct gaze at event boundaries (Brand et al., 2007). Eye contact may
be particularly suitable for breaking up events, as brief periods of direct gaze
disrupt visual working memory (J. J. Wang & Apperly, 2016).
4.4 Chunks and bottlenecks
Chunk-based learning of actions is based on theoretical accounts of language
acquisition, but its principles also apply to the understanding of actions
(Christiansen & Chater, 2016). According to chunk-based learning, children
continuously attempt to integrate novel information. This requires the input
to be processed immediately, before it is overwritten by new information. This
creates a limitation of how much input can be processed and passed on to
the next higher level, the amount of information that can be processed at any
time is restricted. To overcome this bottleneck, a learner needs to form basic
abstractions (e.g. moving hand, filling kettle) that can then be used to build
higher level representations. However, once the appropriate higher level action
representations (e.g. ‘making tea’) are in place, they can be used to reconstruct
the lower level information (Loucks & Meltzoff, 2013; Christiansen & Chater,
2016; Zacks & Swallow, 2007).
A crucial difference between the Natural Pedagogy and Chunk-based learning
accounts is that Natural Pedagogy predicts that communicatively presented in-
formation receives privileged processing compared to non-social, observational
learning (Csibra & Gergely, 2011). Infants and children see actions demon-
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strated in communicative contexts as symbolic and representing other actions
of the same kind (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). Chunk-based learning, on the
other hand, does not distinguish between pedagogical and observational situa-
tions. Instead, the learner attempts to process all information continuously, but
only retains information that can be interpreted within the limits of the learner’s
memory constraints and the complexity of the input. Nevertheless, sensitivity
to ostensive signals and chunk-based learning are not mutually exclusive. It is
possible that humans have evolved an innate sensitivity towards ostensive sig-
nals and exploit them for efficient chunking in pedagogical contexts. It is also
compatible with other theoretical accounts on infants’ learning of ostensive-
referential signals, for example, work on gaze-following suggesting that infants
need a sufficiently strong but not overbearing preference for faces in order to
learn to follow gaze reliably (Triesch et al., 2006).
Whereas the teleological account of goal-directed actions is mainly con-
cerned about the perception of actions that share features of intentionality,
Event Segmentation Theory and Cognitive Chunking accounts describe learning
across a wider range of contexts based on the interaction of low-level visual
features and higher-order knowledge. According to this view, many of the con-
ditions for understanding goal-directed actions discussed by Biro and Leslie
(2007) are linked to perceptual features of movement, variation and perceptual
change (e.g. when an action has an effect) that are essential to the segmentation
of events or could be used to chunk information.
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4.5 Ostensive cues as signifiers of action boundaries
To investigate whether ostensive signals can lead to increased imitation of ac-
tions, it is particularly interesting to look at multi-step actions consisting of dif-
ferent subunits that are not clearly identifiable on their own. An example of such
an action sequence is children’s differentiated imitation of an experimenter slid-
ing or hopping a toy animal across a board before putting it into a house dis-
cussed earlier (Carpenter et al., 2005). Previous research has already shown that
children in this task are sensitive to communicatively presented prior informa-
tion (Esseily, Rat-Fischer, O’Regan, & Fagard, 2013; Southgate et al., 2009). If chil-
dren were told in advance about the goal of putting the animal into the house,
(Southgate et al., 2009), they are almost twice as likely to imitate the manner of
the action, compared to when the actor does not mention the goal outcome or
they discover the goal of the action on their own (Southgate et al., 2009). The au-
thors interpreted these results as providing evidence that 18-month-olds under-
stand communicative relevance. Because the children already know about the
goal, they take the demonstration of the mouse hopping/sliding into the house
to be about novel, relevant information, i.e. the manner of the action.
On a more general level, these results provide evidence that top-down infor-
mation can influences the interpretation of events, as predicted by event seg-
mentation theory (cf. Zacks, 2004), cognitive chunking (Christiansen & Chater,
2016), and teleological accounts (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005).
However, it is possible that bottom-up information can fulfil a similar role (Zacks,
2004) and alter toddlers’ interpretation of an action sequence. Communica-
tive signals, such as direct gaze, infant-directed speech would be ideal candi-
dates for breaking segmenting actions in pedagogical contexts (cf. Brand et al.,
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2002, 2007). If children use communicative signals to segment actions, then they
might show different rates of imitation for the actions’ subunits depending on the
placement of the communicative signal within the unfolding stream of actions.
The methodology is based on Carpenter et al. (2005) and Southgate et al.
(2009) who demonstrated a toy animal moving to a house, either by hopping or
sliding the animal across a playing field. Infants in Carpenter et al. (2005) were ei-
ther presented with the action of sliding/hopping and the goal outcome of mov-
ing the animal into the house, or no observable goal outcome. In Southgate et al.
(2009) infants were either told about the action’s outcome before the demonstra-
tion or received an action-irrelevant piece of information.
According to Event Segmentation and Cognitive Chunking theories, both
top-down and bottom-up information influence the way that information is
segmented and processed, and this information can be used to segment other
events. It is possible that providing prior information about the action goal has
allowed children to segment the hopping/sliding action from the Outcome (cf.
Braukmann et al., 2017; Paulus, Schuwerk, Sodian, & Ganglmayer, 2017; South-
gate et al., 2009). However, it is possible that ostensive signals can provide similar
segmentation cue through their placement within the action stream.
In the study proposed here, we would like to investigate whether commu-
nicative signals can help to segment an action sequence and change children’s
imitation of the actions. Instead of conveying the goal of the action linguistically,
we use an ostensive signal at the boundary after the sliding/hopping action and
before putting the animal into the house to segment the action. The control con-
dition matches the House-Condition in Carpenter et al. (2005) by providing the
entire action, including the goal of putting the animal into the house.
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We hypothesise that the position of ostensive signals within the unfolding ac-
tion can have a similar effect to providing the information about the action goal
communicatively (Southgate et al., 2009) by breaking up the action stream and
emphasising the manner as a separate event. As in previous studies, we expect
that all children will imitate the goal of the action as it is a salient outcome, as
the action of putting the animal into a house is a perceptually marked event on
its own. However, we predict that infants in the boundary-marked condition will
show higher imitation of manner compared to the unmarked condition.
To ensure that the data is comparable with the previous studies (Carpenter et
al., 2005; Southgate et al., 2009), we decided to investigate the same age group of
18-month-old toddlers. These studies have shown that by the age of 18-months,
(and to a lesser extent, by 12-months Carpenter et al., 2005), toddlers are less
likely to imitate only one outcome of an action, but not the manner, and that the
presence of a prior communicative context potentially modulates the imitation
of the action (Southgate et al., 2009). Therefore, we would expect that the effect
of communicative cues on action segmentation and their subsequent imitation
is strongest in 18-month-olds.
4.6 Methods
The methodology, hypotheses and analyses were registered on aspredicted
.org, reference number #5771.
Participants
We tested 40 18-month-old infants (Mean : 18m, Mi n : 17.5m, M ax : 18.5m). An
additional 10 infants were tested, but excluded due to being unwilling to engage
124 Chapter 4. Ostensive-referential signals in action segmentation
with the game (6), parental or sibling interference during all trials (2), incorrect
age at time of testing (1), or experimenter error (1).
Materials
The actions were presented on a green cardboard mat (42×60cm) with a small
cardboard house (yellow, red). Four small toy animals (fox, rabbit, hedgehog,
squirrel, all approximately 6-8 cm tall) were used to act out the actions. The ani-
mals were kept in a small, colourful box prior to the experiment. Additionally, we
used a wooden stacking game during the warm-up phase.
Procedure
Infants were sitting on their caregiver’s lap. After a warm-up session to familiarise
the infant with the room and the experimenter, the experimenter presented each
animal to the infant with a short statement (e.g. “The squirrel has a bushy tail").
The infant was allowed to play with all animals for one minute. Afterwards, the
animals were returned to the box and the experimenter drew the child’s attention
to the house.
The modelling phase began during which the experimenter took out one an-
imal, placed it on the board and said: “Look what the [animal] does!” (German
original: “Schau mal, was das [Tier] macht!”) He then moved the animal across
the table with either the sliding or the hopping action. In the boundary-marked
condition, the adult looked up to the infant and said “Wow”, before putting the
animal into the house. In the boundary-unmarked condition, the adult put the
animal into the house before looking and addressing the child. See Figure 4.1 for
a graphical representation of the procedure. After the animal was put into the
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house, the experimenter said “Great! Did you see what the [animal] did? Now it’s
your turn!” (German original: “Toll! Hast du das gesehen was das [Tier] gemacht
hat? Jetzt bist du dran!”) before pushing the board to the child. Each trial demon-
stration lasted approximately 10 seconds, and the child had 30 seconds to re-
spond. If the child did not engage with the animal, the experimenter encouraged
the child by saying “Now you can play with it!” (“Jetzt kannst du damit spielen”),
“Now it’s your turn” (“Jetzt bist du dran”) or similar. If the child attempted to pull
the house off the board, the experimenter said: “That’s fixed” (“Das ist fest.”).
Each child was presented with up to four trials of the actions. The actions
were shown in a fixed order of sliding–hopping–hopping–sliding, (cf. Southgate
et al., 2009). Half of the children saw the action in the boundary marked condi-
tion, and the other half in the boundary unmarked condition (between-subject).
Coding
Infants were scored on whether they (1) imitated the action manner (2) imitated
the goal/outcome of the action. In line with previous research (Carpenter et al.,
2005; Southgate et al., 2009), the action manner was coded as sliding when the
animal moved continuously without breaking contact with the mat. The child
imitated the hopping action, when the animal broke contact and made contact
at least once again with the mat. The goal of putting the animal into the house
was achieved if the child put the animal into the house at least once, even if the
child removed the animal afterwards.
A second coder naïve to the hypothesis coded manner and outcome for
24 videos. The inter-rater agreement was κ = .899, p < .0001 for manner and
κ= 0.935, p < .00001 for outcome.
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of the procedure, demonstrating the hopping and sliding actions and
the location of the ostensive signals.
Children were included in the analysis if they contributed at least 50 %of the
trials. After coding, 148 trials were included in the analysis. An additional 12 trials
(6 hopping, 6 sliding) were excluded from the analysis due to the child not touch-
ing the animal (1), being fussy (3), parental interference (6) and experimenter
error (2).
Statistical Analysis
Because some trials were missing, we decided to compute a generalised linear
mixed effects model based on the binomial distribution using R (R Core Team,
2018) version 3.5 using the lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) package version 1.1.17. Based
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on our pre-registration, we compared a model with Boundary Marker (yes/no)
to a null model containing the intercept only. In an exploratory analysis, we
also tested the interaction between Action Type (hopping/sliding) and Boundary
Marking. Trial number and Subject-ID were used as random effects. In line with
the recommendations by Barr et al. (2013), we investigated the maximally con-
verging random effects structure. For the model predicting manner imitation,
this included the slope for Manner nested in the random effect for Trial Number.
More complex models failed to converge, i.e. the optimizer failed to establish a
reliable solution to the model. For the model predicting outcomes, the model
with no slopes was the maximal converging model.
4.7 Results
Manner imitation: For the imitation of manner, the model containing the Bound-
ary Marker only was not significantly better than the null model (χ2(1)= 0.99, p =
.32). However, the model containing the interaction between Action Type and
Boundary Marker showed evidence against the null (χ2(3)= 9.27, p = .02) and the
main effect only model (χ2(2)= 8.28, p = .016). A detailed overview of the results
can be seen in Table 4.1. An analysis of subsets of the Action Type factor shows
a significant effect of marking for sliding (β = 1.55,SE = 0.65, p = 0.017), but not
hopping (β = −0.36,SE = 0.56, p = 0.52). According to this model, marking in-
creased the imitation of the sliding action from 12% (95% CI: 5− 27%) to 40%
(95% CI: 24−57%). For the hopping actions, no such increase was observed, and
the imitation of unmarked (M = 50%, 95% CI: 33−67%) and marked (M = 42%,
95% CI: 27−59%) actions was not significantly different (see Figure 4.2).















































































































































Figure 4.2: Means and confidence intervals of manner imitation for the interaction be-
tween the Action (hopping and sliding) and the position Boundary Marker (no/yes).
Outcome imitation: For the outcome imitation, the model containing the
Boundary Marker only was not significantly better than the null model (χ2(1) =
0.05, p = .82).We did not find a significant interaction with Action, and there
is evidence against the model containing the interaction term compared to the
null (χ2(3)= 0.48, p = .92)) and the boundary marker main effects model (χ2(2)=
1.21, p = .55).). A detailed overview is provided in Table 4.2. Overall, imitation of
outcome was at ceiling, with 99.9%.
4.8 Discussion
Although the study’s hypotheses were only confirmed for one type of action, this
study provides information on the role of communicative signals in everyday
action’s segmentation in infants. For the salient hopping action, marking the































































































































boundary between the action manner and the outcome did not increase the level
of imitation that was already high in the unmarked condition. However, for the
less salient sliding action, marking the event boundary increased imitation con-
siderably. These results are broadly compatible with Event Segmentation Theory,
Cognitive Chunking and a Natural Pedagogy. Additionally, our results also sug-
gest that more salient actions are potentially more likely to be segmented and
imitated.
Our results are compatible with domain-general learning accounts, such as
chunking (Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Gobet, Lane, & Lloyd-Kelly, 2015; Isbilen
& Christiansen, 2018). According to these accounts, the brain tries to predict the
incoming stream of information and attempts to meaningful chunks of informa-
tion on different representational levels. Prior knowledge, as well as the structure
of the incoming knowledge, are contributing to the processing and structuring of
information. Input that can be integrated into existing knowledge is processed
further and any inputs that cannot be processed is discarded. The data from our
study is compatible with such a model and there are two potential mechanisms
that could explain our results. Communicative signals might act as boundary
cues that either (1) give children extra time to process the preceding action seg-
ment (e.g. the hopping/sliding), or (2) provide a cue to segment the action and
process it as a separate action on its own. Consequentially, in the unsegmented
sequence, only the outcome of the action will be stored in memory. The manner
of the action will be discarded, unless it can be interpreted on its own. According
to our data, children did not require segmentation cues for the hopping action. It
is possible, that the hopping action was already interpretable and children were
able to store, process and retrieve the action as a separate event without an addi-
tional segmentation cue.
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Event Segment Theory also suggests that bottom-up and top-down processes
influence the perception of an incoming stream of events (Zacks & Swallow,
2007), such as the action sequence observed by the children in our study. Ac-
cording to Event Segmentation Theory, the way that an event is segmented af-
fects how it is interpreted, with similar behavioural consequences as in Cogni-
tive Chunking. Subsequently, the segmentation of an action should lead to a dif-
ferent interpretation of the action sequence. Whereas the unsegmented action
sequence is reduced interpreted as “putting the animal into the house” (by any
means), the segmented event sequence is interpreted as two separate events of
“hopping/sliding” and “putting the animal into the house”. In line with this inter-
pretation, it is possible that the hopping action provided sufficient information
to be segmented from the overall action sequence.
Importantly, our results suggest that any effect of communicative signals only
generalises to the sliding action, since children already imitated the hopping ac-
tion reliably. It is possible that the children in our study were able to segment
the hopping action because it is more easily identified, for example, due to its
salience. Previous research has already highlighted the role of salience in chil-
dren’s imitation of actions. For example, toddlers between 12–30-months were
more likely to imitate a hammering action compared to a less salient pulling
action (Gampe, Prinz, & Daum, 2016) and 12-month olds were better at learn-
ing to anticipate reaches towards large, compared to small objects (Adam et al.,
2016; Henrichs et al., 2012). Importantly, there is also evidence that the pres-
ence of communicative signals affects low and high salience actions differently.
For example, at 16 months children are less likely to imitate actions without di-
rect, observable consequences unless they are cued by social signals (Brugger et
al., 2007). Three- to five-year-olds were more likely to imitate outcomes when
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these were accompanied by verbal information, but this effect was even stronger
for less salient outcomes (Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012). Therefore, the contribution of
communicative signals to goal-directed action segmentation might be to iden-
tify action boundaries in low salience actions. As the results of our experiment
only show an effect of marker location on one of the two actions, future investi-
gations need to systematically broaden the range of actions and their salience to
generalise the findings to other actions.
Whilst some action units have clear boundaries that allow for their segmen-
tation and subsequent processing, other units are not as easily segmented from
the ongoing stream of information and are not processed and stored in memory.
Studies by Hespos et al. (2009); Hespos, Grossman, and Saylor (2010) provide
evidence that already by the age of 6 months, infants are more likely to detect
changes of events with clear outcomes, compared to changes in the transitions
between events, e.g. when a ball moving across the screen bounces down, in-
stead of up, before arriving at its goal location. This distinction is evident in our
results, where children imitated the more salient hopping action irrespective of
the segmentation information provided by the model.
However, although the transition events investigated by Hespos et al. (2009,
2010) are in principle similar to the hopping/sliding actions in our study, the 18-
month-old children in our study clearly imitated the hopping action even with-
out further segmentation cues. This might indicate an age-related difference in
children’s action segmentation, or a difference between the transitional events
used in both studies. In our study, the hopping action was more repetitive than
the single-bounce used in Hespos et al. (2009, 2010). Indeed, domain-general
models of learning (e.g. Goldstein et al., 2010; Twomey, Lush, Pearce, & Horst,
2014) have also emphasised repetitions and variations as important sources of
134 Chapter 4. Ostensive-referential signals in action segmentation
learning about events and structures, particularly in parent-child interactions.
The hopping event is highly repetitive within one presentation and therefore may
stand out on its own. Such repetitions might be an important source of variation
in infant learning and the way that parents shape the input that children receive
in order to facilitate learning.
Children may have been more likely to perceive the hopping action as inten-
tional, as it is not instrumental in moving the animal into the house. Whether or
not an action is carried out intentionally plays an important role in its imitation
(Behne et al., 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; Loucks & Meltzoff, 2013). Furthermore, previ-
ous research has found that adults perceive actions that cannot be explained by
another goal are perceived as goals on their own (Schachner & Carey, 2013). In
fact, this is also a key finding of the original research by Carpenter et al. (2005),
who found that children only imitate the manner of the action when they could
no longer appeal to the higher goal of putting the animal into the house. Repet-
itive, non-goal-directed actions are also perceived as communicative by adults
(Royka, Aboody, & Jara-Ettinger, 2018) and therefore might be sufficient to initi-
ate a communicative context to boost pedagogy.
Children’s increase in their imitation of the sliding motion after being ad-
dressed after the sliding and before putting the animal into the house is also com-
patible with Natural Pedagogy Theory. In inferential accounts of infant learning
such as Natural Pedagogy, the communicative and the informative intention are
two separate intentions (Csibra, 2010). In pedagogical interactions, infants still
need additional information about actions and their constituents to understand
which parts of the actions are relevant. Children may have attributed a different
informative intention to the second “Wow” depending on its location. The inter-
ruption of the action to address the children provides important information on
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interpreting the meaning of events by providing temporal reference, in addition
to spatial reference that can be established through referential gaze to object lo-
cations (S. C. Butler, Caron, & Brooks, 2000; Senju et al., 2008) or pointing (Gliga
& Csibra, 2009; Melinder, Konijnenberg, Hermansen, Daum, & Gredebäck, 2014;
Morissette, Ricard, & Décarie, 1995). In just the same way that pointing can be
used to disambiguate which object a speaker refers to, interrupting an action can
be used to show that the action consists of multiple parts.
Importantly, the manipulation in our study has boosted the imitation of a
preceding event (see also: Nie, Ding, Chen, & Conci, 2018), rather than creating
a referential expectation for an upcoming event. This appears to go against an
interpretation of Natural Pedagogy in which the communicative intention pre-
cedes the informative intention. However, the action demonstration took place
within an already established communicative context, as the experimenter ad-
dressed the child at the beginning of the action demonstration (c.f. Csibra &
Shamsudheen, 2015). Since communication is already established, infants may
actively look for an interpretation of the action based on its location in time and
by doing so establish the relevancy of the sliding action.
Although our study has shown that communicative signals can help to in-
crease the imitation of a non-salient action manner in 18-month-old children,
our study did not show whether this effect is unique to social signals. Social sig-
nals share certain properties that make them particularly useful for this purpose.
For example, infants show a stimuli-specific preference towards gaze (Farroni et
al., 2000, 2002; Michel, Wronski, et al., 2017; Michel, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017) and
infant-directed speech (Dominey & Dodane, 2004) and direct gaze appears to in-
terrupt working memory (J. J. Wang & Apperly, 2016). However, so far we do not
know whether these effects extend to action segmentation. Other, non-social sig-
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nals may have similar effects on action segmentation and increase the imitation
of action manner in this paradigm. It is possible that a non-social, self-directed
‘hmmm’ or a ‘beep’ initiated by a button press may have a similar effect on ac-
tion segmentation. Furthermore, it is possible that even a simple pause might
be sufficient to induce the segmentation of an action. For example, 6- (Sharon &
Wynn, 1998) and 10–11-month old (Baldwin et al., 2001) infants that have been
familiarised with video sequences of everyday actions look longer if the video
sequence is paused within an intentional action, compared to a pause between
intentional actions. Therefore, the effect might not be specific to social signals
and any pause may be sufficient to segment non-salient actions for children and
subsequently increase their imitation.
However, not every interruption is beneficial for the understanding of an
event sequence. For example, Sonne et al. (2016) found that occlusions at event
boundaries impaired children’s memory for movie clips after a two-week delay
and this particularly affected 20-month-old children, compared to 16-month-
olds. Our current experiment has only tested the immediate recall of a relatively
short event sequence and we cannot make any inferences about the long term
retention of these action sequences. However, segmenting a stream of actions
into too many chunks is degrading to memory retention, since too many items
would need to be stored (Christiansen & Chater, 2016). Therefore, it is likely that
the usefulness of segmentation follows a reverse-u shape, with more segmenta-
tion clues leading more accurate imitation of an action sequence up to a point
where too many items will have to be remembered and the number of successful
actions within a sequence declining again. There is evidence that parents may
take into account such a relationship during naturalistic interactions with their
children, as older children receive more frequent, but shorter periods of direct
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gaze (Brand et al., 2007). This sensitivity may reflect children’s increasing mem-
ory capacity or prior knowledge about the actions they are shown.
Previous research has shown that parents use communicative signals partic-
ularly at event boundaries (Brand et al., 2013). We were interested in whether
children use this information in order to determine whether or not to imitate the
manner of a transient action. The results of the current study suggest that they
do, but only for actions that are not salient on their own. For these types of ac-
tions, they may be able to fulfil a similar role to verbal information about the
action (e.g. Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002; Southgate et al., 2009). However,
other parts of an action sequence may be salient enough on their own may not
benefit from the additional information provided by the location of such social
signals. The results of our experiment suggest a potential mechanism on how
communicative signals provide information beyond their function as a marker
for the presence of communication.
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Communication and language shape human culture. Pragmatic theories of com-
munication have argued that humans have a special sensitivity towards recognis-
ing communicative intentions (Scott-Phillips, 2007). Natural Pedagogy has built
on these theories and proposed that infants already show a basic use of commu-
nicative intentions in the presence of specific communicative signals, such as di-
rect gaze, infant-directed speech and contingent reactivity (Csibra, 2010; Csibra
& Gergely, 2009, 2011; Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). Children’s processing of ac-
tions in the presence of communicative signals is informative about the origins of
a pragmatic understanding of communication because it allows us to investigate
the role of communication before language is fully established as a mechanism
of cultural transmission.
This thesis has looked at two different ways that communication and the
presence of communicative signals may shape how infants understand others’
actions. Chapters 2 and 3 derived their central hypotheses from Natural Ped-
agogy and investigate how infants learn about actions in communicative and
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non-communicative contexts. The experiments reported in these chapters are
similar in conceptualisation and link closely to previous research in action un-
derstanding (Reid et al., 2009; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010), but extend this line
of research by investigating the effect of communicative signals on action under-
standing and prediction. Furthermore, Chapter 4 has looked at how ostensive
signals can provide structural information to support how infants learn about
actions by contributing towards their segmentation.
5.1 General Findings
Effects of communicative signals on action understanding
The central question of this thesis has been whether and how the presence of
communicative signals may help children to understand, predict and imitate ac-
tions. Despite their different methodologies, all three experimental chapters in-
vestigated a similar question: Do communicative signals make the following ac-
tion demonstration more meaningful? The four experiments reported in Chap-
ters 2–4 suggests that, given the right circumstances, this may be the case.
Summary of ERP evidence
The main evidence that communication directly affects the meaning of actions
directly comes from the analysis of the N400 and Pb components in Chapter 2.
According to the canonical interpretation, the N400 indexes the violation of pre-
activated semantic memory (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011). In the experi-
ments in Chapter 2, showing a picture of an actor holding a spoon lead to a more
positive deflection towards the following picture, when the actor moved the ob-
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ject to their forehead instead of putting it to their mouth. We observed this effect
in both infant samples and the adult control group in the first experiment, but
not the adults in the second experiment.
Critically, the two experiments reported in Chapter 2 found a small, but re-
liably increased N400 effect (as indicated by the difference between expected
and unexpected mean amplitudes towards the outcome picture) for communica-
tively presented actions. This effect is not straightforward to interpret, as it does
not come up in commonly used analyses, yet replicates across all three exper-
imental groups that showed an N400 effect. Therefore, communicative signals
may lead to a slightly higher activation of semantic expectations.
The results are also broadly compatible with recent interpretations of the
N400 effect suggesting that the N400 reflects a probabilistic interpretation of
meaning (Rabovsky et al., 2018). According to this account, the N400 reflects the
probabilistic likelihood of an event taking place, based on previous constraints.
The increased N400 effect may reflect infants’ expectation that communicatively
presented information is more predictable overall.
The experiments reported in Chapter 2 may have only found a very small ef-
fect of communication on the N400, because it is masked by the repeated stim-
ulus presentation within each experimental sessions. Because ERP analyses ag-
gregate multiple ERP data over time, it is difficult to conclude whether the dif-
ferences between communicative and non-communicatively presented action
outcomes changes over time. For example, it is possible that the presence of
communicative signals initially leads to a higher semantic activation at the be-
ginning of a series of action observations, but then gradually decreases when the
unexpected action outcome has been observed repeatedly. However, it is also
possible that the reverse is also true and communicative signals may facilitate
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action expectations over time and thereby to an increase ERP deflection for un-
expected action outcomes. Given the slight increase of the ERP deflection for
communicative-unexpected outcomes, there are several possibilities as to why
we observe an increased N400 ERP:
1. Communicatively presented unexpected action outcomes lead to an in-
creased ERP amplitude, compared to non-communicatively presented un-
expected action outcomes.
2. Communicatively presented unexpected action outcomes increase the
ERP amplitude for the unexpected condition over time.
3. Communicatively presented unexpected action outcomes show an initially
larger ERP amplitude that decreases over time.
Mixed Effects Regression Analyses on the raw ERP measurements for each time
window may be able to shed light on such effects. Such analyses would be infor-
mative about how communicative signals shape infants’ learning and allow us to
look at the mechanisms behind socio-communicative learning.
The second ERP experiments reported in Chapter 2 also suggests that com-
munication might play an important role much earlier in the processing of the
actions, provided that the input is reliable enough or that models use additional
referential signals. The key finding is that the Pb takes into account both, the
presence of communicative signals prior to the action outcome as well as the
outcome congruency. We found that infants showed a more positive Pb deflec-
tion towards actors that were either communicative and congruent, or not com-
municative and incongruent. Since we did not find a Pb component in Experi-
ment 1, the Pb appears to be sensitive to either the presence of referential signals
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or the predictability of an actor. Only in the presence of referential signals and
a more predictive presentation of the stimuli, as investigated in Experiment 2,
did we find a differentiated Pb response. Overall, this response is likely to reflect
a seeking of information and increased interest in the stimuli that precedes the
semantic integration of the information as indexed by the N400 component.
Summary of Eye Tracking evidence
The study of anticipatory looking in 7-month old infants reported in Chapter 3
did not find any evidence of communication on anticipation of novel action out-
comes. The main findings of this study are that infants show more anticipa-
tory looks towards the mouth region, irrespective of how they were addressed
or whether they are familiar with the action and its outcome.
The findings on their own suggest that infants of this age are potentially not
able to form adequate representations of the actions to reliably anticipate them,
e.g. because they did not yet have sufficient experience with the type of actions
we presented them with. If this is the case, Chapter 3 may have simply failed
to replicate Hunnius and Bekkering (2010). Either children at this age do not
anticipate such action outcomes reliably or our stimuli were more complex than
the original ones.
Discussion: Action semantics during communication
It is possible that the divergent results between Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are due
to developmental differences between the two age groups and 7-month-old in-
fants may not anticipate action outcomes reliably. There is mixed evidence that
infants of this age reliably anticipate action outcomes in such naturalistic envi-
ronments. On the one hand, Reid et al. (2009) found evidence of an N400 ERP
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component only in 9-month-olds and adults, but not in the 7-month old age
group. On the other hand, recent findings by Michel, Kaduk, et al. (2017) sug-
gest that infants discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar action outcomes
at the age of five months, if simplified stimuli are used. Importantly, the stimuli
this study no longer use a semantic priming paradigm, but show the outcome
pictures on their own. Therefore, the evidence that children actively anticipate
such complex actions at this age is limited.
Meaning through segmentation
Chapter 4 of this thesis explored a novel question of the role that communica-
tive signals may play in action understanding by looking at their contribution to
toddlers’ imitation of the parts of an action sequence. It takes a more functional
interpretation of the role of communicative signals in children’s interpretation of
actions, by positing that the placement of communicative signals within an ac-
tion can modify children’s imitation of an action sequence. This chapter draws
upon a wide range of different theoretical approaches that discuss the structure
of action sequences and their corresponding units. An important implication of
a potential role of ostensive signals contributing to the segmentation of actions
is that according to multiple models of cognition the segmentation of an action
is crucial for its interpretation. According to Event Segmentation Theory, the way
that events (and therefore actions) are segmented predicts how they are remem-
bered (Lassiter, Stone, & Rogers, 1988; Sargent et al., 2013).
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Do communicative signals increase infants’ arousal?
An underlying thread running through this thesis is the difference between
Natural Pedagogy and domain-general learning mechanisms. This question is
strongly tied up in how communication may facilitate infants learning. I inves-
tigated infants’ measures of arousal in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3. However,
despite the use of multiple methodologies by investigating the ERPs and the
Pupillary Light Reflex (PLR), I did not find evidence of increased arousal towards
communicatively presented actions. Neither the Nc component in the two
experiments in Chapter 2 nor the Pupillary Light Reflex measurements taken in
the experiment in Chapter 3 found evidence of increased arousal after infants
had been communicatively addressed by the actor. Only the Nc component in
the second experiment of Chapter 2 showed some evidence of a differentiated
response in communicative contexts. We found that in our control condition,
congruent eating actions show an increased Nc response, but such a difference
was absent in the communicative condition.
These results provide evidence against accounts that argue that the effect of
ostensive signals can be explained by an increase in arousal when infants are
addressed with ostensive signals, such as direct gaze or infant-directed-speech
(e.g. Gredebäck et al., 2018; Szufnarowska et al., 2014). However, the experi-
ments presented in this thesis cannot rule out an ostension-is-attention expla-
nation entirely. The experiments discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 use screen-based
experiments and it is possible that the videos used as stimuli were not sufficiently
different in manipulating infants’ arousal or conveying communicative inten-
tions. Since the results of the experiment reported in Chapter 3 do not provide
any evidence of an effect of communication on infants’ action outcomes, it may
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be that for these younger infants, the communicative signals were simply not
strong enough to elicit an effect of attention sufficient for enhanced processing
of the actions. It is also possible that the adult-directed control condition already
triggers a referential expectation. Both sets of studies used adult-directed speech
and averted gaze as a control condition for communication. Despite this, simi-
lar research used adult-directed speech as a control, finding that infants process
novel tools (Hernik & Csibra, 2015) and show differential retention of object lo-
cation following communicative signals (Yoon et al., 2008). Furthermore, there
is evidence that children at the age of five months show distinct neural markers
towards infant-directed speech and direct gaze, or a combination thereof (Parise
& Csibra, 2013). Therefore, infants do appear to show a differentiated response
towards infant-directed speech, compared to adult-directed speech.
Additional findings
The third important thread running through this thesis is the importance of goal
outcomes and the salience of actions. The relationship between the role of os-
tensive communication and the salience of different aspects of an action has
emerged as a key question for future research. The finding that toddlers are more
likely to imitate a salient hopping action compared to the less salient sliding ac-
tion in Chapter 4 is possibly the clearest of the studies presented in this thesis for
such an interaction. However, even for the studies presented in Chapters 2 and
3, the salience of the outcomes may have contributed to the results that we ob-
served. For example, the N400 ERP components for the infant data in Chapter 2
suggest that infants are predominantly sensitive to the outcome. Any modifica-
tions of the N400 component were only observed in the Bayesian analysis. Fur-
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thermore, the Pb response has revealed a complex response pattern that takes
into account the presence of communication, but also the congruency in the
outcomes. The seven-month-old infants in Chapter 3 showed most anticipatory
looks to the mouth region, but only few to the target area at the head.
Since we did not find effects of congruency or communication it appears that
this is mainly due to the mouth area being generally more interesting to infants,
compared to the upper head (Kato & Konishi, 2013). Furthermore, the mouth-
directed actions also had a well-defined target for actions, whereas the actions
directed towards the upper head did not have such a well-defined target area.
Apart from visual saliency, the results are also compatible with teleological inter-
pretations of anticipatory looking in infancy, since infants may have been able
to understand the purpose of the mouth-directed actions better even for objects
that typically do not go to the mouth.
In Chapter 4, I have looked at how communicative signals may provide refer-
ence in time, in addition to space. I have found that the effect of such signals may
differ depending on the actions themselves. Indeed, most actions investigated in
this thesis have clearly defined endpoints. The eating action is completed when
the food is in the mouth or the ear. The endpoints are characterised by a stop
in the motion and in the case of the mouth-directed actions, also a clearly vis-
ible target. The same holds true for the animals hopping and sliding into the
house, which also constitutes a well-defined end point of the action. Taken to-
gether, these results show the need to understand the role that communicative
signals play in understanding different parts of an action and different action
types. They highlight the need to connect infants’ use of communicative signals
to basic mechanisms of perception and learning.
148 Chapter 5. Communication and Action Understanding
5.2 Theoretical challenges in researching an early
understanding of communication
One of the challenges of conducting research on the role of communicative sig-
nals in action understanding has been that the underlying theoretical models are
underspecified. Consequentially, there are not always clear predictions that al-
low us to compare and contrast Natural Pedagogy with domain-general accounts
of learning. The studies reported in this thesis all address central points that are
relevant to Natural Pedagogy and statistical learning accounts, such as curiosity-
based learning. By and large, the results are compatible with both theoretical
frameworks. This is in part due to a theoretical overlap between them.
For example, the definition of relevance according to Relevance Theory shares
important similarities with the Goldilocks effect discussed in the curiosity litera-
ture. Sperber and Wilson define relevance as the following:
Extent condition 1: An assumption is relevant in a context to the ex-
tent that its contextual effects in that context are large. Extent condi-
tion 2: An assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the
effort required to process it in that context is small. (Sperber & Wil-
son, 1987, p. 703)
The so-called Goldilocks Effect (Kidd et al., 2012; Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin,
2014; Twomey, Ranson, & Horst, 2013; Twomey & Westermann, 2017) embod-
ies a similar principle within the curiosity literature, according to which learners
actively seek out information that is of intermediate complexity and disengage
from stimuli that are too simple or too difficult to integrate into existing knowl-
edge. Kidd et al. (2012) describe it as follows:
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[...] infants avoid spending time examining stimuli that are either
too simple (highly predictable) or too complex (highly unexpected)
according to their implicit beliefs about the probabilistic structure of
events in the world. Rather, infants allocate their greatest amount of
attention to events of intermediate surprisingness—events that are
likely to have just enough complexity so that they are interesting, but
not so much that they cannot be understood. (Kidd et al., 2012, p. 1)
The consequence of both principles is similar—learners will avoid stimuli that do
not change their knowledge state and seek out those that can easily be integrated
into existing knowledge.
The key difference between Relevance Theory and Curiosity based learning
lies in the specialisation of the underlying cognitive architecture. Relevance The-
ory assumes innate, domain-specific modules that allow for the fast processing
of social information and the recognition of communicative intent (Sperber &
Wilson, 2002). Curiosity based learning is grounded in domain-general learn-
ing mechanisms. Any specialisation emerges from the accumulation of previous
experience (Twomey & Westermann, 2017). Therefore, if there are effects of com-
municative signals on learning in infancy, they are due to the way that parental
interactions scaffold learning. Curiously, Relevance Theory also places the bur-
den of relevance on the sender in formulating a message that is relevant (i.e.
cognitively interesting) to the receiver (Sperber & Wilson, 1987). Furthermore,
the actual process of recognising relevance takes place within domain-general
central cognitive processes (Sperber & Wilson, 1987), only the processes related
to recognising communicative intent are massively modular (Sperber & Wilson,
2002). These descriptions highlight the considerable theoretical overlap between
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these conceptually very different theoretical frameworks. Therefore, an impor-
tant task for future research will need to disambiguate the predictions that can
be derived from these theories and work out testable predictions.
One of the key notions of Natural Pedagogy is that communicative signals
create a referential expectation that the following information is relevant to the
infant and generalisable to other contexts (Csibra & Shamsudheen, 2015). Cru-
cially, this expectation, according to Natural Pedagogy, is innate and present at
birth (Csibra, 2010). Although there are numerous studies that show that infants
already prefer looking at human eyes (e.g. Farroni, Massaccesi, et al., 2004; Far-
roni et al., 2005) and face-like configurations (e.g. Courchesne et al., 1981; Reid
et al., 2017) within the first month after birth, these findings do not constitute ev-
idence that infants already have a referential expectation. The experiments de-
scribed in this thesis have investigated children between the ages of 7–18 months
of age, but by this age, infants could have already learned about the relevance of
social signals. There is evidence that already infants understand the referential
nature of communicative signals by the age of four months (Michel et al., 2015;
Michel, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017; Wahl et al., 2013).
The discussion in Chapter 4 has also shown how the structures of caregiver-
infant interactions can provide the ‘cradle for social learning’ (as coined by Shnei-
dman & Woodward, 2016). Studying how infants understand everyday actions
offers an important aspect of how infants learn from others. Repetitive, over-
emphasised actions have a Natural Meaning and offer ways of abstracting from
individual observations (Stahl et al., 2014; Waterfall, Sandbank, Onnis, & Edel-
man, 2010). Like spoken language, they are also highly transient. Both have com-
monalities in structure (Maffongelli et al., 2015, 2018), meaning (Amoruso et al.,
2013; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 2011) across space and time. Future work will
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need to specify computational models of the different theoretical accounts that
have been discussed here, so that more detailed predictions can be developed
and reviewed.
By looking at actions as a stream of events in need of segmentation, it is also
possible to draw from a wide range of theoretical literature previously not been
used to study action understanding in early infancy. In particular, event segmen-
tation theory (Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Zacks, 2004; Zacks et al., 2009) and the
chunking account (Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Isbilen & Christiansen, 2018).
However, toddlers may also perceive the actions themselves as more meaning-
ful if they are segmented, and therefore the results are also compatible with ac-
counts that are founded in a teleological interpretation of infants’ action under-
standing (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Gergely & Csibra, 2003).
Spike et al. (2016) have reviewed computational accounts on the emergence
of stable communication systems and identified three properties that are neces-
sary to develop a functional communication system: (1) a mechanism to estab-
lish reference, (2) a bias against ambiguity that ensures that meaningful informa-
tion is retained, and (3) some form of information loss that facilitates abstraction
by removing irrelevant information. This work has important implications on the
role of communicative signals for assigning meaning in interactions. Based on
these three principles, ostensive-referential signals fulfil the function of linking
signals and referents in time and space, cognitive memory bottlenecks and lossy
social transmission contribute to their generalisation: According to this view,
children will attempt to generalise social and non-social information equally,
but child-directed interactions provide more reliable structures in which relevant
units are emphasised (Brand & Shallcross, 2008; Koterba & Iverson, 2009; Ruther-
ford & Przednowek, 2012), and therefore allow for an easier identification of the
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sub-units. The results of the experiment reported in Chapter 4 have contributed
to this literature by emphasising the role that communicative signals may play
in segmenting actions. Repetitions in child-directed interactions (e.g. Brand et
al., 2009) allow the identification of candidates for generalisation (Brodsky, Wa-
terfall, & Edelman, 2007; Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Goldstein
et al., 2010). Finally, there are multiple mechanisms of how infant-directed in-
teractions might reduce the information retained in each interaction, and future
research may attempt to disambiguate these: (1) infant-directed interactions po-
tentially reduce the information load by directing infants’ attention to key as-
pects and moments in time and thereby reduce the overall information that is
transmitted. (2) infant-directed interactions potentially increase the cognitive
load and/or the amount of information transmitted and thereby ensure that less
information actually gets encoded. (3) The learner’s memory constraints act as a
further source of information loss to abstract away from single observations, and
generalise to other instances of the events. The success of achieving previously
observed goal outcomes or parents’ corrective feedback (for example by repeat-
edly demonstrating actions, varying the demonstrations) prevents overgeneral-
isation (i.e. too much information loss) and achieves successful transmission.
Such a learning mechanism could potentially account for children’s differenti-
ated learning in the presence of communication without appealing to an innate
referential expectation being triggered by communicative signals.
5.3 Methodological contributions
This thesis has also used different methodological approaches. By using Bayes
Factors I was able to test specific predictions about the direction and size of the
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ERP effects in Chapter 2. This has allowed me to establish the absence of the
N400 effect for the adults in Experiment 2, as well as the absence of effects on
the Nc component in Experiment 1. So far, only very few ERP studies have used
Bayes Factors for the analysis (e.g. Fu et al., 2013, 2017). At the time of writing,
this thesis is one of the first papers that have used Bayes Factors in the devel-
opmental electroencephalography literature. The use of Bayes Factors has also
raised important questions on the conceptualisation of ERPs. Determining the
minimally and maximally interesting effect sizes required a survey of the litera-
ture, but many papers do not report raw ERP measures in the first place. To make
the best use of specific ERP-related predictions we need to better understand
the variance and parameters that determine the amplitude and their differences
for different ERP components. Future electrophysiology research should em-
brace Bayesian analyses. In particular, in combination with the pre-registration
of methodology and analyses, they can offer a powerful tool to test specific pre-
dictions, and also ascertain the absence of effects (see Lakens, Scheel, & Isager,
2018, for an alternative approach using classical null hypothesis testing).
Furthermore, although eye tracking and pupil dilation measurements have
become a commonly used technique in developmental research, the use of the
Pupillary Light Reflex (PLR) has not been used in many developmental studies
(see: Hepach et al., 2012, 2016, 2017, for some examples). Although this measure
has not shown to be sensitive to the manipulations used in the experiment in
Chapter 2, it is a potentially useful indicator of measuring arousal in infants and
is easily integrated into already existing methodologies (Hepach, 2016; Hepach &
Westermann, 2016).
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5.4 Limitations of the Thesis
Of course, this thesis cannot settle the question about how infants use commu-
nicative signals to understand and predict actions.
It is possible that the effects of communication that I described in Chap-
ters 2 and 3 were relatively small or absent, since the control conditions were very
strong. The control conditions for the experiments used adult-directed speech as
a baseline. It is possible that infants are in fact already sensitive to adult-directed
communication, and therefore already associate some degree of informativeness
to the actors in the control condition as well. Furthermore, the actors in the
videos were facing the child and the presentation of the actions was highly pre-
dictable and systematic. Therefore, they used a highly structured and repetitive
presentation that may have made it equally easy for infants to understand the
actions they were interested in.
One limitation of the experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 is that most of the ac-
tions investigated were actions that infants are familiar with. This provides the
advantage that, in particular, for the eating actions, infants will have had consid-
erable experience with observing these actions, and may already attempt some
of them already. However, because of this, we cannot control how much expe-
rience infants had prior to taking part in our studies. It is possible, for example,
that some infants may have had more experience with using cups and spoons
than others, and the same holds true for their parents’ use of mobile phones for
calling and using a hairbrush. To control for such effects, the experiment used
novel object-action relationships to create a baseline that other the actions can
be compared against. However, in the absence of effects in Chapter 3, the lack
of anticipations is best explained by the lack of familiarity for the sets of action-
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object relationships, and novel generalisations may take some time to allow chil-
dren to reliably anticipate the actions.
Future research on everyday actions might use questionnaires and home re-
ports using apps to query infants’ exposure to certain types of actions, to control
for such effects. This would also allow for the study of how individual differences
in infants’ environment can influence the processing of actions. However, such
measures can only be a crude way of taking into account the variance that chil-
dren are exposed to, and another way of explicitly reducing (or even manipulat-
ing) the variance that children are exposed to is the use of a home training pro-
gramme for parents and their children, during which children are taught novel
actions over a prolonged period of time (c.f. Kaduk, 2017).
Chapter 4 looked at the role of communicative signals in a unique way, and
it has raised important questions on the role of communicative signals in seg-
menting actions. Because of this, the conclusions are limited to the two actions
that we presented to infants. However, to ascertain that the salience and/or in-
strumental distinction between the hopping and sliding action is determining
the effect of the temporal placement of communicative signals, it is necessary to
investigate a wider range of actions along these distinctions. One way to extend
these findings is the use of longer action sequences to combine (e.g. Elsner, Hauf,
& Aschersleben, 2007; Loucks & Meltzoff, 2013).
Furthermore, from the experiment in Chapter 4, it is not possible to con-
clude that communicative signals themselves are special in their role of action
segmentation for less salient, instrumental actions. It is possible that a non-
communicative pause can have similar effects in breaking up the action into
different units. Other sources of information may also contribute to action seg-
mentation, and may play an even greater role in action segmentation. For exam-
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ple, knowledge about an event unit can contribute to its segmentation, in the
same way that knowing a word can support the segmentation of other words
within a phrase (Christiansen & Chater, 2016; Monaghan & Christiansen, 2010;
Tomasello, 2000), or the partial repetition of words within phrases in variation
sets (Brodsky et al., 2007; Goldstein et al., 2010; Waterfall et al., 2010).
A constraint of the study of action segmentation is posed by the earliest ages
at which infants and toddlers can imitate actions and action sequences. Many
other studies on event segmentation have used looking times (e.g. Baldwin et al.,
2001; Hespos et al., 2009, 2010), but the interpretation of passive viewing may be
more informative if combined with other methods, such as EEG (e.g. Braukmann
et al., 2017).
One of the issues raised in Chapter 4 was that the prior ostensive context
has led children to be more likely to attribute meaning to segmentation infor-
mation. Csibra and Shamsudheen (2015) raised similar concerns about stud-
ies by L. P. Butler and Markman (2012, 2013, 2014), who found that three-year-
olds did not explore pedagogically and intentionally presented objects, com-
pared to intentionally but not pedagogically presented objects. However, the
older children were more likely to imitate the pedagogically presented objects.
Csibra and Shamsudheen (2015) that the younger children may associate the
non-pedagogical demonstration of the objects to an earlier interaction with the
experimenter that had pedagogical features.
This issue is present in many other studies. For example, Moore and col-
leagues (R. Moore, Liebal, & Tomasello, 2013; R. Moore, Mueller, Kaminski, &
Tomasello, 2015) showed that children are able to infer an experimenter’s com-
municative intention without ostensive signals, such as gaze or speech. However,
in both studies, children were playing with the experimenter prior to this demon-
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stration of the game and apparatus used. Therefore, they may have still perceived
the experimenter as a communicative partner during the test trial. Hoehl, Zetter-
sten, et al. (2014) conducted one of the few studies that presented a completely
non-communicative action demonstration, albeit investigating much older chil-
dren. The five-year-old children in their study were not more likely to imitate
unnecessary actions in an action sequence, irrespective of whether the model
interacted with them in a pedagogical-communicative manner, or whether they
acted aloof. Only observing a communicative, but more efficient actor during the
next observation reduced their levels of overimitation, suggesting that the effect
of communicative signals may only appear over consecutive trials. These results
demonstrate the complex relationship between action understanding, sensitiv-
ity towards communicatively presented information and age, and future research
will need to investigate these relationships more systematically.
5.5 Future research
The results of the thesis open up new questions for future research. For exam-
ple, humour and pretence offer an interesting case of parents use of commu-
nicative signals. Such interactions are fairly common throughout childhood, but
are distinct from classical pedagogical exchanges since at least some information
shown here is not meant to be generalised beyond the current context. How-
ever, previous research by Hoicka (2016) has shown that parents actually provide
more ostensive signals, but fewer referential signals during humorous interac-
tions. These results support the notion that the role of ostensive signals itself is
all-or-nothing, and that it is not the quantity of communicative signals that af-
fects what a learner takes away from an interaction. Instead, the key question is
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how the information is disambiguated by referential signals that determine what
is being learned. These points also come up in the current thesis. For example,
it is possible that the cheerful ostensive address without the combination with
referential signals in Chapter 2, Experiment 1 primed children towards a humor-
ous interpretation of the stimuli, and therefore potentially masked the effects we
found on the Pb in Experiment 2.
By investigating how ostensive signals, such as direct gaze and Infant-
Directed Speech, can provide temporal reference, Chapter 4 has broadened our
current understanding of how they might contribute to action understanding.
This conceptualisation of communicative signals as potential segmentation
markers provides important links about how children identify the units of an
action sequence, particularly for units that are low in salience on their own.
An important alternative to classical ERP paradigms is the use of time-
frequency analysis. Time-frequency analysis allows a wider range of stimuli,
and is more robust towards the presentation of animated stimuli, including
videos and live interactions. An important frequency band associated with social
cognition and motor activity is the mu frequency range (Cuevas, Cannon, Yoo, &
Fox, 2014). Mu-desynchronisation has been observed for for unexpected action
observations similar to chapter 2 and 3 (Stapel et al., 2010), when infants learn
to shake a rattle (Paulus, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2012), observe actions
they can carry out themselves (van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & Bekkering,
2008) or for goal-directed reaching (Nyström, Ljunghammar, Rosander, & von
Hofsten, 2011). Increased mu-desynchronisation has also been observed in
infants during dyadic turn-taking with their mothers. (Liao, Acar, Makeig, &
Deak, 2015). Since previous research has linked the mu-frequency to action and
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social processing, it may be interesting to investigate whether communicative
signals affect increase desynchronisation during action processing.
The current thesis has used four different methodologies to investigate the
effect of communication on how infants learn from others. We combined eye
tracking and pupil dilation Chapter 3. However, in particular, the combination
of EEG with behavioural measures would open up a promising avenue towards
interpreting the neural markers underlying what infants and young children ac-
tually take away from pedagogical demonstrations. Such work would enhance
our understanding of how neural markers are linked to actual behaviour.
5.6 Summary
This PhD thesis has contributed to the understanding of how children may use
communicative signals to learn about actions. It has explored the effect of com-
munication on infants’ and toddlers’ understanding of actions using four dif-
ferent methodologies—EEG, Eye Tracking, Pupil Dilation and Behavioural mea-
sures. Although it has largely used Natural Pedagogy as a reference framework
to specify hypotheses for Chapter 2 and 3, it has also conceptualised the role of
communicative signals in a novel way by looking at how they provide structural
information within communicative interactions (Chapter 4).
The thesis has shown that it is likely that communicative signals enhance the
processing of semantic information and information seeking, given the right cir-
cumstances. The EEG study in Chapters 2 found tentative evidence for an in-
creased action N400 effect for communicatively presented actions in 9-month-
olds, in addition to an interaction at the PB component, suggesting that infants
seek more information after ostensive-expected and non-ostensive unexpected
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action outcomes, provided that the presentation is predictable or the actors use
referential signals towards the objects during the greeting. Furthermore, the ex-
perimental results in Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence that the mere presence
of communicative signals does not appear to lead to an increase in arousal. Since
we do not find any evidence of such an increase, it is unlikely that the effects we
observed on the N400 and Pb component in the experiments in Chapter 2 can
be explained by the arousal account proposed by Szufnarowska et al. (2014) and
Gredebäck et al. (2018). Additionally, we also did not find an increase in arousal
towards communicatively presented actions, as measured by the Pupillary Light
Reflex in Chapter 3. This provides further evidence against an arousal-driven ac-
count of communication. However, the 7-month-old infants in the eye tracking
experiment did not show evidence of increased learning as measured by their
anticipatory looking either. Therefore it is possible that the methodology used
in this Chapter was not successful in eliciting the communicative expectation in
the first place.
The results of the behavioural experiment reported in Chapter 4 have shown
that toddlers use communicative signals to segment less salient actions. How-
ever, if actions are already salient on their own and can be easily identified as
intentional, toddlers do not appear to require additional segmentation informa-
tion. This study has contributed a novel way of looking at the role that commu-
nicative signals can help learning about actions in infancy.
However, many more questions remain to be answered, and this thesis has
also contributed novel open questions. So far, little is understood about the neu-
ral underpinnings of the effects of communication on infants’ processing of in-
formation in general, and actions in particular. Future research will need to dis-
ambiguate whether the results on the Pb component between Experiment 1 and
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Experiment 2 are due to the higher predictability of the actions carried out by
each actor, or whether they are related to the actors’ use of referential signals
during their communication. Another realm for future research lies in the role of
communicative signals providing structural information about actions, and how
this may feed into existing theories of cognition.
This PhD thesis has contributed to the question of how communicative sig-
nals contribute to the understanding of actions during infancy. It has shown that
communicative signals play a role in action understanding by creating a pre-
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A.1 Anova tables for Experiment 1
Table A.1: Exp. 1, Infants: Anova table for the Pb between 200 and 350 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 0.049 0.828 0.001
2 Communication 1 15 0.005 0.945 0.0001
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 1.375 0.259 0.025
Table A.2: Exp. 1, Infants: Anova table for the Nc between 350 and 700 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 0.495 0.493 0.010
2 Communication 1 15 0.228 0.640 0.004
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 0.400 0.536 0.010
Table A.3: Exp. 1, Infants: Anova table for the parietal N400 between 700 and 900 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 10.032 0.006 * 0.202
2 Communication 1 15 0.898 0.358 0.027
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 1.423 0.251 0.015
Table A.4: Exp. 1, Adults: Anova table for the parietal N400 between 300 and 500 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 7.173 0.017 * 0.236
2 Communication 1 15 0.048 0.830 0.001
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 15.057 0.001 * 0.116
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A.2 Anova tables for Experiment 2
Table A.5: Exp. 2, Infants: Anova table for the Pb between 200 and 350 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 0.020 0.889 0.0005
2 Communication 1 15 0.002 0.962 0.0001
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 9.609 0.007 * 0.135
Table A.6: Exp. 2, Infants: Anova table for the Nc between 350 and 700 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 1.788 0.201 0.037
2 Communication 1 15 0.027 0.871 0.001
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 4.175 0.059 0.049
Table A.7: Exp. 2, Infants: Anova table for the parietal N400 between 700 and 900 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 7.089 0.018 * 0.146
2 Communication 1 15 2.309 0.149 0.040
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 0.432 0.521 0.011
Table A.8: Exp. 2, Adults: Anova table for the parietal N400 between 300 and 500 ms
Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
1 Outcome 1 15 2.152 0.163 0.062
2 Communication 1 15 0.695 0.417 0.008
3 Outcome:Communication 1 15 0.387 0.543 0.009
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A.3 Anova tables for the additional analyses
Please turn over



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































172 Appendix B. Supporting information for Chapter 3
B.1 Data points for the anticipation analysis
Congruency
Communication Congruent Incongruent Novel Total
Ostensive 42 (47) 34 (40) 40 (45) 116 (132)
Control 35 (42) 36 (42) 38 (46) 109 (130)
Total 77 (89) 70 (82) 78 (91) 225 (262)
Table B.1: Number of data points available for the anticipation analysis. Each data point
represents one block containing 5–9 measurements The numbers in brackets indicate the
data points in the original sample.
B.2 Data points for the pupil dilation analysis
Congruency
Communication Congruent Incongruent Novel Total
Ostensive 32 (44) 28 (39) 28 (42) 88 (125)
Control 29 (37) 29 (37) 36 (42) 94 (116)
Total 61 (81) 57 (76) 64 (84) 182 (241)
Table B.2: Number of data points available for the pupil dilation analysis. The numbers
in brackets indicate the data points in the original sample.
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B.3 Offset correction for the gaze measurements
Offsets were calculated for infants that consistently looked at the centre fixation
point during the pupil dilation measurements. If the fixation
Offsets were computed by subtracting the difference of the fixations from the
target point, excluding any fixations deviating by two standard deviations from
the mean (to exclude outliers and measurements where the child has not consis-
tently fixated the target point). The corrected points were visually inspected to
check that they provided an improved accuracy. If they did, the offset correction
was applied to all the gaze data for this participant.
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Figure B.1: Uncorrected fixations at the fixation point for each participant.
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Figure B.2: Fixations on the fixation point for each participant after correction.
B.4. Residuals vs fits plots for the Proportion and Elog-corrected models 175



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.3: Residuals vs. fits plot for the raw proportion model.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.4: Residuals vs. fits plot for the empirical log-corrected proportion model
B.5. Predicted proportions based on the complex interaction model 177

















Figure B.5: Predicted proportion of looks to the target vs. competitor, based on the complex
model for the Communi cati on×Cong r uenc y×Tr i al Number interaction. Error bars
represent confidence intervals.
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B.6 Graphs for the pupil dilation analysis
Congruent Incongruent Novel













Figure B.6: Raw data of the averaged pupil dilations measurements. Grey lines indicate
the baseline measurement.



































Figure B.7: Baseline-corrected change in pupil dilation measurements for the investigated
Outcome×Communi cati on interaction.
Congruent Incongruent Novel
















Figure B.8: Boxplot of the mean over time baseline-corrected change in pupil dilation for






C.1 Pre-registration with aspredicted.org
Please turn over
CONFIDENTIAL - FOR PEER-REVIEW ONLY
OSTSEG – Structural information provided by ostensive-referential communic (#5771)
Created: 09/29/2017 06:17 AM (PT)
Shared:   06/18/2018 08:05 AM (PT)
This pre-registration is not yet public. This anonymized copy (without author names) was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review. A
non-anonymized version (containing author names) will become publicly available only if an author makes it public. Until that happens the contents
of this pre-registration are confidential.
1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
No, no data have been collected for this study yet.
2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
We are interested in whether toddlers use ostensive signals, such as direct gaze and infant-directed speech to segment actions and determine which
parts of a two-stage action sequence are worth imitating. 
Caregivers often use ostensive signals, such as direct gaze and infant directed speech to communicate with their infants and transmit new and
relevant information (Csibra, 2010). A large part of research investigated the effect that communicative signals have on infants’ interpretation of
actions (e.g. Nielsen, 2006; Király et al., 2013). However, ostensive signals and communicative interactions also provide lower level, structural
information. Parents use direct gaze particularlyat event boundaries (Brand et al., 2007) and adapt the use of their signals to the infant’s knowledge
by providing younger infants with fewer, but longer gaze (Brand et al., 2007). Furthermore, brief periods of direct gaze disrupt visual working
memory (Wang & Apperly, 2016), making ostensive signals ideal candidates in breaking up a stream of events.
Previous research already indicates that segmenting a stream of events is an important part of making sense and anticipating event sequences (Zacks
et al., 2001, 2007, 2009; Sonne et al., 2016; Baldwin et al., 2001). The coarseness and detail of action segmenting in itself provides important
information about an agents’ goals and intentions (Zacks, 2004). Research in infants has shown that interrupting event sequences mid-stream, rather
than at boundaries, makes infants perceive these events as novel (Baldwin et al., 2001).
The methodology is based on Carpenter et al. (2005) and Southgate et al. (2009) who demonstrated a toy animal moving to a house, either by
hopping or sliding the animal across a playing field. Toddlers in Carpenter et al. (2005) were either presented with the action of sliding/hopping and
the goal outcome of moving the animal into the house, or no observable goal outcome. In Southgate et al. (2009) infants were either told about the
action’s outcome before the demonstration or received an action-irrelevant piece of information. 
However, instead of conveying the goal of the action linguistically, we use an ostensive signals to mark the boundary after the sliding/hopping action
and before putting the animal into the house to segment the action. Such a cue may provide low level information that segments the hopping/sliding
action into two separate events.We expect that, if toddlers use direct gaze and/or infant directed speech to segment and chunk events, toddlers in
the boundary-marked condition will show higher manner imitation compared to the unmarked condition. 
We expect that, if toddlers exploit direct gaze and/or infant directed speech to segment and chunk events, toddlers in the boundary-marked
condition will show higher manner imitation compared to the unmarked condition.
3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
We are interested in two dependent variables: 
1. How many toddlers (in percent) imitate the manner of the action? (i.e. hopping or sliding action) 
2. How many toddlers (in percent) imitate the goal of the action? (i.e. putting the animal into the house)
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
We will have two conditions, in a between-subjects design.
Participants
We aim to test 18-month-old toddlers (same age as in Southgate et al., 2009, Carpenter et al., 2005)
Materials and Methods. 
An adult experimenter presents the toys to the infant and they can play with the animals for one minute. Afterwards, the experimenter removes the
animals by placing them into a small box and draws the child’s attention to the house. 
The modelling phase begins with the experimenter greeting the child in and saying ‘Look, I’m going to show you what the (animal) does’. The
experimenter takes one animal and moves it across the table either in a sliding or hopping action. In the in the boundary marked condition, the
experimenter looks up to the child and says “Wow!” between the sliding action and putting the animal into the house. In the boundary unmarked
condition, the experimenter puts the animal into the house, before looking at the infant and saying “Wow!”. Following the presentation, the
experimenter concludes the modelling phases by saying ‘Look, the (animal) went into the house’, and passes the mat with house and the animal to
the child, and encourages them to play with it by saying ‘Now it’s your turn!’. If toddlers do not pick up the animal, the experimenter prompts the
child again by saying ‘What are you going to do with the (animal)?’. A trial is concluded if an infant gives a clear response by leaving the animal on the
mat, leave it in the house, return it to the experimenter, or if a child does not touch the animal for 60 seconds. If an infant does not respond within
60 seconds, the experimenter requests the animal from them. If the infant then puts the animal into the house or returns the animal in a hop-
ping/sliding motion, these will be coded as valid responses. However, trials where the infant only returns the animal to the experimenter will not be
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counted. 
Toddlers will be presented with four different trials, each using a different animal. Based on piloting by Southgate et al. (2009), the order of the
action manners will be fixed (slide, hop, hop, slide), as toddlers had an inclination to prefer the hopping action. Each action will be accompanied by a
sound.
5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
We aim to conduct two t-tests of the number of imitation for the manner and the goal location scores. We will also conduct two Bayesian t-tests to
investigate whether there is evidence that there is no difference between groups.
6) Any secondary analyses?
n/a
7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the
number will be determined.
Based on similar research, we aim to test twenty children / condition, forty children in total. This does not include children that meet the exclusion
criteria specified below.
8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., data exclusions, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
We will be using the same exclusion criteria as Southgate et al. (2009) and (Carpenter et al., 2005) and exclude children who are (a) uncooperative
and refuse to touch the mouse (b) hand the mouse back to the experimenter, (c) return the mouse to the experimenter, (d) cry or are otherwise
fussy. We will also exclude trials with parental interference and with experimenter error (e.g. E did not mark the conditions). 
Based on the outcome of this study, we are planning a series of follow up studies to investigate whether other signals, beyond direct gaze and
infant-directed speech, may have a similar function.
Verify authenticity:http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=gi4dg4 
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